Judgement Consolidated Appeals from five decrees of the High Court (April 29, 1903) reversing five decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly (March 30, 1900) and giving to the respondents the absolute possession with mesne profits of the properties respectively comprised in their suits, all Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 138 ( 1908- 1909) Munshi Karim-Ud-Din V. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 57 of them situated in the province of rohilkund, within British India. The appellants defended titles derived from one Jai Chand Rai, who claimed under a conveyance in his favour in 1869 from the respondents mother, Mewa Kunwar, who at the time represented the estate of her father, Daulat Singh, and died in 1899. The respondents sued as maternal grandsons and reversionary heirs of Daulat Singh, alleging that they were not bound by Mewa Kunwars conveyance of 1869, and that the same only affected her life interest. Daulat Singh was the predeceased son of Raja Ratan Singh, who died in 1851, a few months after his son. When the succession to Raja Ratans estate, including the properties in suit, opened on the death of his widow in 1858, Khairati Lal, his daughters son, claimed as sole heir. Mewa Singh and her sister contended that, as Ratan Singh had been converted to Mahomedanism in 1845, his estate was at that date forfeited to his son Daulat, who died its exclusive owner ; his two daughters succeeding thereto as his heiresses on the death of his widow, Sen Kunwar, in 185.8, On July 21, 1860, a compromise was effected, under which Khairati Lal took a 7 1/2 anna share, Mewa Kunwar a 4 ¼ anna share, and her sister Chatar Kunwar a 4 ¼ anna share, a complete partition being carried out on December 15 in the same year. The compromise of 1860 was executed by Khairati Lal and the two daughters of Daulat Singh and was in the following terms — " Whereas there was a dispute amongst us, the executants, as regards all the properties movable, immovable, ancestral and self-acquired, owned, possessed and left by Raja Ratan Singh, deceased, in charge of the Court of Wards, situate in the districts of Bans Bareilly, Pilibhit, Shahjahanpur, Budaun, &c. (and) in the Province of Oudh ; we have, whilst in the perfect enjoyment of our senses, and without being under any kind of compulsion or coercion, come to amicable terms in the presence of Mr. John Inglis, Collector of Bareilly, and agreed to regard the whole of the property as if it were one rupee and to divide it into the following shares 7 ½ annas as the share of Rai Khairati Lal, 4 ¼ annas as the share of Rani Chatar Kunwar, and 4 ¼ annas as the share of rani Mewa Kunwar. According to these rates the whole of the property shall be divided amongst us agreeably to an arbitration (punchait). We shall not retract from the partition referred to above. If we put forward any claim in contravention of the partition we will be held to be false before the revenue and civil authorities. These few words have been written by way of an agreement in order that they may serve as evidence and be of use when needed." The respondents claiming in this suit under Daulat Singh alleged that his widow, Sen Kunwar, gave to their paternal grand father, Jai Chand Rai, a bond dated October 4, 1857, for Rs. 51,369 " without any lawful necessity " ; that Jai Chand on June 9, 1868, obtained a decree thereon against their mother, Mewa Kunwar, at the time the surviving daughter of their maternal grandfather, who on December 13, 1869, transferred several villages to Jai Chand Rai, who subsequently conveyed some of them to the appellants or their predecessors. They contended that only the life interest of their mother passed by the transactions. They contended that only the life interest of their mother passed by the transactions. The written statements, besides pleading that Daulat Singh had never been the owner in possession of the properties in suit, contended further that, if his title were established, the respondents and their paternal grandfather, Jai Chand Rai, were members of a joint Hindu family, Jai Chand being the manager, and that the respondents were bound by his conveyances, the consideration money having been received by the joint family to which the respondents belonged; also that there was a justifying necessity for the loans by Jai Chand to Sen Kunwar, and the respondents were bound by the decree which he obtained against their mother. The appellants were purchasers from Jai Chand in good faith, and the respondents claim was barred by Act IV. of 1882, s. 41. Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 138 ( 1908- 1909) Munshi Karim-Ud-Din V. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 58 The conveyance relied on by the appellants was evidenced by a petition filed by Mewa Kunwar on December 13, 1869, by way of compromise in the execution proceedings by Jai Chand to enforce his decree of June 9, 1868. It was as follows " In the above case a settlement and compromise has been made between the decree holder and the judgment debtor in this way that the decree holder should in lieu of the decree money due to him take from the petitioner judgment debtor the property in the following revenue-paying zamindari and also perpetual muafi villages owned and possessed by the judgment debtor together with the mesne profits for rabi 1277 Fasli and enter into possession as a proprietor like the petitioner. Under this petition Jai Chand obtained possession of the villages in suit, which Mewa Kunwar had derived under the partition of 1860. The Subordinate Judge held that Raja Ratan Singh did not forfeit his title on his conversion, but continued full owner till his death. Otherwise his possession became adverse to Daulat Singh and his heirs, and his widow, Raj Kunwar, continued in adverse possession and acquired absolute ownership, which she transmitted to her daughters son Khairati Lal, from whom the daughters of Daulat Singh acquired under the said compromise of July 21, 1860, by transfer an absolute title. Otherwise his possession became adverse to Daulat Singh and his heirs, and his widow, Raj Kunwar, continued in adverse possession and acquired absolute ownership, which she transmitted to her daughters son Khairati Lal, from whom the daughters of Daulat Singh acquired under the said compromise of July 21, 1860, by transfer an absolute title. He did not therefore deal with the issues which related to justifying necessity and to the respondents being bound by Jai Chands conveyances (see I. L. R. 25 Allah. 546), The High Court held that Ratan Singh by his conversion became under Hindu law civilly dead, and that all his property at once devolved on his son Daulat Singh, to whom his daughters eventually succeeded; that Mewa Kunwar in 1869 could and did only transfer her widows estate in the properties in suit; and " that no facts had been proved which in our opinion could have justified Sen Kunwar in imposing a permanent burden on her husbands estate under the plea of legal necessity." The material part of the judgment is as follows " No facts have been proved which in our opinion would have justified Rani Sen Kunwar in imposing a permanent burden on her husbands estate under the guise of legal necessity. The bond which forms the root of the respondents title was executed by Rani Sen Kunwar at Lucknow in October, 1857, during the height of the Mutiny disturbances there and a few weeks before her death. There is reason to believe from papers on the record that she was at the time somewhat weak in intellect. There was no reason why she should have wanted to raise such a large sum of money as Rs. 51,369. There were no ancestral debts to pay, there were no creditors of the deceased husband pressing for pay ment, there were no demands on her for payment of Government revenue. The estate she claimed was under the management of the Court of Wards, which no doubt provided for her household expenses as is the invariable rule in estates taken under its management after she was released from the custody of the King of Oudhs officials. Admittedly the bond in question did not purport to create any charge or incumbrance on her husbands estate. He knew nothing about that instrument. Admittedly the bond in question did not purport to create any charge or incumbrance on her husbands estate. He knew nothing about that instrument. We do not know what were its terms, nor from what sources rani Sen Kunwar contracted to repay the alleged loan, nor for what purposes she raised money. All we know is that there was such a bond, and that when it was sued on one of the defendants, rani Mewa Kunwar, daughter-in-law of the plaintiff Jai Chand, confessed judgment, while her sister Rani Chatar stoutly resisted the claim. Was Rani Mewa Kunwar then justified in transferring— to the detriment of her sons the plaintiffs—permanently any portion of the estate she had inherited from her father to satisfy such a claim ? We think not. She of course could transfer her own life interest in any manner she pleased, but nothing more. That interest is, we think, all she did transfer to Jai Chand by her petition of December 13, 1869. And this seems also to have been her opinion, for in that petition she purports to transfer the villages therein scheduled to her judgment creditor Jai Chand to enter into possession as proprietor like the petitioner.’ Now the status of the petitioner, i.e., Rani Mewa Kunwar, was that of a limited owner entitled to a life estate. Under the wording of the petition that was the estate she transferred to Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 138 ( 1908- 1909) Munshi Karim-Ud-Din V. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 59 her father-in-law. That also is the estate she successfully claimed in her litigation with her sisters husband. That estate determined on her death, and thereupon the right of Jai Chand and of his assignees to continue to hold any portion of the estate by virtue of Rani Mewa Kunwars assignment came to an end. If by her petition of December 13, 1869, she intended to convey a larger estate, we need only say again that she had no power to convey more than her life estate, no legal necessity being shewn for a permanent transfer.” Cowell, for the appellants, contended that the respondents were bound by Mewa Singhs transfer to Jai Chand. They were maternal grandsons of Daulat Singh, whose representatives were the judgment debtors and vendors, and they were also paternal grandsons of the judgment creditor and purchaser. They were maternal grandsons of Daulat Singh, whose representatives were the judgment debtors and vendors, and they were also paternal grandsons of the judgment creditor and purchaser. The evidence proved justifying necessity for Jai Chands loans to Sen Kunwar, who was shewn to have been in distress and involved in litigation as to her husbands title, and that the decree against Daulat Singhs daughters and a later decree against Mewa Singh, the surviving daughter, had been duly obtained. The onus probandi was heavily on the respondents to prove the contrary and no evidence had been given. The transfer of 1869 passed the absolute estate on its true construction. It did not in any event purport to pass less than the right title and interest of Mewa Singh, who, as representing her father, was for the purposes of Jai Chands decree possessed of an absolute estate see Jugol Kishore v. Jotindra Mohun Tagore (( 1884) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 66.); Ishan Chunder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagur (( 1863) Marshalls Rep. 614.); General Manager of Raj Durbhunga v. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Sing (( 1872) 14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 605, 617.); Bissessur Lall Sahoo v. Luchmessur Singh (( 1879) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 233, 238.); Transfer of Property Act, s. 41. As to the title taken by Daulat Singh in the properties in suit under the compromise of July, 1860, see Mewa Koonwer v. Lalla Oudh Beharee Lall (( 1867) 2 Agra H. C. Rep. 311; S. C. in appeal, ( 1868) 3 Agra H. C. 017. Rep. 83.); Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar. (( 1874) L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 157.) De Gruyther, K.C, and Dube, for the respondents, contended that the High Court was right in holding that there was no evidence of justifying necessity for the loans alleged to have been made by Jai Chand to Sen Kunwar. There was no evidence of the loans or that the bond had ever been executed, and it was not produced. The decree in consequence of which the conveyance of 1869 was made was obtained on the admission of Mewa Singh after the death of her sister, and it must be presumed to have been made under the influence of Jai Chand Singh, who was her father-in-law. It was not binding on the respondents. The decree in consequence of which the conveyance of 1869 was made was obtained on the admission of Mewa Singh after the death of her sister, and it must be presumed to have been made under the influence of Jai Chand Singh, who was her father-in-law. It was not binding on the respondents. The respondents were the real representatives of the estate, and Daulat Singhs two daughters were not the debtors and had only succeeded to life interests in the estate. The conveyance of 1869 was not a sale in execution, but a voluntary conveyance by Mewa Singh by way of compromise, and both the intention and the effect of it and the understanding of both parties thereto were that it was limited to Mewa Singhs widows estate. Reference was made to Lala Amarnath Sah v. Rani Achan Kuar. (( 1892) L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 196.) Cowell, in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The five actions in ejectment, which have been consolidated for the purposes of these appeals, all raise the same question. The plaintiffs (the present respondents) in each case are the sons of Rani Mewa Kunwar, deceased ; and the defendants (the present appellants) severally claim as purchasers from one Jai Chand Kai, who, in his turn, claimed to have become entitled to the property sold, in satisfaction of a decree obtained by him against the same Rani Mewa Kunwar, for money advanced by him to her mother for family purposes. The point for decision is Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 138 ( 1908- 1909) Munshi Karim-Ud-Din V. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 60 whether Rani Mewa Kunwar conveyed to Jai Chand Rai an absolute, or only a daughters, estate in the villages in suit. It is unnecessary to enter into the earlier history of this family, as it will be found summarized in the judgment of this Committee in the case of Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar. (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 157.) For the purposes of these appeals it is sufficient to state that, disputes having arisen as to the succession to the estate of one Raja Ruttun Singh, Rani Mewa Kunwars grandfather, a compromise was effected between the rival claimants, the terms of which were embodied in an agreement dated July 21, 1860. (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 157.) For the purposes of these appeals it is sufficient to state that, disputes having arisen as to the succession to the estate of one Raja Ruttun Singh, Rani Mewa Kunwars grandfather, a compromise was effected between the rival claimants, the terms of which were embodied in an agreement dated July 21, 1860. Under this agreement, the property being treated " as if it were one rupee," a share of 7 ½ annas was awarded to Khairati Lai, his grandson, a share of 4 ¼ annas to his granddaughter Rani Mewa Kunwar, and a share of 4 1/4 annas to her sister, Rani Chittar Kunwar. As to the effect of this agreement their Lordships observe that it "assumes that the parties were severally claiming by virtue of some right of inheritance the property of the Raja Ruttun Singh ; that there were questions between them which might disturb the rights which each claimed ; and it was better instead of a long litigation to settle these rights. (L. R. Ind. Ap. At p. 164.) .... The compromise is based on the assumption that there was an antecedent title of some kind in the parties, and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is." (Ibid. at p. 166.) For the purposes of the present appeals, it is necessary to inquire what was the " antecedent title" of Rani Mewa Kunwar and her sister to the property of their grandfather, which is disclosed by the agreement. In it they are described as the daughters of Kunwar Daulat Singh, and their title must be taken to have been derived through him, notwithstanding the fact that he predeceased his father. This was the view taken by Mewa Kunwar herself, when she successfully claimed to take by survivorship the share of her sister, who died on April 13, 1866, on the ground that the property in suit descended from Daulat Singh through his widow to his daughters. It is, at all events, clear that whatever may have been the original imperfection of Daulat Singhs title, that imperfection was pro tanto cured by the agreement, which secured to his daughters a considerable portion of the family estate. Assuming, then, that the daughters took a share in their grandfathers property under the agreement in right of their father, what was the nature of the estate which so devolved upon them ? Assuming, then, that the daughters took a share in their grandfathers property under the agreement in right of their father, what was the nature of the estate which so devolved upon them ? Mr. Cowell, for the appellants, argued that they took absolutely, and that the property, in their hands, must be treated as self-acquired. Mr. De Gruyther, for the respondents, contended that they took only a daughters estate, that is to say, a life interest. This was the view adopted by the learned judges of the High Court at Allahabad, who say in their judgment, " It is to us perfectly clear that the title which Mewa Kunwar and her sister claimed, and which was the title by virtue of which they took the 8h annas of the property under the agreement with Raja Khairati Lal, and by virtue of which Mewa Kunwar subsequently defeated her sisters husband, was that they, as daughters of Daulat Singh, were entitled to succeed to a daughters estate in his property on the death of their . mother as a single heir, with a right of survivorship inter se." With some hesitation, their Lordships have come to the conclusion that this is the correct view. Turning now to the transaction between Rani Mewa Kunwar and Jai Chand Rai, upon which the title of the appellants is based, it appears from the judgment of this Committee already referred to (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. At p. 160.) that, after the death of Raja Ruttun Singh, " questions arising out of this alleged conversion to Mahomedanism of the Rajah, and respecting the confiscation [of his estate in Oudh by the King of Oudh] were contested between the widows of the deceased Ruttun Singh and of his son, Daulat Singh; and after their deaths, the controversies were renewed between Khairati Lal and Mewa Kunwar and her sister." Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 138 ( 1908- 1909) Munshi Karim-Ud-Din V. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 61 These controversies were put an end to by the agreement of July 21, 1860 ; but as Ruttun Singh died on September 14, 1851, the litigation lasted for nearly nine years, and, as the estate was large, the expenses were correspondingly heavy. 36 Ind. App. 138 ( 1908- 1909) Munshi Karim-Ud-Din V. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 61 These controversies were put an end to by the agreement of July 21, 1860 ; but as Ruttun Singh died on September 14, 1851, the litigation lasted for nearly nine years, and, as the estate was large, the expenses were correspondingly heavy. To meet these and other expenses, Sen Kunwar, Daulat Singhs widow, is alleged to have borrowed from Jai Chand Rai, in the six years from September, 1851, to October, 1857, sums amounting to Rs. 51,366—upon which Rs. 20,528 were due for interest— and to have executed in his favour a bond for Rs. 51,369 and a mortgage deed for Rs. 20,525. In 1861 Jai Chand Rai brought a suit upon the mortgage deed in the District Court at Bareilly against Sen Kunwars two daughters, Chittar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar, which, on appeal to the Sadr Court at Agra, was decided in his favour, the learned judges holding that there could be " no question then as to the validity of the consideration for which the deed in suit was executed," and that the loan had not been exclusively made on account of the litigation between Raj Kunwar and Sen Kunwar in the British Courts, but it might " be reasonably believed that portions of it were applied to the recovery from attachment of Ratan Singhs property in Lucknow, and to the maintenance of the family in a style suited to their social position and antecedents." It should be mentioned that, although Mewa Kunwar did not contest this claim, it was hotly contested by Chittar Kunwar upon every possible ground, and that there was no appeal against this decision. In 1865 Jai Chand Rai brought a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge at Lucknow claiming Rs. 96,368 as due upon the bond executed by Sen Kunwar in 1857. To this suit Chittar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar were made defendants. Mewa Kunwar again admitted the claim, but Chittar Kunwar resisted it. She died, however, while the suit was pending, and eventually the full claim was admitted by Mewa Kunwar, who had inherited her sisters share, and a decree was passed accordingly. In satisfaction of this decree, Mewa Kunwar, with the sanction of the Court, assigned certain villages, including those in question in this suit, to the judgment creditor. She died, however, while the suit was pending, and eventually the full claim was admitted by Mewa Kunwar, who had inherited her sisters share, and a decree was passed accordingly. In satisfaction of this decree, Mewa Kunwar, with the sanction of the Court, assigned certain villages, including those in question in this suit, to the judgment creditor. In her petition to the Court, for permission to settle the claim in this way, she says that the judgment creditor is to "enter into possession as a proprietor like the petitioner," and it was suggested at the bar that this meant that he was to take her life estate only; but as there is a previous statement in the same document that the villages to be transferred were "owned and possessed " by her, the more reasonable construction is that she intended to convey an absolute estate. The question remains, Was the debt which was due to Jai Chand Rai a debt which, according to Hindu law, Mewa Kunwar was justified in paying ? It was a debt which her mother, the widow of Daulat Singh, had incurred for family purposes, and of which the family had had the benefit; for the result of the litigation, which could not have been carried on without borrowed money, was the compromise which secured to the family a large share of the estate. The preservation of the estate, and the costs of litigation for that purpose, are objects which justify a widow in incurring debt and alienating a sufficient amount of the property to discharge it. (Mayne, Hindu Law, 7th ed., par. 327.) Moreover, the general principle of Hindu law, that he who takes the estate becomes liable for the debts of the estate, is especially applicable in a case like the present, where, but for the debt, the estate would have been lost to the respondents. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these appeals should be allowed, the decrees of the High Court discharged with costs, and the decrees of the Subordinate Judge in the five original suits restored. The respondents must pay the costs of the appeals.