Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Chief Court (June 10, 1904) reversing a decree of the District Judge of Umballa (August 24, 1901). The suit was brought by the appellants against the respondents or their predecessors in title for a declaration that they were the reversionary heirs to the property of one Munshi Wazir Singh and that certain alienations made by his widow and others were null and void as against the appellants reversionary rights. The District Judge decreed the suit, but the Chief Court dis missed it. The property in suit originally belonged to Sultan Singh, named in the pedigree inserted in their Lordships judgment, who died about the beginning of the year 1861. He was succeeded by Wazir Singh. The appellants alleged that Wazir Singh was his adopted son, but the adoption was denied by the respondents. Wazir Singh died on October 25, 1870, leaving him surviving his widow, Sarsuti, his adoptive mother, Adjudhia Devi, and his sister, Puran Devi. Sarsuti succeeded and a certificate to collect debts was granted to her under the provisions of Act XXVII. of 1860. On September 3, 1871, an agreement was made between Sarsuti and Puran Devi in terms following— “With the exception of Mussammat Puran Devi, there is no other heir to, or claimant of, the said property. The parties, therefore, of their own accord and free will have agreed that during my lifetime Mussammat Puran Devi should remain in possession of one half-share of the property, and that after the death of Mussammat Puran Devi and myself, both the shares should devolve by inheritance on the sons of Mussammat Puran Devi, who are the grandsons (daughters sons) of Munshi Sultan Singh, the common ancestor." The appellant Jai Narain was born on December 19, 1871, and Rup Narain on March 11, 1876. Sarsuti and Puran Devi made various alienations of Wazir Singhs property, and on June 14, 1897, the appellants sued them in the Court of the District Judge of Delhi, and various alienees, to obtain a declaration that the said alienations would not be binding on them as reversioners after the death of Sarsuti. Their title as reversioners was based on the adoption of Wazir Singh by Sultan Singh. Their title as reversioners was based on the adoption of Wazir Singh by Sultan Singh. There were two preliminary objections taken to the suit, the first being that there had been misjoinder of plaintiffs, on the allegation that Jai Narain was the legally adopted son of Brij Mohan and had as such no right of suit; the second that there had been misjoinder of defendants and of causes of action in that five alienees had been joined as defendants in respect of five different alienations. Both Courts overruled the first, con currently finding against Jai Narains alleged adoption. The District Judge overruled the second, but the Chief Court upheld it. It considered that the proper course was to allow the plaintiffs to elect which suit they would prosecute without prejudice to their rights to bring fresh suits against the other defendants separately. The plaintiffs elected to proceed against the fifth defendant, Shambhu Nath, the claims against the other alienees being struck out. Shambhu Nath claimed under a deed of sale executed on July 1, 1888, by Sarsuti and Puran and sufficiently recited in their Lordships judgment. The substance of the respondents pleadings in their written statements, in addition to their denial of Wazirs adoption by Sultan, was as follows (1.) The suit is barred by the law of limitation. (2.) Assuming Wazir Singhs adoption, the plaintiffs cannot succeed, having regard to the settlement of family disputes embodied in the deed of agreement dated September 3, 1871, concurred in by their father Gurdial Singh, and having regard also to subsequent acts of the said Gurdial Singh which signified a relinquishment of his claims. (3.) The alienations were made for necessary purposes to alienees who were parties to the alienations, in the belief on good grounds that Gurdial Singh had relinquished his rights in the properties alienated. (4.) Large sums were spent by the alienees in improving the properties, and they are entitled to compensation in respect thereof. The Subordinate Judge decided the issues relating to limitation and to justifying necessity for the alienations in favour of the appellants. He found with reference to the documentary and circumstantial evidence in favour of the alleged adoption, and that the only fact inconsistent therewith was the conduct of Gurdial Singh, the next reversionary heir. The Subordinate Judge decided the issues relating to limitation and to justifying necessity for the alienations in favour of the appellants. He found with reference to the documentary and circumstantial evidence in favour of the alleged adoption, and that the only fact inconsistent therewith was the conduct of Gurdial Singh, the next reversionary heir. He found that Gurdial did consent to the deed of 1871 and to the alienations of the properties in suit made in the exercise of powers conferred by the deed. But he held that the appellants derived their title from Wazir and not from Gurdial, and that the latter1 s surrender of his title and his consent to the alienations did not affect the appellants title, who were therefore not estopped from suing. With regard to the plea of some of the defendants, based upon the allegations that improvements of considerable value had been effected in certain properties after they had been acquired by the alienees, the District Judge held (and refused to review his judgment on the point) that there was no evidence on the record that any of the alienees had subsequently improved the properties, and he also refused to consider the point, taken in the argument before him, that the alleged adoption of Wazir Singh was invalid (the adoption of a daughters son not being permissible among the regenerate tribes, according to Hindu law) on the ground that the point had not been raised in the pleadings and could not be raised at the last stage of hearing. The Chief Court affirmed the findings of the District Judge as to the legal necessity for the alienations and as to the consent of Gurdial Singh to the settlement of September 3, 1871, and to the subsequent alienations. With regard to the adoption the Chief Court decided that it was for the appellants to prove it, and that they had failed to shew that Sultan Singh had adopted Wazir Singh in such a manner as to give them, either by law or custom, any right to succeed collaterally to the estate of Wazir Singh. It followed that they were not Wazir Singhs reversioners and could not therefore maintain the suit. It followed that they were not Wazir Singhs reversioners and could not therefore maintain the suit. The Court then considered the effect of Gurdial Singhs acquiescence in the deed of settlement of September 3, 1871, reviewed at length the authorities of the High Courts in India and of the Chief Court of the Punjab on the subject, and, having regard to the principles both of Hindu law and common equity, they held that the sons of Gurdial Singh were bound by his action in regard to the said settlement; that Gurdial, being the only living reversioner of Sultan Singh, was competent by his assent to validate the settlement made by Sarsuti and Puran Devi on that date; and that his sons could not now traverse his action. The Chief Court concluded its judgment as follows " As regards the question whether the validity of the adoption of Wazir Singh could be raised at the stage at which it was raised in the First Court we are clear that it could be so raised. No doubt the reason why it is raised was the publication of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council that among twice-born classes the adoption of a daughters son is invalid. The respondents urge that on this point they are governed by custom and that the onus of proving that the adoption of a daughters son among Khatris is invalid by custom lies on the B appellants. With this we do not concur. The initial onus always lies upon any person who asserts that he is governed by a custom at variance with his general law to prove the particular custom he alleges." " As regards the claim of the defendants to bereimbursed for improvements we think that attention was certainly drawn to the matter in the pleas, and we should have directed further inquiry as to this point also had it been necessary. It was overlooked by the lower Court and no issue drawn." Sir R. Finlay, K.C., De Gruyther, K.C., and Govind Sahai Sharma, for the appellants, contended that on the evidence the District Judge was right in finding that Wazir Singh had in fact been adopted by Sultan Singh and had been recognized as adopted son till his death. It was overlooked by the lower Court and no issue drawn." Sir R. Finlay, K.C., De Gruyther, K.C., and Govind Sahai Sharma, for the appellants, contended that on the evidence the District Judge was right in finding that Wazir Singh had in fact been adopted by Sultan Singh and had been recognized as adopted son till his death. With regard to the validity of his adoption, Wazir Singh being daughters son to Sultan, it was contended that the respondents were precluded from denying it, never having raised the question in the First Court. The question was not one of pure law, for it is frequently governed by family local or tribal custom. No custom either in favour of or opposed to the adoption of daughters sons among Khatris was alleged by either side, and no issue was raised or evidence taken on the subject. The First Court was right in refusing to allow the point to be raised after the trial was concluded. Reference was made to Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. pp. 172 and 175, par. 136, as to the general law upon the subject. With regard to the conveyances impeached in this suit there are concurrent findings of fact that they were not made for legal necessity. As regards the acts and conduct and assent of Gurdial they did not in law create any estoppel which would have prevented Gurdial himself from challenging their validity as binding the estate if he had lived. Even if he were estopped, the appellants did not derive title from him, but as heirs to Wazir Singh. It is established law that the actual reversioners at the time when the succession opens are not bound by the acts of the presumptive reversioner. The consent of the latter may be an important matter for consideration in regard to the issue as to legal necessity, but his assent to the transaction does not cure its invalidity when concurrent findings of fact have established it. Reference was made to Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 204, to the end of par. 157; Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 1, 8, 9.); Bhagwanta v. Sukhi(( 1899) I. L. R. 22 Allah. 33.); Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah (( 1861) 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529, 549, 551.); Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry (( 1869) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 157; Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 1, 8, 9.); Bhagwanta v. Sukhi(( 1899) I. L. R. 22 Allah. 33.); Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah (( 1861) 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529, 549, 551.); Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry (( 1869) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 209, 228, 229.) ; Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal (( 1891) L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 30.); Hemchunder Sanyal v. Sarnomoyi Debi (( 1894) I. L. R. 22 Calc. 354.); Nobokishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy (( 1884) I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1102, 1107.); Jiwan Singh v. Misri Lal (( 1895) L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 1, 6.) ; Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar (( 1898) L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 183, 189.); Bajrangi Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh (( 1907) L. R. 35 Ind. Ap. 1.) ; Soliman v. Ramdial. (( 1901) 36 Punjab Record, 253, 259.) With regard to misjoinder of causes of action it was contended that the Chief Court had erroneously ruled to that effect; otherwise that the error is cured by s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code, which prevents its being made a ground of appeal after the trial of the suit had been concluded see Param v. Achal. (( 1882) I. L. R. 4 Allah. 289.) Jardine, K.C., and Ross, for the respondents, contended that the appellants had failed to prove the factum of Wazir Singhs adoption, and that if it had taken place it was invalid as being of a daughters son see Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh. (( 1898) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 153.) It was contended that the agreement of September 3, 1871, operated as a settlement of disputed succession and was agreed to by all the members of the family interested in the dispute, including Gurdial Singh, the father of the appellants, who was at the time the sole living reversioner. There were concurrent findings of fact that Gurdial had ceded all reversionary rights (if any) which he had to the property in suit. And it was contended that the Chief Court was right for the reasons stated and on the authorities cited in its judgment in holding that the appellants were estopped by their fathers acts and consent from contesting the agreement of 1871 and the alienations effected thereunder. And it was contended that the Chief Court was right for the reasons stated and on the authorities cited in its judgment in holding that the appellants were estopped by their fathers acts and consent from contesting the agreement of 1871 and the alienations effected thereunder. B They also contended that the Chief Court was right in holding that there had been a misjoinder of defendants and of causes of action. If the alienations are set aside so far that they have no effect after the widows death, it should be on terms of compensating the purchasers for the moneys which they have expended upon improvements in the belief that their purchases were of absolute estates. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the present appellants against a number of persons as defendants. The plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be prospectively reversionary heirs to an estate now enjoyed by two ladies, claimed a declaration that certain alienations, four in number, of portions of the estate made by those ladies were not binding on the reversioners. Both Courts in India have agreed that there was no such legal necessity as could justify the alienations; and their Lordships have not been asked to review that finding. The questions which do arise are of quite a different character. It is necessary to follow the pedigree of the family in order to appreciate the contentions raised on each side. The pedigree, so far as material, is as follows The properties in question formed part of the estate of Sultan Singh, who died in 1861. He was succeeded by Wazir Singh. Wazir, as will be seen by the pedigree, was the eldest son of Sultans daughter, and, according to the case of the plaintiffs, was adopted by Sultan. It is not disputed that, if Wazir was the adopted son of Sultan, the present plaintiffs are competent to maintain this suit as reversionary heirs of the estate of Wazir. If Wazir was not such adopted son, the plaintiffs (appellants) have no right to sue. The first important question, therefore, is whether Wazir was the adopted son of Sultan. On this question the Courts in India have differed. The District Judge of Umballa, who tried the case, thought the adoption proved. If Wazir was not such adopted son, the plaintiffs (appellants) have no right to sue. The first important question, therefore, is whether Wazir was the adopted son of Sultan. On this question the Courts in India have differed. The District Judge of Umballa, who tried the case, thought the adoption proved. The Chief Court took a different view. The adoption, if it took place, was about fifty years ago, so that direct evidence of much value could hardly be looked for. Their Lordships are of opinion that the adoption is established. Before the death of Sultan in 1861 Wazir is described as his adopted son. On the death of Sultan, Wazir succeeded to the estate without controversy, which he could only have done as adopted son, and enjoyed it and disposed of it as his own without controversy down to his death in about 1870. Almost every document, both during the life of Wazir and since his death, is framed entirely upon the basis of the adoption. It was sought to raise another point in connection with the adoption, that if it took place in fact, it was invalid in law on the ground that under Hindu law a daughters son could not be adopted. With this point their Lordships think the District Judge dealt rightly. The general rule of Hindu law cannot be disputed, but it may be varied by family custom, and often is so varied in the province from which this appeal comes. If the legal point had been duly raised in proper time by the pleadings or issues, it would have been examined with the aid of any evidence adduced on either side bearing upon the question. But it was not so raised. It was put forward for the first time at the very last stage of the hearing, after all the evidence was closed, and when nothing but argument remained. Their Lordships think that the District Judge was right in refusing to entertain at that stage a new question of this kind, of which the solution must be dependent upon evidence. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the appellants have established their right to maintain the present suit. The second question of importance is as to the effect of the alleged assent of one Gurdial Singh, the father of the plaintiffs, to the disputed transactions or some of them. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the appellants have established their right to maintain the present suit. The second question of importance is as to the effect of the alleged assent of one Gurdial Singh, the father of the plaintiffs, to the disputed transactions or some of them. Gurdial witnessed an important document of September 3, 1871, and one of those of transfer, and it was said that by so doing he was estopped from disputing the validity of the alienations, and that his sons, the now appellants, were similarly estopped. On this question the First Court decided in favour of the plaintiffs ; the Chief Court of the Punjab held otherwise, and considered that the estoppel contended for bound Gurdial, and also the plaintiffs, his sons. This decision involves two propositions—first, that Gurdial was estopped, and, secondly, that the estoppel was binding upon his sons. The second of these pro positions it is immaterial to consider unless the estoppel against Gurdial is first accepted; and, in order to see whether it should be so accepted or not, it is necessary to examine the documents upon which it is based. The document of September 3, 1871, is the most important of them, and it affords a very clear indication of the positions taken up by the parties. It purported from its title to be a deed of partition executed by Sarsuti, the widow of Wazir, in favour of Puran Devi, his natural mother. The most notable point about this deed is that according to its terms Sarsuti is the only person who conveys anything, and this is in accordance with the recitals, which allege that Wazir was the adopted son of Sultan Singh, and that Sarsuti, Wazirs widow, had succeeded him on his death. The next notable point about the deed is that, with the exception of the last few lines of the operative part, everything contained in the deed is within the rights of the executant as heiress of her husband, because she purports to deal only with her life estate. The exception in those last few lines purports to affect the devolution of the inheritance after the deaths of Sarsuti and Puran, which was clearly beyond Sarsutis powers as the widow of Wazir. The exception in those last few lines purports to affect the devolution of the inheritance after the deaths of Sarsuti and Puran, which was clearly beyond Sarsutis powers as the widow of Wazir. The contention being that Gurdial, by having signed this deed, became an assenting party to the transaction embodied in it, it is necessary to consider what the nature of that transaction is. It is one by which Sarsuti professes to divide her life interest with Puran, which she could do without any assent of Gurdial. It purports, secondly, to provide for the descent of the inheritance after her death in a line different from that prescribed by law, a thing which apparently she could not do either with or without the consent of reversioners. The second document relied upon was one dated July 1, 1888, purporting to be the deed of sale by Sarsuti and Puran containing one of the alienations impugned in the suit. The most obvious peculiarity of this document is that it is framed on a basis altogether inconsistent with that of the document last referred to. It recites that the two ladies inherited the property in question with other property from Sultan Singh by virtue of their right of succession, and also by reason of abandonment and relinquishment of their rights by all the collateral heirs of Sultan. They then refer to the document of September 3, 1871, and another document. They say that they, the executants, have been absolute owners by exercising proprietary rights. They go on to convey the land to the purchasers absolutely, and they proceed " Now and hereafter neither we nor our reversionary heirs nor any other persons coming forward as claimants by right of succession or by virtue of their being male descendants of the aforesaid family shall raise any sort of objection..... Even if the heirs of the family of the above-named Munshi had any sort of right, whether vested or contingent, in the property in question at all, such right has been extinguished by their putting their signatures to this deed and admitting its contents to be correct." The deed was executed by Sarsuti and Puran and witnessed, amongst others, by Gurdial. Assuming that Gurdial effectually assented to this document, the document itself must be looked at, in order to see what it was that he assented to. Assuming that Gurdial effectually assented to this document, the document itself must be looked at, in order to see what it was that he assented to. And on the face of the document it is clear that all it professes to do is to bind the ladies themselves, who executed the deed, and the collateral heirs of Sultan, from whom they claim to have derived title. It does not profess to affect any title coming from Wazir. But the present plaintiffs claim title from Wazir, and are therefore unaffected by any estoppel arising from Gurdials assent to the deed. Another point raised on behalf of the respondents was that at any rate the respondents, or some of them, had spent money upon the properties purchased by them, and that such persons could not be evicted without compensation. On this point it is enough to say that it does not arise on this appeal, and cannot arise till the death of Sarsuti. Their Lordships therefore have only to say that they abstain from expressing any opinion upon the question and from saying anything which could tend to prejudge the question in case it should be raised hereafter in due time and in due manner. Another question discussed in argument was whether the Chief Court was right in the mode in which it dealt with an alleged misjoinder of causes of action. Their Lordships think it is at least very doubtful whether, upon the strictest con struction to be placed upon the Procedure Code, it can properly be said that there was any misjoinder in this case. And if there was any such misjoinder, s. 578 of the Code has, in their Lordships opinion, the effect of preventing such a defect from being made a ground of appeal and from being dealt with on appeal as it was dealt with by the Chief Court. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, the decree of the Chief Court set aside with costs, and the decree of the District Court restored, but with costs in favour of the plaintiffs, and without prejudice to the right of such of the respondents as claim to have expended money on the properties respectively purchased by them to raise the question of compensation in such manner as they may be advised. The respondents will bear the costs of this appeal.