JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal from the order of the District Judge of Chittagong, reversing that of the Munsif of Hathazari, and allowing execution of a decree, dated the 26th August 1904, to proceed at the instance of the Respondent before this Court. The first application by the decree-holder, to execute her decree, was on the 21st August 1907, that is, within the three years' limit of time. It was an application under sec. 235 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, but it was withdrawn on the 21st September 1907 on the objection of the judgment-debtor to the effect that the decree had been transferred to one Fuljan who had re-transferred it to the original decree-holder, the Respondent, Amirjan. The latter again applied, on the 3rd October 1987, under sec. 232 of the old Code, but the Munsif held that the decree was barred by the three years' rule because the application of the 21st August 1907 was not an application under sec. 232 as it ought to have been and, moreover, it had been withdrawn. The Munsif did not further decide whether, as alleged by the judgment-debtor, the transfer to Fuljan was a benami transaction, and devoid of consideration, and whether the alleged conditions on which Fuljan had re-transferred the decree to Amirjan had been carried out by Amirjan. But, in the analogous application, which is not the subject of appeal, these further questions were decided by the Munsif in favour of the decree-holder, and that application was allowed to proceed. 2. On appeal by the decree-holder, the District Judge has held that the application of the 21st August 1907, though mistaken in form, was a step in aid of execution, and that the next application, on the 3rd October 1907, was in time. The District Judge, also, did not express any opinion on the further questions to which we have alluded. 3. In second appeal it has been urged, first, that the application of the 3rd October 1907 was out of time; and, secondly, that, if it was not barred, the further questions ought now to be decided before execution is allowed to proceed. 4. In support of the first contention, reliance is placed on the observations in Gopal Sah v. Janaki Koer I. L. R. 23 Cal. 217 (223)(1895).. 4. In support of the first contention, reliance is placed on the observations in Gopal Sah v. Janaki Koer I. L. R. 23 Cal. 217 (223)(1895).. There the proposition is stated that " where an informal application for execution has been returned for amendment under sec. 245, what has been done in the matter by the decree-holder has been undone by him, and the proceeding became to all intents and purposes as though no application had been put in." This case, however, can be distinguished from the facts of the present litigation. The application of the 3rd October 1907 was identical in form with that of the 21st August 1907: it was in continuation of it, and it merely complied with the objections of the judgment-debtor and afforded an opportunity to the parties to go into those objections which was done. On the face of it, the application of the 21st August 1907 was in proper form; it was numbered; it complied with the provisions of sec. 235 of the Code as required by sec. 245. It was, therefore, an application " in accordance with law," within the meaning of Art. 179 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act, XV of 1877. 5. The second contention, also, fails. It was not pressed before the District Judge and the effect of the re-assignment to Amirjan, the original decree-holder must be to place her in the same position. For these reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs-2 gold mohurs.