JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The only question in this case is whether there were any arrears of revenue due, which would justify the sale which has taken place. This is a second appeal, and we must accept the facts as found by the lower Appellate Court. The difficulty arose as to the non-payment of the January kist for the year 1899:--the last day for the payment of that kist was the 12th of January and it was not paid. But on the 27th of February 1899, a notification was issued from the office of the Collector in these terms :--"It is hereby notified under secs. 5 and 13 of Act IX of 1859 that if arrears of revenue mentioned below be not paid on or before the 28th of March, i.e., the next latest day for payment of revenue, the under mentioned Mehals or share or shares thereof lying within District Faridpur shall be sold by auction for the said arrears in the office of the Collector of the said District at 11 A.M. of the next sale day." The Judge in the Court below finds that that notification was issued--the arrear was a very petty sum of Rs. 1-6-11 p.--some two or three days before the 28th of March. The present Appellants, the Plaintiffs, who are seeking to set aside the sale, remitted a sum of Rs. 3.7 as. to the Collector, and the Collector received it on the 28th March. He appropriated that sum of Rs. 3.7 as, to the payment of the March kist, the last day for the payment of which was also the 28th March, and not to the payment of the small arrear of the January kist. The question turns upon whether payment of Rs. 3.7 as. ought to have been appropriated to the January kist which was in arrear or to the March kist: if to the former, there would have been no arrear to justify the sale. The Plaintiffs when remitting the money did not expressly intimate that the payment was to be applied to the discharge of the January kist. Then the question arises whether the circumstances imply that the payment was to be applied to the discharge of the arrears of the January kist. I think the circumstances raise such implication. The Plaintiffs when remitting the money did not expressly intimate that the payment was to be applied to the discharge of the January kist. Then the question arises whether the circumstances imply that the payment was to be applied to the discharge of the arrears of the January kist. I think the circumstances raise such implication. The fact of the above notice having been sent and having been received telling the Plaintiffs that, unless they pay the arrears on or before the 28th of March, the property would be sold, the fact that they paid it so that it was received on that day, and with the object of its being received on that day, implies that the Plaintiffs intended the payment to be treated as made in respect of the January kist. No intention or notice had been given to them about the March kist. The March kist amounted to about Rs. 9 so that the amount sent was substantially below the amount of that kist and was a little in excess of the small arrears of the January kist. The probabilities appear to be greatly in favour of the view that the payment was made in respect of the January kist and it ought to be treated as paid in respect of that kist. In that view, the money was in the coffer of the Collector on the 28th March, the last day for payment; and there was consequently no default which would warrant a sale. We have been referred to a case of Ganga Bishen Singh v. Mahomed Jan 10 C.W.N. 948 : s.c. ILR 33 Cal. 1193 (1906), where it was held that secs. 59 and 60 of the Indian Contract Act do not apply to transactions in relation to realisation of land revenue. Speaking with great respect, I am doubtful as to the soundness of that decision. If these sections do not apply, what law does apply. There is nothing specific on the subject in Act XI of 1859. If secs. 59 and 60 of the Contract Act do not apply, we must fall back upon the general law and practically that law is embodied in these sections. 3. For these reasons, I think the appeal must succeed and the sale must be set aside. 4. The Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in all the Courts. This judgment, it is conceded, will govern App. 3. For these reasons, I think the appeal must succeed and the sale must be set aside. 4. The Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in all the Courts. This judgment, it is conceded, will govern App. No. 1683 of 1906, which is accordingly allowed with costs in all the Courts. Doss, J. I agree.