Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (February 17, 1906) setting aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum (June 29, 1905) and dismissing the appellants action of ejectment. Mouzah Gorfalbari was the subject of the action, the soil of which had in recent years been discovered Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 63 to be fit for the construction of bricks, tiles, &c, of good quality, and accordingly had been competed for by the appellants Messrs. Burn & Co., Limited, and the respondent company. The former were alleged in the plaint to have duly taken a lease from the infant co-plaintiff, Abhiram, dated the 8th Jaista, 1511 B.S. (May 21, 1904), of the entire underground and surface rights of the said mouzah for a considerable premium and rent. The respondent company were found to be " lessees and sub-lessees under defendants and are now in actual possession of the mouzah Gorfalbari." The object of the suit was to establish a preferential title in the appellants and to eject the said company, who with their predecessors in title had been in undisturbed possession since 1860. The appellants alleged that the mouzah was dedicated as debottar property as far back as 1194 B.S. (1787) and was thereby rendered inalienable without valid and special reasons; that the infant plaintiff (their lessor) was the rightful mahant ; that the respondents were wrongfully in possession, and by virtue of s. 10 of the Limitation Act were not protected by the statute. The deed of dedication propounded purported to have been executed by Maharja Dharma, the Rajah of Pandra of that date, in favour of Bichitrananda, described as Mahant Goswami, of good character. " This deed of debottar property is executed to the following effect—Being in sound health and easy mind I do grant to you by way of lakeraj debottar (These words are corruptly written throughout for " lak hiraj " and "devatra" as pronounced in Bengal.) the entire mouzah Gorfalbari in pergunnah Pandra together with all bils jhils waste and danga lands jungles and culturable lands and whatever exists thereon. By bestowing your blessings on us you do enjoy and possess the same with great felicity. By bestowing your blessings on us you do enjoy and possess the same with great felicity. If I or any of my heirs ever dispossess you the dispossession shall be ineffectual." The title of the respondents was derived under a mokurari pottah dated 25th Magh, 1266 (February, 1860), and executed by Pranananda Mahant Goswami, a successor of Bichitrananda and a predecessor of the said infant plaintiff described as Brittibhogi holder of debottar in favour of Anangamohini Debi. It recited that the mouzah in suit was "my long-standing ancestral lakheraj debottar property (endowed ?) for the services of the deity," and then proceeded " I of my own free will do grant you this mokurari pottah of the whole mouzah" (as described) "with the exception of .... five bighas set apart for the place of repose for the deity" for a rent of Rs. 31 and a bonus of Rs. 62 "and taking a kabuliyat of the said mouzah from you." " You continue to hold and enjoy the same with the greatest comfort in any manner you please together with your sons grandsons &c. in succession on payment of the said amount of rent year by year kist by kist and month by month to me without variation." Under this grant Anangamohini and afterwards her husband Magaram Chatterji had possession of the said mouzah (except five bighas) for more than the statutory period of twelve years, and on December 14, 1877, the same was sold in execution of a decree for rent obtained by the said Pranananda Goswami against Magaram. On January 21, 1878, a certificate of purchase thereof was granted to Durgadas Chatterji, the respondent Shyama Charan Nandi, and Katazani Dasi in certain specified shares, which by subsequent assignments were all vested in defendants Nos. 1, 2, and 3, who at the date of action had themselves possessed the same for considerably more than the statutory period of twelve years. The five bighas excepted from the settlement of 1860 were made the subject of a mourasi mokurari settlement on November 2, 1896. Defendants 1, 2, and 3 were the grantees, and the grantors were the sons and widow of the said Pranananda Mahant Goswami, the consideration being a permanent rent of Rs. 50 a year and a bonus of Rs. 700. Defendants 1, 2, and 3 were the grantees, and the grantors were the sons and widow of the said Pranananda Mahant Goswami, the consideration being a permanent rent of Rs. 50 a year and a bonus of Rs. 700. On September 21, 1904, the infant plaintiff, Abhiram Goswami Mahant, as shebait of two deities named in the plaint as Raghunath Jiu and Durgamata Thakurani, and the second plaintiffs, Burn & Co., Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 64 his lessees, sued to eject the defendants from the surface and underground rights of the mouzah Gorfalbari. The plaint alleged the said dedication thereof by the Rajah of Pandra on the 11th Pous, 1194 (December, 1787), as "lakeraj debottar " for the purposes of the sheba of the thakurs, its subsequent application thereto, and management by their shebait as kurta, who was " not competent without valid and special reasons to transfer the debottar properties in any way or to make any permanent settlement thereof." It further alleged that Bichitrananda Goswami was the shebait at the date of the dedication, that Pranananda Goswami, his lineal descendant in the elder line and third generation, was subsequently mahant, and that he in turn was succeeded by his eldest son, Raghabananda, and after him by the infant plaintiff Abhiram, whose guardian learnt on inquiry that the defendants claimed to be entitled to possession subject to payment of an annual rent of Rs. 81 under settlements taken from Pranananda and his successors. These settlements, if proved by the defendants, the plaint; prayed should be declared invalid as against the thakurs and consequently annulled as ultra vires of the shebaits. The plaint also prayed for mesne profits up to recovery of possession and for three years prior to suit. There were nineteen defendants, of whom the principal were the respondents Shyama Charan Nandi and the Barakar Brick and Tile Syndicate Company, Limited. The first named with the two female defendants (his co-owners) filed a written statement on November 27, 1904. They narrated their title as above set out and submitted that, considering the nature of the interest which they had in the mouzah, Pranananda and the owners succeeding him were fully competent to grant the settlements under which they claimed. The first named with the two female defendants (his co-owners) filed a written statement on November 27, 1904. They narrated their title as above set out and submitted that, considering the nature of the interest which they had in the mouzah, Pranananda and the owners succeeding him were fully competent to grant the settlements under which they claimed. They submitted that Anangamohini Debi and her husband had acquired an indefeasible right in the disputed mouzah by virtue of their possession for more than twelve years in mokurari mourasi right; also that they themselves had subsequently acquired an indefeasible right by virtue of their possession for an additional period of more than twelve years. They also submitted that they were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, and that after their purchase they had effected considerable improvements in the disputed property on spending large sums of money to the knowledge of and without objection from the maliks. The respondent company filed a written statement on March 6, 1905, in which they contended that mouzah Gorfalbari, including the underground, being the personal property of the predecessors of plaintiff No. 1, was validly settled in mokurari with their own predecessors in title. Both the surface as well as the underground rights so settled did thereby pass to them and were and are in their possession as such, and consequently the plaintiffs had no right at all to eject. The third, fourth, and fifth issues were material in the appeal. The third raised the question of limitation, the fourth that ofdedication of the mouzah as debottar property of the idols, the fifth that of the power to grant the permanent settlement thereof under which the respondents claimed. On the third issue the Subordinate Judge found that the defendants did not claim to hold mouzah Gorfalbari adversely to the infant plaintiff, but as tenants under him on the strength of the mokurari pottah granted by the plaintiffs predecessor. He held " that it is an established principle of law that so long as the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties no question of adverse possession or limitation can arise." He held that the suit was not barred either by art. 124 or 144 of the Limitation Act of 1877. He held " that it is an established principle of law that so long as the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties no question of adverse possession or limitation can arise." He held that the suit was not barred either by art. 124 or 144 of the Limitation Act of 1877. The High Court, on the other hand, held that " a permanent mokurari lease is an alienation of the proprietary interests pro tanto, and if the property was debottar the alienation by Pranananda was beyond his legal competence, and the possession of Anangamohini Debi, the lessee, became adverse to the lessor from the date of the lease. The case would then be governed prima facie by art. 144 of the Limitation Act and the suit be barred by reason of its being brought more than twelve years after Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 65 the alienation." They found that " taking the property to be debottar Anangamohini obtained a permanent lease of the whole mouzah except the five bighas which were excepted; it was not a lease merely of any interest Pranananda as shebait might have had in the property. This was a purchase pro tanto of the property, and the lessee became the purchaser within the meaning of art. 134 of the Limitation Act." The Court added "We are of opinion that the fact that Anangamohini had notice that the property which she was acquiring in 1860 was debottar property does not preclude her from being regarded as a purchaser within the meaning of art. 134." And it held that "assign for valuable consideration" includes cases like the present, where the purchaser may have known that the property which is acquired had been originally conveyed in trust. " There is nothing to shew that the lease of 1860 was vitiated by fraud, and no attempt was made to argue the case on that ground. 134." And it held that "assign for valuable consideration" includes cases like the present, where the purchaser may have known that the property which is acquired had been originally conveyed in trust. " There is nothing to shew that the lease of 1860 was vitiated by fraud, and no attempt was made to argue the case on that ground. As far as we can judge the property was leased for its full value." As regards the defendants payment of rent under the lease they said " If they rely on the payment of rent they cannot fairly attribute it to a tenancy which was never in the contemplation of the contracting parties, but must attribute it to the lease which was the contract between the parties." On the fourth issue the Subordinate Judge found that "the disputed property mouzah Gorfalbari is the debottar property of the idols Raghunath Jiu and Durgamata, that its proceeds have all along been spent for the maintenance of the sheba of the said idols, and that it was never the personal property of the mahant Bichitrananda or his successor Pranananda." The High Court, on the other hand, said "Debottar property is property dedicated to a god or gods. In the sanad there is nothing to shew that there was such a dedication except the use of the word debottar. The grant is made to Bichitra Mahant Goswami apparently for his personal use." On the terms of the document the Court was not satisfied " that mouzah Gorfalbari had been dedicated to any idol or that the word debottar signified any more than that the grantee as a pious Brahman was to hold the land rent free." Upon the fifth issue the Subordinate Judge held that the " mokurari lease dated 25th Magh, 1266, marked Ex. L., which was granted by Pranananda Mahant, the grandfather of the infant plaintiff, without any legal necessity, is void, and that the defendants have not acquired any right thereunder to hold the property in dispute permanently against the will of the plaintiff. For similar reasons I hold that the lease of five bighas of land alleged to have been granted by the plaintiffs father marked Ex. M. is also void." The reasons were that religious endowments are not alienable except on the ground of legal necessity, and that legal necessity had been neither alleged nor proved. For similar reasons I hold that the lease of five bighas of land alleged to have been granted by the plaintiffs father marked Ex. M. is also void." The reasons were that religious endowments are not alienable except on the ground of legal necessity, and that legal necessity had been neither alleged nor proved. The High Court held that, on the assumption that the mouzah was debottar, Anangamohinis mokurari lease of 1860 was "a purchase pro tanto of the property and the lessee became the purchaser within the meaning of art. 134 of the Limitation Act," and that the fact of her having notice that it was debottar did not preclude her from being so regarded. As regards the five bighas the High Court held that the mokurari lease of 1896 under which the respondents held "was a good and valid lease of the five bighas." The material passages in the High Court judgment relative to these issues are as follows "But assuming that the sanad is as old as it professes to be, and is genuine, the next question we have to determine is whether the debottar character of the grant has been established. Debottar property is property dedicated to a god or gods. In the sanad there is nothing to shew that there was such a dedication, except the use of the word debottar. The grant is made to Bichitra Mahant Goswami apparently for his personal use. By bestowing your blessings on us you do enjoy and possess the same with great felicity. There is not a word here that the income is to be applied to the service of Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 66 any god, or in any other way than the personal enjoyment of the grantee. It is true that the latter is styled Mahant Goswami, which would prima facie indicate that he is a shebait, but the documents produced in this case from the records of a litigation that took place in 1883 shew that this is an appellation borne by the other members of the family, and the oral evidence also disclosed that it is not uncommon in the neighbourhood. Had there been any inten tion to dedicate the property to any particular idol, we should, at least, have expected, if the dedication was not made expressly to it, that Bichitrananda would have been described as the mahant or shebait of the idol to be benefited. If we had to base our finding on the terms of this document alone, we should not be satisfied that mouzah Gorfalbari had been dedicated to any idol, or that the word debottar signified anything more than that the grantee as a pious Brahman was to hold the land rent free. The grantor may very naturally have contemplated that, as a matter of fact, the profits of the property, after satisfying the personal wants of the grantee, would be devoted to the service of the god whom he worshipped and on whom he attended. Such an expectation may explain the use of the word debottar,’ but does not suffice to constitute a valid dedication to that god. As has been remarked in a similar case by Mr. Justice Mukerji, whose opinion on such a subject is entitled to great weight, the use of the word debottar is obviously not conclusive, because whether the property be absolutely dedicated to a thakur, or be secular subject to a religious charge, it would in popular language be fittingly described as debottar Ram Kanai Ghosh v. Raja Sri Sri Hari Narayan Singh Deo Bahadur. (( 1905) 2 C. L. J. 546, at p. 552.) .... "But, even if the mouzah were debottar property, we think that the suit is barred by limitation as regards the portion demised by Pranananda in 1860. A permanent mokurari lease is an alienation of the proprietary interests pro tanto, and if the property was debottar, the alienation by Pranananda was beyond his legal competence, and the possession of Anangamohini Debi, the lessee, became adverse to the lessor as from the date of the lease. The case would then be governed prima facie by art. 144 of the Limitation Act and the suit be barred by reason of its being brought more than twelve years after the alienation. This was the view taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram. (( 1899) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 69; I. L. R. 23 Madr. 144 of the Limitation Act and the suit be barred by reason of its being brought more than twelve years after the alienation. This was the view taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram. (( 1899) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 69; I. L. R. 23 Madr. 271.) It is, however, contended on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents that the article applicable is No. 134 read with s. 10 of the Limitation Act. That article refers to a suit to recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards purchased from the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration; and imposes twelve years from the date of the purchase as the period within which such a suit must be brought. Sect. 10 of the Act exempts from the operation of the Act suits against a person in whom pro perty has become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration) for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property. It is urged that in the present case Anangamohini became a mala fide purchaser, as she took the lease with notice that the property was debottar, and that the word purchased in art. 134 refers only to a bona fide purchaser. Here there was nothing to affect the lessee with notice save what appeared on the face of the lease itself. It was further urged that she did not profess to acquire an absolute title in the property, and was therefore not a purchaser within the meaning of the article just quoted. It is also argued that, as she had notice that she was purchasing what was debottar, she was not an assign for valuable consideration within the meaning of s. 10, but must be held to have acquired only the interest that the trustee himself held in the property. In sup port of these propositions reliance is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Radhanath Das v. Gisborne & Co, (( 1871) 14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 1; S. C. 15 Suth. W. R. (P.C.) 24.), and also on the decision of this Court in Ram Charan Tewary v. Protap Chandra Dutt Jha. In sup port of these propositions reliance is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Radhanath Das v. Gisborne & Co, (( 1871) 14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 1; S. C. 15 Suth. W. R. (P.C.) 24.), and also on the decision of this Court in Ram Charan Tewary v. Protap Chandra Dutt Jha. (( 1886) 2 C. L. J. 448.) In the case before the Privy Council the plaintiff sued to redeem a usufructuary mortgage, and one of the defences set up was that the suit was barred by limitation under the provisions of the law then in force (Act XIV. of 1859), the 5th section of which dealt with suits for the recovery from the purchaser, or any persons claiming under him, of any pro- Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 67 perty purchased bona fide and for valuable consideration from a trustee or mortgagee. The defendants set up that they were purchasers within the meaning of that section from a mortgagee. Their Lordships pointed out that the word purchaser in that section meant the purchaser of an absolute title and not the purchaser of the mortgage, that is of the mortgagees interest, and, on a review of the evidence in that case, decided that the defendants had only acquired the mortgagees interests and were therefore not purchasers within the meaning of the words quoted. "Now in the present case, taking the property to be debottar, Anangamohini obtained a permanent lease of the whole mouzah, except the five bighas which were excepted it was not a lease merely of any interest Pranananda as shebait might have had in the property. This was a purchase pro tanto of the property and the lessee became the purchaser within the meaning of art. 134 of the Limitation Act. No doubt, on a somewhat similar state of facts, a Divisional Bench of this Court in Ram Charan Tewary v. Protap Chandra Dutt Jha (2 C. L. J. 448.) held that the lease of debottar property did not constitute the lessee with notice that it was debottar a purchaser within the meaning of that article. We do not think this is so ; and the facts of that case are, perhaps, distinguishable from thoe now before us. We do not think this is so ; and the facts of that case are, perhaps, distinguishable from thoe now before us. "We are of opinion that the fact that Anangamohini had notice that the property which she was acquiring in 1860 was debottar property does not preclude her from being regarded as a purchaser within the meaning of art. 134. Sect. 10 has always been regarded as having a close connection with that article. In the Act of 1871 the corresponding section exempted from the operation of the law of limitation trustees and their representatives. The persons exempted under the present law are trustees and their legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration). Again art. 134 under the former Act referred to suits for property purchased from the trustee in good faith and for value. The omission of the words in good faith cannot have been otherwise than intentional, and shews that the language the assigns for valuable consideration includes cases like the present where the purchaser may have known that the pro perty which she acquired had been originally conveyed in trust. There is nothing to shew that the lease of 1860 was vitiated by fraud, and no attempt was made to argue the case on that ground. As far as we can judge the property was leased for its full value. If the view of the plaintiffs prevail, no effect is given to the words not being assigns for valuable consideration in s. 10 of the Limitation Act. We think the section means that time is to be no bar to an action against the trustee himself, his representatives or assigns, except an assign for valuable consideration, but as regards the latter the period of twelve years from the date of the purchase is to be the period within which the suit must be brought. This view brings s. 10 of the Act and art. 134 in the Second Schedule into harmony..... This view brings s. 10 of the Act and art. 134 in the Second Schedule into harmony..... "Then it is said that inasmuch as the defendants paid rent up to 1902 there can be no adverse possession as against the plaintiffs, and that, assuming the property to be debottar, the lease of 1860 was void, and the defendants must be treated as tenants from year to year of the property, and reliance is placed on an observation of Lord Selborne in the case of President and Governors of the Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts. (( 1879) 4 App. Cas. 324.) His Lordship said .... if any rent had been reserved and received, however small, the legal relation of a tenancy from year to year would have been created, and the Statutes of Limitation could not have run. This, however, was not necessary for the decision of the case, and is opposed to the view of the Court in the case of Attorney-General v. Davey (( 1859) 4 De G. & J. 136.), where the point was expressly decided. We do not think the plaintiffs can blow hot and cold; if they rely on the payment of rent, they cannot fairly attribute it to a tenancy which was never in the contemplation of the contracting parties, but must attribute it to the lease, which was the contract between the parties. In the case of President, &c, of Magdalen College, Oxford v. Attorney-General (( 1857) 6 H. L. C. 189.) the lease reserved a rent which had been regularly paid up to a few years before the institution of the suit." De Gruyther, K.C., and Ross, for the appellants, contended that the evidence established that the Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 68 mouzah Gorfalbari is debottar property and not the personal property of the mahant or of the family to which he belongs. By the sanad of 1787, which was an ancient document produced from the proper custody, although the High Court expressed some suspicion with regard to it, the mouzah was granted to Bichitrananda in his capacity of mahant. The true construction of the document was that the legal estate was vested in the idol. The beneficial interest might be either in the idol or in the grantee named for his own benefit. The true construction of the document was that the legal estate was vested in the idol. The beneficial interest might be either in the idol or in the grantee named for his own benefit. The material word was "debottar." Wilsons Glossary, p. 134, was referred to as shewing that debottar meant the property of the idol, while at p. 93 of the same work it appears that brahmottar was the apt word to have used if the intention had been to grant the beneficial interest to Bichitrananda and his heirs. There was no provision in the sanad as to the succession to Bichitrananda, an omission which pointed to the idol being the real grantee. With regard to the idol not being named, it was known to the parties and shewn by the subsequent user of the property to what idol or idols in particular it was dedicated. The evidence shewed that from 1787 to the present time the proceeds had been devoted to the worship of the idols Raghunath Jiu and Durga Mata. The property had all along been in the possession of the mahant for the time being. Had it belonged beneficially to the original grantee and his heirs, his descendants would have been entitled in shares and there would have been partition. The evidence shewed that at a family partition this mouzah was excepted from it, and it descended by lineal primo geniture for six generations in the family of the sebait. The recital in the lease of 1860 shewed that down to that time and in that transaction it was treated as the property of the idol. Assuming the mouzah to have been debottar property of the idol, the lease of 1860, if intended as a perpetual lease, was ultra vires the sebait. There was no proof of legal necessity, and in its absence no justification for such an improvident alienation. The lease should be held not to convey a permanent tenure see Mayandi Chettiyar v. Chokkalingam Pillay. (( 1904) L. R. 31 Ind. Ap. 83.) The suit is not barred by the Limitation Act, 1877. Article 134 has no application to a mortgage or lease, and the grantee under the lease of 1860 was not a purchaser within the meaning of that article. (( 1904) L. R. 31 Ind. Ap. 83.) The suit is not barred by the Limitation Act, 1877. Article 134 has no application to a mortgage or lease, and the grantee under the lease of 1860 was not a purchaser within the meaning of that article. Anangamohini the lessee took the property with notice that it was debottar and, if a purchaser at all, was not a bona fide purchaser. Nor was she an "assign for valuable consideration" within the meaning of s. 10 of the Limitation Act. Purchaser means in its ordinary sense a person who acquires an absolute title see Radhanath Das v. Gisborne & Co. (14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 1.), which was a decision under s. 5 of Act XIV. of 1859, corresponding with the said art. 134. The article therefore does not apply to Anangamohini and her representative in title see also Ram Charan Tewary v. Protap Chandra Butt Jha (2 C. L. J. 448.) and Act IX. of 1871, s. 10. Besides, Anangamohini and her successors had paid rent under their lease up to 1902, and if the lease was void as ultra vires the grantor, they were at least tenants from year to year, and therefore no question of adverse possession could arise. A tenant could not while paying rent acquire an absolute proprietary tenure against his landlord. Reference was made to President, &c, of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts(4 App. Cas. 324, 335.), Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Merral (( 1869) L. R. 4 Ex. 162, 166.), Attorney-General v. Davey (4 De G. & J. 136.), and Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 69.), and it was contended that the latter had no bearing on this case. For a definition of tenant as understood in India see Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 3, sub-s. 3, and ss. 4 and 5. There were several kinds of tenants who had permanent interests in their holding, but they remained tenants and not proprietors, and their possession did not become adverse so long as their tenancy lasted to the lessor. See Bengal Tenancy Act, ss. 5,18, 20,178; Transfer of Property Act, s. 8, s. 108 (o), and s. 111 (g); and Rally Bass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee. See Bengal Tenancy Act, ss. 5,18, 20,178; Transfer of Property Act, s. 8, s. 108 (o), and s. 111 (g); and Rally Bass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee. (( 1897) I. L. R. 24 Calc 440, 448.) As regards the lease of 1896, that also was void as ultra vires the mahant, and also because Raghabananda was insane at the time of the execution. Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 69 Further, the lease of 1860 did not pass the minerals under the soil and was only an agricultural lease granted for purposes of cultivation. There were no royalties reserved, and the phrase "rights of various kinds" would be only those ejusdem generis and would not include minerals see Campton v. Jarratt. (( 1885) 30 Ch. D. 298.) Only the rights specified in the lease were granted, and this lease did not specify mining rights. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Cowell, for the first respondent and the Barakar Brick and Tile Syndicate Company, contended that there was no evidence of a valid dedication of the mouzah so as effectively to tie up the same in perpetuity. The High Court doubted the evidence as to the genuineness of the sanad of 1787. If genuine, its terms properly construed did not operate a grant to any specific idols and did not impress upon the property any specified or definite trust. It was contended that the intention was to grant it beneficially to Bichitrananda and his heirs, the evidence being that it was at the time of a merely nominal value insufficient to form the subject of endowment. The word debottar did not necessarily imply dedicated property; it was a description of tenure well known in the sense of being lakhiraj excluded at the settlement from paying revenue to Government see, especially Konwur Doorganath Roy v. Ramchunder Sen (( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 52.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 585, s. 439 ; Delroos Bana Begam v. Ashgur Ally Khan (( 1875) 15 B. L. R, 167.); Brojosoondery Debia v. Luchmee Koonwaree. (( 1873) 15 B. L. R. 176, n., 178.) With regard to the lease of 1860, Pranananda as beneficial owner had power to grant it, and on its true construction it was a grant in perpetuity. (( 1873) 15 B. L. R. 176, n., 178.) With regard to the lease of 1860, Pranananda as beneficial owner had power to grant it, and on its true construction it was a grant in perpetuity. It was equivalent to a grant in fee subject to a perpetual fixed rent-charge. Though in form a pottah, it was in intention and effect a conveyance of an absolute title. Cases of istemrari mokarari grants were referred to Toolshi Pershad Singh v. Ramnarain Singh (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 205, 213, 214.) ; Bijoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosonno Mookerjee (( 1878) I. L. R. 4 Calc. 327, 330.) ; and Himmut Bahadur v. Sooneet Kooer. (( 1871) 15 Suth. W. R. 549.) The broad distinction between leases of this description and ordinary leases is that there is no reversionary right on the part of the so-called lessor, who after the grant was a stranger to the property except as the holder of a fixed rent-charge thereon. It was also contended that on its true construction the lease of 1860 granted the right to the minerals and certainly to the brick clay which was part of the surface of the soil and did not come within the class of subjects known as minerals. After reciting specifically what was granted, the lease concluded with the words "and all rights of various kinds," which were large enough to include mineral rights and certainly all surface rights. There was no hint of a reservation of any kind in the operative words of grant. The lease of 1896 only related to five bighas, but it stands on the same footing as the earlier lease except in regard to limitation. With regard to the Limitation Act it was contended that the suit was barred by art. 184 read in conjunction with s. 10. The grantees in 1860 were assigns for valuable consideration within the meaning of those provisions and held for the statutory period.The purchasers at an execution sale against them in 1877 and the defendants who claim under those purchasers have also held for much longer than the statutory period, so that the appellants rights were extinguished by s. 28. The family of the grantor acquiesced in the receipt of income from the lease for more than forty years, considering that it repre sented a sufficient portion for the sheba. The family of the grantor acquiesced in the receipt of income from the lease for more than forty years, considering that it repre sented a sufficient portion for the sheba. It is said that the payment of this rent prevented the statute from running. But payment of rent in the case of a lease means recognition of the lessors reversionary title. Here the lease was mokurari mourasi and there was no reversionary right to acknowledge. Possession is adverse to vendors whose conveyance is void from the date of the transaction Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Vein Pandaram. (L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 69, 76.) The decision in President, dc, of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts (4 App. Cas. 324.) was opposed to that in Attorney-General v. Davey(4 De G. & J. 136.), while President, &c., of College of St. Mary Magdalen v. Attorney-General (6 H. L. C. 189.) shews that the true remedy of the appellants in a Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 70 case like this is against the estate of the grantor which is liable for the breach of trust. As regards Bijoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosonno Mookerjee (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 327.), relied upon by the First Court in favour of the appellants, it is in reality a strong authority the other way. It decided that a wife could not herself hold adversely to her husband in his absence, but inasmuch as she had granted a mokurari pottah to a third person, he held adversely to the husband and had acquired an absolute title. De Gruyther, K.C., replied, citing Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 582 ; Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram (( 1887) I. L. R. 12 Bomb. 247, 263.); Sathianama Bharati v. Saravanabagi Ammal (( 1894) I. L. R. 18 Madr. 266, 274.); Mahomed v. Ganapati(( 1889) I. L. R. 13 Madr. 277, 280.); Delroos Bana Beg am v. Ashgur Ally Khan (15 B. L. R. 167.); Konwur Doorganath Roy v. Ramchunder Sen (L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 52, 55.) ; Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand.(( 1875) L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 145, 152.) Sect. 10 of the Limitation Act had no application, for there was no adverse possession in this case, and therefore the cases in 4 Calc. 327 and 15 S. W. R 549 did not apply. Ap. 52, 55.) ; Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand.(( 1875) L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 145, 152.) Sect. 10 of the Limitation Act had no application, for there was no adverse possession in this case, and therefore the cases in 4 Calc. 327 and 15 S. W. R 549 did not apply. The distinction between a lease in perpetuity and an absolute conveyance is clear from the decision in Kally Dass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee. (I. L. R. 24 Calc. 440.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. The subject-matter of this litigation is a mouzah called Gorfalbari, in the district of Manbhum, and the main questions for consideration are, first, whether the mouzah is debottar or dewattar property, and, secondly, whether, assuming it to be so, the mohunt of the endowment for the time being had power to grant a mokarari pottah or permanent lease of it. The relevant facts may be shortly stated. In the village of Achkoda is the shrine of two Hindu idols, known as Raghunath Jiu and Durga Mata, served by a family of Goswamis, among whom the office of mohunt has descended for more than a century by the rule of lineal primogeniture. In 1787 one Bichitrananda was mohunt, and the origin of the title to the mouzah is a sanad dated December 23 in that year, which is in the following terms— " To the remembered and abode of all blessings, Sri Bichitrananda Mohunt Goswami, of good character. " This deed of pottah of debottar property is executed to the following effect— " Being in sound health and easy mind, I do grant to you by way of lakeraj debottar the entire mouzah Gorfalbari, in pergunnah Pandra, together with all bils, jhils, waste and danga lands, jungles and culturable lands and whatever exists thereon. By bestowing your blessings on us, you do enjoy and possess the same with great felicity. By bestowing your blessings on us, you do enjoy and possess the same with great felicity. If I or any of my heirs ever dispossess you, the dispossession shall be ineffectual." It was contended on behalf of the respondents that, although the grant was to the mohunt, and " by way of lakeraj debottar," there was no complete or specific dedication of the mouzah to the service of any idol, but that the gift was to the mohunt personally, and descendible to his heirs, in return for blessings bestowed on the donor and his family. There is, no doubt, much force in this contention, but, however ambiguously the intention of the donor may have been expressed, it is perfectly clear from the evidence in the case that the donee received the gift as a gift for the service of the particular idols whose shebait he was, and that the income of the mouzah has ever since been entirely appropriated to that service. The Subordinate Judge finds as a fact that " its proceeds have all along been spent for the maintenance of the sheba of the said idols," and there is no evidence at variance with this finding. The Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 71 mere fact of the proceeds of any land being used for the support of an idol may not be proof that those lands formed an endowment for the purpose (Muddun Loll v. Komul Bibee (( 1867) 8 Suth. W. R. 43.)), but it is a fact that may well be taken into consideration when, as in this case, the intention of the founder has to be gathered from an ancient document expressed, to say the least, in ambiguous language. Contemporanea expositio est optima. But the case for the appellants does not rest on this consideration alone. W. R. 43.)), but it is a fact that may well be taken into consideration when, as in this case, the intention of the founder has to be gathered from an ancient document expressed, to say the least, in ambiguous language. Contemporanea expositio est optima. But the case for the appellants does not rest on this consideration alone. In February, 1860, the then mohunt Pranananda, describing himself as "Brittibhogi holder of debottar," granted to one Ananga Mohini Debi a mokarari pottah, or permanent lease, of the entire mouzah, with the exception of five bighas, which were reserved as " set apart as a place of repose for the deity." In this document the mouzah is described as "my long-standing ancestral lakeraj debottar property endowed for the services of the deity." Under this grant, Ananga Mohini, and afterwards her husband, Magaram, had possession of the estate until 1877, when it was sold in execution of a decree for rent obtained by Pranananda against Magaram, whose interest is now represented by the first three respondents. The five bighas reserved in the original pottah were granted to the same respondents on the same tenure by the three sons and the widow of Pranananda by a lease dated November 2, 1896. Upon these facts the learned Subordinate Judge found that Gorfalbari was the debottar property of the idols Raghunath Jiu and Durga Mata ; and the High Court, feeling a difficulty on this point, decided the case upon the question of limitation. Leaving the question of limitation aside for the moment, their Lordships are of opinion that the Subordinate Judge was right, and that Gorfalbari must be held to be debottar property, in the sense of having been dedicated to the worship of the idols represented by the mohunt Bichitrananda. The second question is whether, this being so, the mohunt had power to grant a mokarari pottah of the mouzah. It is well settled law that the power of the mohunt to alienate debottar property is, like the power of the manager for an infant heir, limited to cases of unavoidable necessity Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand. (L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 145.) In the case of Konwur Doorganath Roy v. Ram Chunder Sen (L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. It is well settled law that the power of the mohunt to alienate debottar property is, like the power of the manager for an infant heir, limited to cases of unavoidable necessity Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand. (L. R. 2 Ind. Ap. 145.) In the case of Konwur Doorganath Roy v. Ram Chunder Sen (L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 52.) a mokarari pottah of dewattar lands was supported on the ground that it was granted in consideration of money said to be required for the repair and completion of a temple, for which no other funds could be obtained. But the general rule is that laid down in the case of Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo (( 1869) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 270, at p. 275.), that apart from such necessity " to create a new and fixed rent for all time, though adequate at the time, in lieu of giving the endowment the benefit of an augmentation of a variable rent from time to time, would be a breach of duty " in the mohunt. There is no allegation that there were any special circumstances of necessity in this case to justify the grant of the pottah of 1860, which on the most favourable construction enured only for the lifetime of the grantor, Pranananda, who died in 1891, or of the pottah of 1896, which, at best, could only be deemed operative during the lifetime of Raghubananda, who died in 1900. As regards Raghubananda, who succeeded his father as mohunt in 1891, the Subordinate Judge found that he became insane about two years before his fathers death, and continued so to the time of his death. The High Court say that " he was apparently insane in 1892 and again in 1897, but the oral evidence as to his being insane in 1896, at the date of the lease, is far from convincing.....The better view seems to us that he was not insane in 1896." Their Lordships can find no satisfactory evidence of any lucid interval between the periods when he was undoubtedly a lunatic, and as his mental incapacity arose from an excessive habitual use of ganja, it is extremely unlikely that such an .interval should have occurred. They agree with the Subordinate Judges finding upon this point. They agree with the Subordinate Judges finding upon this point. It remains to deal with the question of limitation, upon which the learned judges of the High Court have rested their decision, The article in the Limitation Act applicable to this case is art. 184, by which a Law Rep. 36 Ind. App. 148 ( 1908- 1909) Abhiram Goswami V. Shyama Charan Nandi 72 period of twelve years from the date of purchase is fixed for suits " to recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards purchased from the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration." The operation of this article is controlled by s. 10 of the Act, which provides that " No suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property shall be barred by any length of time." " Statutes of Limitation, like all others, ought to receive such a construction as the language, in its plain meaning, imports" Luchmee Buksh Roy v. Runjeet Ram. (( 1873) 13 Beng. L. R. (P. C.) 177, at p. 182.) Now, what is the plain meaning of the words " purchased for a valuable consideration " ? They mean that the ownership of the property sold has been absolutely transferred from the vendor to the purchaser in consideration of a price paid or secured by the purchaser to the vendor. Sir Robert Finlay, in his able argument for the respondents, contended that a mokarari lease is tantamount to a conveyance in fee simple, and that the lessee must therefore be treated as a purchaser within the meaning of the Limitation Act. But the distinction between the two transactions has been well pointed out by Jenkins J. in his judgment in the case of Rally Dass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee. (I. L. R. 24 Calc. 440, at p. 447.) "Because at the present day," says the learned judge, "a conveyance in fee simple leaves nothing in the grantor, it does not follow that a lease in perpetuity here has any such result..... (I. L. R. 24 Calc. 440, at p. 447.) "Because at the present day," says the learned judge, "a conveyance in fee simple leaves nothing in the grantor, it does not follow that a lease in perpetuity here has any such result..... The law of this country does undoubtedly allow of a lease in perpetuity.....A man who, being owner of land, grants a lease in perpetuity carves a subordinate interest out of his own, and does not annihilate his own interest. This result is to be inferred by the use of the word lease, which implies an interest still remaining in the lessor.” He held, therefore, that, whether the Transfer of Property Act applied or not, such a lease is forfeitable, notwithstanding that it is permanent. In this opinion their Lordships concur, and it follows that they are unable to give to the Limitation Act the wider interpretation adopted by the High Court, and to treat the lessee as a purchaser under art. 134 of the Act. The purchaser must be the purchaser of an absolute title. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the leases under which the respondents claim were valid only during the lifetime of the mohunt by whom they were granted, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be allowed, the judgment of the High Court set aside with costs, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored. The first and fourth respondents, who resisted this appeal, must pay the costs of it.