Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Chief Court (March 12, 1907) reversing a decree of the same Court in its original jurisdiction (May 1, 1906). The sole question at issue was whether the appellant was the adopted daughter of one U Mya, deceased. U Mya, a Burman Buddhist, died at Rangoon on April 19, 1905, leaving the appellant, who claimed as his adopted daughter, and his two sisters, the respondents. The appellant was the daughter of U Nyein and Ma Ka, both of whom died—U Nyein about 1896, and Ma Ka in November, 1900. Ma Ka was U Myas sister, and the appellants case was that during Ma Kas last illness she asked her brother to take care of appellant, and that he promised that he would look after her as his daughter; that after Ma Kas death he did in fact treat her in every way as his daughter ; that he gave up his own house in Rangoon and lived with her up to the time of his death in her house, and that he informed a number of people that she was his daughter, or Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 192 ( 1908- 1909) Ma Ywet V. Ma Me 90 adopted daughter. It was also proved that before his death he consulted several persons as to what he should do to ensure appellant getting his property, and that he was on bad terms with respondents, with whom he had business disputes. The proceeding in which the appeal was brought arose in the form of a contest as to whether appellant or respondents were nearest of kin to U Mya and, as such, entitled to letters of administration to his estate. On May 25, 1905, the respondents applied to the Chief Court of Lower Burma for letters of administration to the estate of U Mya as being his sisters and sole heirs. On June 9, 1905, a caveat was filed on behalf of the appellant, and on June 19, 1905, the Court ordered the matter to be tried as a regular suit, this being the ordinary procedure where applications for probate or letters of administration are contested. On July 4, 1905, the appellant filed an application praying that letters of administration might be granted to her, and on July 10, 1905, the Court ordered the two cases to be tried together. On July 4, 1905, the appellant filed an application praying that letters of administration might be granted to her, and on July 10, 1905, the Court ordered the two cases to be tried together. On May 1, 190G, the Chief Court found that the appellant had proved the adoption and ordered letters of administration to be issued to her. The Court relied on the appellants relationship to the deceased, the deceaseds promise to her mother, his leaving his own house and residing with the appellant after Ma Kas death, his proved affection for her and proved desire that she should inherit his property to the exclusion of the respondents, and his references to her before witnesses as his adopted daughter. The Appellate Court reversed this finding on the ground that though no particular ceremony is required for adoption among Burman Buddhists, yet some overt act or speech on the part of the person adopting is necessary, and that the fact of the adoption must be shewn to be public and notorious, and that in this case there was no proof of any overt act or of notoriety. The Appellate Court accordingly ordered that letters of administration should issue to respondents. De Gruyther, K.C., and Eddis, for the appellant, contended that the fact of the adoption was sufficiently established. The probabilities were strongly in favour of it, and it was contended that the overt act on the part of the adopter and the notoriety of the adoption were also proved. Reference was made to Ma Me Gale v. Ma Sa Yi(( 1904) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 72, 75.); Ma Gun v. Ma Gun (( 1874) 1 Chantoons L. C. on Buddhist Law, 147.); Ma Bwin v. Ma Yin (( 1879) Ibid. 151.); Mating Aing v. Ma Kin (( 1893) Ibid. 157, 161.); Ma Mein Gale v. Ma Kin (( 1893) Ibid. 168, 170, 172.); Ma Gyan v. Maung Kywin (( 1895) Ibid. 393.); Mali Thine v. Bah Pe(( 1897) 2 Ibid. 53.); Ma Sa Yi v. Ma Me Gale (( 1901) 2 Ibid. 181 ; reversed in ( 1904) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 72.); and Ma Tax Shwe v. Kan Gezi (( 1899) 2 Upper Burma Rep. 142.), and Chantoons Principles of Buddhist Law, pp. 83, 84. The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DUNEDIN. 181 ; reversed in ( 1904) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 72.); and Ma Tax Shwe v. Kan Gezi (( 1899) 2 Upper Burma Rep. 142.), and Chantoons Principles of Buddhist Law, pp. 83, 84. The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DUNEDIN. The only question in this appeal is whether Ma Ywet, the appellant, has proved that she was the adopted daughter of the late U Mya, who died in 1905. If she was, then she inherits U Myas estate. If not, that estate is inherited by the respondents, Ma Me and Ma Mi, the sisters of the deceased. Ma Ywet is the daughter of Ma Ka, who was another sister of U Mya. Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 192 ( 1908- 1909) Ma Ywet V. Ma Me 91 Ma Ka died in 1900, and up to that time there was no question of adoption, as Ma Ywet took out letters of administration to her mother as her child. The story of the appellant is that, on the death-bed of her mother, her uncle U Mya promised her mother to adopt her, and that after her death he did so. Admittedly there was no specific occasion on which this was done by any quasi-ceremony or in presence of any witnesses or other persons. It is said, however, that he acknowledged to other persons the fact that he had adopted her, and that his life and conduct in relation to her were consistent with the fact. This is denied by the respondents. The learned judge on the original side, before whom the suit depended, found that the appellant had sufficiently proved the fact of adoption; but this judgment was reversed on appeal, the learned judges of the Appellate Court holding that the appellant had failed to make out her case. It has already been laid down by this Board that, according to the law of Burma, no formal ceremony is necessary to constitute adoption. One may go further and say "that, though adoption is a fact, that fact can either be proved as having taken place on a distinct and specified occasion, or may be inferred from a course of conduct which is inconsistent with any other supposition. One may go further and say "that, though adoption is a fact, that fact can either be proved as having taken place on a distinct and specified occasion, or may be inferred from a course of conduct which is inconsistent with any other supposition. But in either case publicity must be given to the relationship, and it is evident that the amount of proof of publicity required will be greater in cases of the latter category, when no distinct occasion can be appealed to. The present case is one of these, and it is on the question of the want of publicity that the learned fudges of the Court of Appeal have (Offered from the judge of original jurisdiction. In many cases the inference of the relationship existing, and the publicity of the relationship itself, may naturally be taken from the facts of the life of the parties apart from the verbal statements of those concerned. Thus when a child who has natural parents leaves those parents and its own home, and is brought up in the house of another who treats it as a father would a child, the inference is not difficult to draw, and the facts from which that inference is drawn are public facts necessarily known to all the persons friends and acquaintances. Some of the decided cases are instances of this sort. In the present case such considerations are unavailable, because before adoption is alleged to have taken place Ma Ywet was thirty years old, was an orphan, and, as the niece of a childless uncle, was a natural person to live with him. Accordingly the evidence of the publicity of the relationship alleged really comes to depend upon the testimony of Ma Ywet herself and the statements of the deceased U My a spoken to by some of the witnesses. The learned judges of the Appellate Court have held that the testimony falls short of being satisfactory. Their Lordships are unable to say that in their opinion the learned judges are wrong in this opinion. In the case of an adult, where the inferences to be drawn from "bringing up" are necessarily absent, and where the consequence of adoption is disinherison of those entitled to succeed by law, it is, in their Lordships view, especially necessary to insist on adequate proof. In the case of an adult, where the inferences to be drawn from "bringing up" are necessarily absent, and where the consequence of adoption is disinherison of those entitled to succeed by law, it is, in their Lordships view, especially necessary to insist on adequate proof. It would have been easy for the parties, by means of an actual, though not ceremonial, adoption in presence of witnesses, to have precluded the raising of subsequent questions. "Where that has not been done, and where the fact of adoption is left to be inferred from past statements and conduct, it is, in their Lordships opinion, a salutary rule that adequate proof of publicity or notoriety of the relationship should be insisted on. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. As the respondents have not appeared in the appeal, there will be no order as to costs.