JUDGMENT 1. The only question is whether the District Munsif had jurisdiction to try the suit. The 1st defendant under the orders of the Maharajah of Cochin held an enquiry into the conduct of a Brahmin woman who was charged with adultery. He announced the result to the Maharajah who put the persons found to have committed adultery out of caste. The 1st defendant is a native of the Cochin State and the proceedings also were held in that State. He does not reside within the jurisdiction of the. District Munsifs Court and the cause of action also did not arise within it. He denied the jurisdiction and there was no waiver of his right or submission to jurisdiction. 2. The 2nd defendant though a native of the Cochin State, resides within the jurisdiction and it was argued by the appellants counsel that the Court has, therefore jurisdiction over him. Mr. Sundara Iyer did not seriously dispute this proposition, but he chiefly relied upon the fact that the plaint alleges publication of the defamatory statements at Triparayar while the finding is that the publication was within the Cochin State. 3. The 2nd defendant is the Kariestan of the Triparayar Devasom which is in British Malabar and owns properties also in British Malabar. The Devasom office is in the Cochin State. He delivered the proceedings to his subordinate, the Pattataali, so that he might prohibit the persons named therein, one of them being the plaintiff, from entering the temple on the alleged ground of his adultery with the woman and consequent ex-communication. The real publication proved, therefore, was in the Devasom office and not the Devasom or temple itself. The plaint, therefore, in alleging that the publication was in the temple did not put forward the real cause of action. Both the lower Courts, however, dismissed the suit not on that ground but on the ground that as the cause of action arose in the Cochin State, the British Courts had no jurisdiction though the 2nd defendant has been a resident in British Territory for the last seven years. In this, we are of opinion, they are wrong. If the objection had been taken in the lower Courts the plaint might have been amended, and considering the nature of the error we do no think that at this stage the suit should be dismissed on that ground. In this, we are of opinion, they are wrong. If the objection had been taken in the lower Courts the plaint might have been amended, and considering the nature of the error we do no think that at this stage the suit should be dismissed on that ground. We will, therefore, take it that the real cause of action is that, which is proved by the plaintiffs 2nd witness, on which the two lower Courts proceeded, i.e., delivery of the order to the Ptattamali at the Devasom office to enforce the same at the Devasom or temple. We are, therefore, of opinion that the decrees of the Courts below must be set aside so far as the 2nd defendant is concerned; we direct the Munsif to restore the suit to is file and proceed to dispose of it in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result. It was also argued before us that the transaction was one continuous proceeding and that the 1st, defendant was, therefore, rightly made a party, if the suit was rightly instituted so far as the 2nd defendant is concerned. The 1st defendant swears he bad nothing to do with the matter after his report to the Maharajab. This ground is, therefore, unsustainable. The second appeal is dismissed with, costs against the 1st defendant (1st respondent).