JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - This is a rule calling upon the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta and upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of dismissal of the complaint should not be set aside and a further enquiry directed to be made. It is argued in the first place, on behalf of the opposite party, that we have no jurisdiction to Interfere with the order of the Presidency Magistrate. The question of jurisdiction has been considered both with reference to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and of the Charter Act. I need not discuss the question whether we have the necessary power under the Criminal Procedure Code. That question has been the subject of conflict of decisions as appears from the cases reported in Colville v. Kristo Kishore I. L. R. 26 Cal. 746 (1899) and Emperor v. Varjivandas I. L. R. 27 Bom. 84 (1902) deciding the question in the affirmative [see also as regards the position of the Presidency Magistrate Liakat Hossein v. The Emperor 12 C. W. N. 246 (1907)] and from the cases reported in Charoobala v. Barendra I. L. R. 27 Cal. 126 (1899), Debi Bux v. Jutmal I. L. R. 83 Cal. 1282 (1906) and Kedar Nath Sanyal v. Khetter Nath Hitter 6 C. L. J. 705 (1907) deciding the question in the negative. I say it is unnecessary to consider whether we have power under the Criminal Procedure Code, because, without deciding one way or other and assuming for the purpose of argument that the Code does not give us power, I am clearly of opinion that we have jurisdiction under the provisions of the Charter Act. This, however, has been contested and reliance has been placed upon the following observations of Mitra, J., In the case reported in Kedar Nath Sanyal v. Khetter Nath Mitter 6 C. L. J. 705 (1907)--" Sec. 15 of the Charter Act, however, gives us a limited jurisdiction. We can exercise that power only in cases of non-exercise or illegal exercise of jurisdiction. We cannot set aside the order of discharge made by the Presidency Magistrate, merely on a consideration of the evidence in the case. We are, therefore, of opinion that this is not a case in which we may exercise our powers under sec. 15 of the Charter Act and direct a further enquiry. We cannot set aside the order of discharge made by the Presidency Magistrate, merely on a consideration of the evidence in the case. We are, therefore, of opinion that this is not a case in which we may exercise our powers under sec. 15 of the Charter Act and direct a further enquiry. The rule is accordingly discharged." It is possible that my learned brother did not use the word " can " in its strict sense and did not, by these observations, mean to absolutely exclude the Court's power of interference in any but the cases mentioned. But, if he did, and the language appears to bear this meaning, I must, with all respect, express my dissent. Other Judges have, on other occasions, repeatedly refused to make any declaration limiting their powers under the Charter. It is one thing to say that the Court will not ordinarily interfere except in the cases stated and it is another thing to say that it can never interfere but in those cases. For my part, I am of opinion that there is no form of judicial injustice which this Court, if need be, cannot reach. It would be unfortunate if it were otherwise. I may add that injustice may equally be done where persons, in fact guilty, are improperly acquitted or discharged as well as where innocent persons are convicted. In the decision reported in Charoobala v. Barendra I. L. R. 27 Cal. 126 (1899) it is stated with reference to our power under the Charter that " that section (sec 15) has always been interpreted in a very extended meaning so as to give us ample power of superintendence, that is to say, powers of revision over proceedings of the subordinate courts." I may also refer to an unreported decision--which I remember and which was referred to at the bar--R. v. Rye Charan Pal Unreported. in which Banerjee and Handley, JJ., after consideration of the evidence directed the Presidency Magistrate to make further enquiry into a case which was subsequently committed to the Sessions held by this Court. These decisions do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided the case in Kedar Nath Sanyal v. Khetter Nath Mitter 6 C. L. J. 705 (1907). I am therefore of opinion that we have jurisdiction to interfere in this case. These decisions do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided the case in Kedar Nath Sanyal v. Khetter Nath Mitter 6 C. L. J. 705 (1907). I am therefore of opinion that we have jurisdiction to interfere in this case. The next question is--should we do so. What the Magistrate appears to have done is this-- he put a few question to the complainant and then, without further examination of the prosecutor and without allowing him an opportunity of proving his case, passed the following order : " Says (i.e., prosecutor says) he did not understand he was being cheated until accused ran away on 19th December. This shows that there was only a vague understanding as regards repayment. Civil matter --dismissed--sec. 203." In my opinion the Magistrate has disposed of the complaint too hastily and has given reasons which are neither conclusive nor even good. A complainant does well to avoid the making of hasty charges. But subsequent facts may disclose to him the criminal character of past actions. I do not wish to be understood as deciding any thing one way or other as to the truth of the facts of this case. But for the limited purpose of this application, the facts alleged must be assumed to be true. It may well be that at the time that the alleged promise was broken the complainant did not understand that he had been cheated. The subsequent conduct, however, of the accused may have convinced him that there was an intention to cheat when the money was obtained. It is alleged that it was falsely stated that no silver had been taken from the bank. It is also alleged that silver bars were in fact afterwards taken from the bank and that the accused, instead of making them over to the complainant, dealt with them himself by raising money on the security of these bars with another party. It is further stated that the accused set up various false pretexts from time to time and ultimately absconded from Calcutta. Now, whatever the effect of these various allegations (if proved) may be, It is obvious that they and the other circumstances alleged are facts which should be enquired into and considered upon the charge which had been made by the complainant. Now, whatever the effect of these various allegations (if proved) may be, It is obvious that they and the other circumstances alleged are facts which should be enquired into and considered upon the charge which had been made by the complainant. I am of opinion that on the facts disclosed there has not been a proper adjudication and that there should be further enquiry. 2. There is one other matter to which I wish to draw attention. I observe in this as in all other cases which have come before me that the Presidency Magistrate says that he has no cause to show. A Magistrate by so stating may either mean that there is nothing to be said against the rule being made absolute or that he has in his judgment said all that he wished to say and that he has nothing to add to it. But the making of such a reply to a Rule in all cases appears to me, (except upon the assumption that the orders complained of are always wrong), to be not the proper manner of dealing with this Court's orders. If there is cause to show, this Court is entitled to require that that cause be shown by the officer to whom the rule is directed in order that he may thus assist the Court in its determination. 3. I would therefore make the rule absolute. Geidt, J. I agree. I only wish to add that when the Magistrate said that he had no cause to show I understand he meant to say that he has no further reason to give than what Is stated in his order.