JUDGMENT : TUDBALL, J.:— The facts of the case out of which this appeal has arisen are as follows:— One Chiraunji Lal was the owner of the property now in suit. He died on 19th February, 1900 leaving as his heirs the plaintiff appellant, Bansidhar defendant No. 1 and one Sham Lal. Some ten years prior to his death, that is, on 27th April, 1890, he executed a deed of gift to defendant No. 2 of the whole of his property. The deed was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar of Bindraban, but no part of Chiraunji's property was situate within the local jurisdiction of that officer. In order, therefore, to secure registration, an item of property was included in the deed of gift purporting to be within the jurisdiction of that officer. As a matter of fact no such property was ever in existence. 2. The document was however presented, accepted, and registered. On 21st December 1896, defendant No. 1 sold the property now in suit to defendants Nos. 2 and 3. On 30th August, 1899, the plaintiff himself purchased from the donee another portion of the gifted property. In 1900 after the death of Chiraunji, Sham Lal the third heir brought a suit to recover a one-third share and the present plaintiff was made a defendant. He contested the claim basing his title on the deed of gift and his own sale-deed. 3. Then on 19th March, 1907 the plaintiff brought the present suit alleging that Chiraunji was a man of weak intellect, and that the deed of gift had been obtained from him by undue influence, and was therefore invalid, that the registration had been fraudulently obtained by including in the document property which was non-existent, and therefore the deed was of no avail, that Chiraunji was dispossessed from 21st December 1896, the date of the sale-deed by Bansi Dhar defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. He, therefore, claimed as heir his one-third share in the house in suit and asked for partition. The defendants contested the suit pleading (1) that there had teen noundue influence, (2) that the suit was time-barred, (3) that the registration was good in law. There were other defences to the suit with which I am not concerned. 4. He, therefore, claimed as heir his one-third share in the house in suit and asked for partition. The defendants contested the suit pleading (1) that there had teen noundue influence, (2) that the suit was time-barred, (3) that the registration was good in law. There were other defences to the suit with which I am not concerned. 4. The court of first instance held (1) that the deed of gift had been obtained by the exercise of undue influence over a man of weak mind, (2) that the deed of gift had not been duly registered in accordance with the Registration Act, and (applying section 49) that it did not operate to pass title, that the suit was not time-barred in that it had been brought within the time allowed for suits for possession. I presume the Munsif meant that it had been brought within 12 years of Chiraunji's death. The claim was decreed. 5. On appeal the District Judge held (1) that the deed of gift was duly registered in accordance with the Act, (2) that undue influence had not been exercised and that Chiraunji was not of weak mind, (3) that the suit was time-barred in that it had not been brought within 3 years of Chiraunji's death if he were insane and also because it had not been brought within twelve years of the deed of gift, the date thereof being the date on which the donee took possession adversely to the donor, and the plaintiff being the representative of the latter. The suit was therefore dismissed. 6. The plaintiff appeals and urges (1) that the deed of gift has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act, and, therefore, section 49 operated to prevent the passing of the title, and (2) that the suit is not barred by time. In regard to registration stress is laid on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim, [1900] I.L.R., 23 All 233, as practically overruling the decisions of this Court in Hardei v. Ram Lal, [1889] I.L.R., 11 All., 319 and other earlier cases Har Sahai v. Chunni Kuar, [1881] I.L.R., 4 All., 14, Husaini Begam v. Mulo, [1882] I.L.R., 5 All., 84. In my opinion this argument has great force. In my opinion this argument has great force. In Hardei v. Ram Lal, it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that the word registered as used in section 49 of the Act refers to the act of registration by the registering officer and not to matters of procedure or conduct of parties, that that section read with section 60 only means that a document to be admissible in evidence for the purposes of section 49 must be registered, i.e., the officer must have put upon it the certificate mentioned in section 60; and that if he has done so, the document bearing the certificate becomes admissible in evidence, and it has been registered within the meaning of section 60, and becomes under the second paragraph thereof admissible in evidence and the operation of the second paragraph is not interfered with by section 49. In this case the document had been presented and execution admitted by a person who was not qualified to do so under sections 32 and 35 of the Act. 7. In Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim, [1906] I.L.R. 23 All., 233, the facts were similar. A document was presented in the proper office by a person who was not qualified to do so. Moreover he also admitted execution not being qualified to do so. A Bench of this Court expressed dissent from the ruling of the Full Bench in Hardei v. Ram Lal, but considered itself bound by that ruling. The judgment of BURKITT, J., is a very clear one and shows the palpable departure from the act that had taken place in the course of the registration, and how in his opinion the latter was not in accordance with the Act. Before their Lordships of the Privy Council no attempt was made to justify the registration as having been done regularly in accordance with the Act. Reliance however was placed on section 87 and it was urged that there had only been a defect in procedure which did not validate the act of registration. Their Lordships of the Privy Council repelled this holding that the error was of a more radical nature and that in view of the terms of section 32 it was clear that the power and jurisdiction of the Registrar only came into play when he was invoked by some person having a direct relation to the deed. Their Lordships of the Privy Council repelled this holding that the error was of a more radical nature and that in view of the terms of section 32 it was clear that the power and jurisdiction of the Registrar only came into play when he was invoked by some person having a direct relation to the deed. They held that the registration was invalid and illegal, and section 49 therefore operated to prevent the document affecting the immovable property comprised therein. It seems to me clear therefore from this ruling that the endorsement on a document of the certificate of registration unless it is made by a Registrar whose power and jurisdiction have been properly invoked does not amount to a registration in accordance with the Act within the meaning of section 49. This ruling clearly over-rides that of the Full Bench in hardei v. Ram Lal, [1889] I.L.R., 11 All., 31. But the facts of these two cases are different from those of the present case, and it remains to be seen whether the principle of the Privy Council ruling applies equally to the latter as to the former. In the present case it is urged that the document was net presented at the proper registration office because no part of the property to which it related was situate within the sub-district of the Sub-Registrar, and there fore, that the Sub-Registrar had no jurisdiction. It is pleaded that though a property was entered as situate within the sub-district, as a matter of fact it was not so situate, and section 28 demands that the document shall be presented in the office of a Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district a part at least of the property “is” situate and not in the office of one in whose sub-district a part of the property purports to be situate. On the other hand it is urged that it is not one of the duties of a Registrar to make inquiries as to whether the property does or does not as a matter of fact lie within his sub-district, that if on the face of the document any of the properties lies within his territorial jurisdiction, he has jurisdiction to register. It is true that the Act does not contemplate any such inquiry by the Sub-Registrar. It is true that the Act does not contemplate any such inquiry by the Sub-Registrar. In a case such as the present he has merely to examine the document if presented by a proper person to see if on the face of it he has jurisdiction; but if a fraud of this nature (and it amounts to a fraud) be practiced on him, it cannot be said that he as a matter of fact has jurisdiction. Section 28 ends as follows: “within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property to which such document relates is situate.” This clearly means “is as a matter of fact actually situate” and not “purports on the face of the document to be situate.” The language of the section is clear and unambiguous and must receive its plain ordinary meaning. In the present case the property entered in the document as lying within the sub-district of Bindraban has been held to be non-existent no portion of that property was situate in that sub-district, and in my opinion the Sub-Registrar had no jurisdiction over the property to which the document actually related. No portion was within his sub-district. In these circumstances the principle of the Privy Council ruling in Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim, [1900] I.L.R., 23 All., 233. applies. Section 32 of the Act lays down that the document shall be presented at the proper registration office by the proper person or persons. If not presented at the proper office, but at the wrong office, the Sub-Registrar clearly has no jurisdiction and his registration is not in accordance with the Act. It is not an error in procedure within the meaning of section 87, but an entire absence of jurisdiction. The object of registration is the prevention of fraud and to make public all transfers of property. To hold that the Registrar of Bindraban had jurisdiction in such a case as this would be to open a very wide door to fraud. I, therefore, hold that the document in question was not registered in accordance with the Act and that section 49 of the Act applies. 8. The next point is one of limitation. The suit was brought more than 12 years after the execution of the deed of gift. I, therefore, hold that the document in question was not registered in accordance with the Act and that section 49 of the Act applies. 8. The next point is one of limitation. The suit was brought more than 12 years after the execution of the deed of gift. The lower appellate court has held that Bansidhar defendant took possession on 27th April, 1890 adversely to the donor that being the date of the gift. It is urged for the appellant that he in his plaint stated that Chiraunji was first dispossessed on 21st December, 1896, and that the defendants produced no evidence to prove 12 years adverse possession. The finding of the lower court is one of fact, viz, that the donee took possession in 1890. This finding is not attacked in the petition of appeal on the ground that there is no evidence at all, to support it, on the record. The possession of the donee under the invalid deed of gift was adverse to the donor, and time began to run from 1890. The plaintiff sues as heir of the donor. He brought his suit in 1907. It is, therefore, barred by time.