Judgement Appeal by special leave from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (May 1, 1905) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich (August 12, 1904) in favour of the respondents for Rs. 32,877 principal and interest on a registered bond given by the appellant. Lala Shadi Lal, the first plaintiff, and one Salig Ram, deceased, a member of a joint Hindu family, of which the five other plaintiffs were members, carried on a banking business at Bahraich, in Oudh. In 1882 they began to lend money to the appellant, the taluqdar of Mallanpur, in the district of Sitapur. In August, 1886, the appellant, who was heavily in debt, was, on his own application, declared a disqualified proprietor under the provisions of the Oudh Land Revenue Act (Act XVII. of 1876), and his property was placed under the charge of the Court of Wards and remained under such charge until July, 1898, when it was restored to him, and he resumed possession. While the property was under its charge the Court of Wards made an allowance of Rs. 1250 per mensem to the appellant for his maintenance and also gave him a beneficial lease for two years of six villages. On September 14, 1889, the appellant, without the sanction of the Court of Wards, borrowed Rs. 4000 from the said Salig Ram and Shadi Lal and executed a bond in their favour for that amount. In January, 1896, an account was settled between the parties to that bond, and it was found that Rs. 9950 were due by the appellant, who thereupon executed the bond in suit, dated January 27, 1896, in favour of the said Salig Ram and Shadi Lal. The defence was that the appellant was not liable to pay the moneys due on the bond, as its execution was procured by undue influence; that " the deed in suit was an un-conscientious transaction "; that the rate of interest was penal, and that he was compelled to admit the receipt of the consideration. The Subordinate Judge found that it was intended by the parties to the bond for Rs. 4000 dated September 14, 1889, that the greater part of the amount should be paid out of the profits of the villages leased by the Court of Wards to the appellant; that there had been a part payment of Rs. The Subordinate Judge found that it was intended by the parties to the bond for Rs. 4000 dated September 14, 1889, that the greater part of the amount should be paid out of the profits of the villages leased by the Court of Wards to the appellant; that there had been a part payment of Rs. 500; that there had been a further payment of Rs. 2500 after the release of the estate; that the appellant was " literate in Hindu, Persian, and English " and was not a man of weak intellect; and that the rate of interest and compound interest charged was the usual rate prevalent between the parties, and that the plaintiffs used to invest their money in loans to other persons at that rate. The Appellate Court affirmed this judgment. It referred to s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872) as amended by s. 2 of Act VI. of 1899. With regard to the contention that the 3rd clause of the 2nd section of the latter Act was applicable to the facts of the case it remarked " Assuming that it is, it only provides that when one party to a contract is in a position to dominate the will of another and makes a contract with that other person which prima facie appears to be unconscionable, then the onus of proof of its fairness lies on him. It is, after all, only a matter of evidence in each case. Each ease must stand or fall on its own merits. In this case the plaintiff was examined and cross-examined, and all the evidence that the defendant put forward was recorded. After examining the evidence of both sides the Court below has upheld the contract, and I think rightly." The Appellate Court also examined that evidence at length and, in the result, agreed with the First Court in holding that undue influence had not been proved. With reference to the contention that the contract was unconscionable the judgment proceeded— " The only other point that I need consider is whether the contract was unconscionable. I do not think it was. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that although 18 per cent, compound interest may not be unusual, yet in the present case it was excessive. I do not think it was. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that although 18 per cent, compound interest may not be unusual, yet in the present case it was excessive. There had been previous loans advanced by the plaintiff to the Raja before his disqualification on the same terms, and in some cases on even higher terms, in which, besides his personal security, landed property had been hypothecated. These debts had not been discharged by the Raja. The Court of Wards had discharged them. Because he had not paid up those debts, it was argued that he could not have paid them. If then the plaintiff knew, as he must have known, that even before his disqualification the Raja could not pay off previous debts carrying interest at 18 per cent., he most certainly knew that after his disqualification, when he had only his monthly pittance of Rs. 1250, and what he could make out of the leased villages, he would be unable to pay anything towards the discharge of fresh debts, and that, therefore, under the circumstances, knowing the man he was dealing with, it was unconscionable on the part of the plaintiff to insist on so high a rate of interest. I see no force in the argument. No sane money-lender would lend money to a disqualified proprietor on easier terms after his disqualification than what before disqualification had been accepted as reasonable by both, for his security was immeasurably reduced, and the chance of recovering his money rendered very remote. The previous dealings between the parties when there is no suggestion of any undue influence, and experience in other cases, abundantly prove that the rate of interest charged was, under the circumstances, by no means excessive." It appeared that while the taluqa of Mallanpur was under the management of the Court of Wards another money-lender named Auseri Lal had lent money to the appellant and had put his bond in suit. On appeal therein to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, the Court, as then constituted (Messrs. Macleod and Spankie), decided on June 3, 1902, that the appellant was entitled to be relieved from the strict terms of the bond, and granted him relief accordingly. That judgment was confirmed by the Judicial Committee in Dhanipal Das and Another v. Raja Maneshar Bakhsh Singh (L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. Macleod and Spankie), decided on June 3, 1902, that the appellant was entitled to be relieved from the strict terms of the bond, and granted him relief accordingly. That judgment was confirmed by the Judicial Committee in Dhanipal Das and Another v. Raja Maneshar Bakhsh Singh (L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 118.), where it was expressly decided that the lender was in a position to dominate the will of the borrower in consequence of the pressure for money caused to the defendant by his estate being in the possession of the Court of Wards, and relief was granted to him on the true construction of s. 16 of the Contract Act. The judgment now under appeal was delivered before the judgment in L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 118, and differentiated the case from that of Auseri Lal, dissenting from the law, as propounded by their predecessors in office, in that case. De Gruyther, K.C., and Kyffin, for the appellant, contended that the judgment in L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 118 governed this case. In accordance therewith it ought to have been held in this case, as in Auseris, that the bond was obtained by the exercise of undue influence, and that on the true construction of s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act as amended, and on the evidence, the appellant was entitled to be relieved from strict compliance with the provisions of the bond in suit. Ross, for the respondents, contended that the concurrent findings of the Courts below—(1.) that the bond was not the result of the exercise of undue influence by the plaintiffs or their predecessors ; (2.) that the terms thereof were not in themselves unfair or unconscionable—were right and were conclusive. The effect of their judgments was to distinguish the case from that of Auseri Lal in L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. in the points specified by them. De Gruyther, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. The effect of their judgments was to distinguish the case from that of Auseri Lal in L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. in the points specified by them. De Gruyther, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. This is an appeal by the defendant, a disqualified proprietor under the provisions of the Oudh Land Revenue Act, 1876, against the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, affirming a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich in favour of the plaintiffs suing to recover money secured by a bond dated January 27, 1896, whereby the defendant contracted to pay within two years to the plaintiffs (or their predecessors in title) a sum of Rs. 9,950, with interest and compound interest at the rate of Rs. 18 percent, per annum, with yearly rests. There was practically no consideration paid at the time of the execution of the bond, which was given in renewal of a previous one dated September 14, 1889, the con sideration for which was an advance of Rs. 4,000. The Raja was a person of extravagant habits, and when his estate was placed under the Court of Wards, as it was, at his own instance, in August, 1886, his debts were said to have amounted to about seven or eight lakhs of rupees. The bond in suit was given without the knowledge or consent of the Court after his estate had been taken over. The defence was that, in the circumstances, the bond ought to be treated as given under undue influence and as unconscionable. It was assumed both in the Court of first instance and in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner that the onus of proving undue influence was upon the appellant. In this respect the said decisions are directly opposed to that of this Board in the case of Dhanipal Das v. Raja Maneshar Bakhsh Singh (L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 118.), the present appellant, decided in respect of another loan by the then plaintiff (one Auseri Lal) to the present appellant while under disqualification. In that case—which was as nearly as possible identical in its facts with that under appeal, except that the money-lender was a different person, though the borrower was the same—their Lordships, in referring to the evidence, say (Ibid, at p. 126.) "The fair result .... In that case—which was as nearly as possible identical in its facts with that under appeal, except that the money-lender was a different person, though the borrower was the same—their Lordships, in referring to the evidence, say (Ibid, at p. 126.) "The fair result .... is that the respondent, through his improvidence, was in urgent need of money, and owing to his estate being under the care of the Court of Wards, he was in a helpless position. There was no fraud in the matter, and no pressure was put upon the respondent by Auseri Lal .... to induce him to accept the conditions offered to him .... But it must be taken that the respondent was compelled by his circumstances to accept the terms which were offered to him..... Their Lordships are of opinion that, although the respondent was left free to contract debt, yet he was under a peculiar disability, and placed in a position of helplessness by the fact of his estate being under the control of the Court of Wards, and they must assume that Auseri Lal, who had known the respondent for some fifty years, was aware of it. They are therefore of opinion that the position of the parties was such that Auseri Lal was ‘in a position to dominate the will of the respondent within the meaning of the amended s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act. It remains to be seen whether Auseri Lal used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the respondent." Their Lordships then draw the conclusion that the Subordinate Judge, who had found that simple interest at 18 per cent, per annum was not high, must be taken to have found that the charging of compound interest in the circumstances was unconscionable, a conclusion in which they deemed the Court of the Judicial Commissioner to have concurred, and, in the result, their Lordships held that the lender used his position to demand and obtain from the respondent more onerous terms than were reasonable, and that the bond sued on must be set aside. It is true that the learned judges in the present case took a different view of the relative position of the parties under s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which in itself would be sufficient to account for their differing conclusion as to the proper inference to be drawn from facts in all essential points identical with those in the earlier case. Moreover, the Judicial Commissioners seemed to regard themselves as free to criticize, and apparently not to follow, the decision of their predecessors in the same Court in Dhanipal Dass Case. (L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 118.) Indeed, the main reasoning of both the learned judges seems to be addressed to impugning the position expressly asserted in the judgment of this Board that, in the case of a disqualified proprietor whose estate was under the control of the Court of Wards, a lender who knew the facts was prima facie " in a position to dominate the will" of the borrower within the meaning of the amended s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act. Of course at the time when their judgments were delivered in this case the judgment of this Board in Dhanipal Dass Case (L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 118.) had not yet been delivered. Dealing, then, with this case on the lines laid down by this Board, their Lordships have no hesitation in differing from the conclusions arrived at by the learned judges in the Courts below, and are satisfied that in this case also the borrower was placed in such a condition of helplessness that the lender was " in a position to dominate his will,” and that he used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the appellant. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be allowed, that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh and the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich be discharged, and that instead thereof it be ordered that the bond of January 27, 1896, be set aside, and that the appellant pay to the respondents the sum of Rs. 4000 with simple interest at the rate of 18 per cent, a year from September 14, 1889, to the date of payment, with proportionate costs in both Courts below on the amount decreed, to be settled by the Judicial Commissioner in case of difference, and that as to the rest each party bear his own costs. The respondents will pay the costs of the appeal.