Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (July 5, 1907) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Tahsil Biswan District, Sitapur (September 13, 1906). The suit was brought by the respondent as the heir of his cousin, Raghuraj Singh, for possession of the estate left by him. The estate consisted of the taluq of Rajpur and other lands, of which the appellant had obtained possession on the death of the widow of Raghuraj Singh. The Subordinate Judge held that the respondent was not entitled to inherit any part of the estate and dismissed his suit. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner, on appeal, reversed this decision as to the taluq of Rajpur, but affirmed it as to the rest of the estate. In 1860 the taluq of Rajpur was granted by Government to the said Raghuraj Singh under a sanad which contained the following provision —" It is another condition of this grant that, in the event of your dying intestate, or any of your successors dying intestate, the estate shall descend to the nearest male heir, according to the rule of primogeniture." The name of Raghuraj Singh was entered in the first and fifth of the lists mentioned in the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, s. 8. Raghuraj Singh died intestate and without issue in 1892, whereupon the taluq and the rest of his estate passed into the possession of his widow. On her death, which took place in 1904, the appellant, who was a first cousin of Raghuraj Singh, entered on the whole estate, claiming to be entitled thereto according to the ordinary law of inheritance under the Mitakshara, as being the nearest reversioner. The respondent, as the son of the appellants eldest brother, who had predeceased Raghuraj Singhs widow, claimed to be entitled to succeed in preference to the appellant under the rule of lineal primogeniture, which was, as he contended, applicable to the taluq of Rajpur under the sanad and the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, and to the rest of the estate under a family custom. He accordingly sued on November 14, 1905, to recover possession of the entire estate of Raghuraj Singh. He accordingly sued on November 14, 1905, to recover possession of the entire estate of Raghuraj Singh. Both Courts found that the respondent had failed to prove an alleged family and tribal custom of lineal primogeniture applicable to the whole estate, and agreed in holding that he was not entitled to any portion of Raghuraj’s estate other than the taluq. They differed as to the destination of the taluq. The Subordinate Judge held that the succession to the taluq also was not governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and dismissed the suit. He summed up his rulings as follows " (1.) The plaintiff cannot claim the estate under the terms of the sanad granted to Raghuraj Singh, because it is superseded by Act I, of 1869, and is not revived by the Crown Grants Act, 1895. (2.) Even assuming that the plaintiffs claim under the terms of the sanad is admissible, the language of the sanad fails to shew that succession according to lineal primogeniture was intended. (3.) When clause (11.) of s. 22 is reached the estate does not descend as an impartible property, and, therefore, the rule of primogeniture—much less lineal primogeniture—does not apply. (4.) Even if it descends as an impartible property, in the present case, succession will not be governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture, and (5.) the succession to the estate shall be regulated by the Hindu law and the estate will devolve upon the nearest male heir, i.e., the defendant, who was alive when the widow Rani Brijnath Kunwar died." The Court of the Judicial Commissioner held that the rule of lineal primogeniture applied to the taluq and decreed to the respondent its possession with mesne profits. Mr. E. Chamier delivered the judgment of the Court, saying that the question at issue was one of some difficulty and importance. After referring to the respective contentions of the parties and the authorities cited on their behalf, the learned judge said " The question is whether the words rule of primogeniture in s. 8 of the Act denote the succession of the eldest or first-born among several claimants, equally entitled under the ordinary law, or the succession of the representative of the senior line however remote he may be, i.e., lineal primogeniture. It is common ground that the words do not denote the succession of the first-born or eldest collateral regardless of line and degree. It is only by establishing lineal primogeniture as the rule of succession applicable to estates in List 3 that the plaintiff can succeed, for the defendant is older than the plaintiff, and is nearer in degree to Raghuraj Singh. " Babu Sri Earn, on behalf of the plaintiff, contended that subject to any custom that may be proved all impartible estates descend under the Hindu law in accordance with the rule of lineal primogeniture. He relied upon the cases of Naraganti v. Venkata Chalapati(( 1881) I. L. R. 4 Madr. 250.) Kachi Kaliyana v. Kachiyuva(( 1905) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 261; S. C. I. L. R. 28 Madr. 508.), and Mohesh Chandra Dhal v. Satrughan Dhal. (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 62 ; I. L. R. 29 Calc. 343.) " The first of these cases related to a polliam or paleiyam which was described in 9 Moores Ind. Ap., at p. 86, as being in the nature of a raj which may belong to an undivided family but is not the subject of partition and can be held by only one member of the family at a time. This paleiyam had been held by the Privy Council in 1861 to be the property of the undivided family to which the parties to a suit belonged. The principal plaintiff was the paternal uncle and nearest heir of the tenth paleiyagar. The defendant had been let into possession on the death of the tenth paleiyagar as the surviving representative of the eldest branch of the family and pleaded that he was entitled to retain possession under the rule of primogeniture. The High Court held that the property was still joint and the parties were still members of an undivided family. The question was (see p. 265) how the rule of primogeniture should be applied. The High Court held that the property was still joint and the parties were still members of an undivided family. The question was (see p. 265) how the rule of primogeniture should be applied. The Court Laid stress on the fact that separate possession but not separate ownership is the characteristic of property which although impartible is ex hypothesi joint, that therefore the senior branch of the family retained its ownership though out of possession, and the undivided interest of a member in that branch passed by survivorship to his descendants, and they held that when impartible property passes by survivorship from one line to another it devolves on the nearest coparcener of the senior line. " In the second case also stress was Laid upon the fact that the estate in question was the impartible property of an undivided family (see the report of the case in the High Court in I. L. R. 24 Madr. at p. 609) and the decision was upheld on the same ground. In the third case the decision rested on the evidence of a custom that no descendant of a younger branch could take until all the elder branches were exhausted. In the present case no such custom has been proved. In both the Madras cases the Court referred to and distinguished the Tipperah Case. (1) The decision in that case also rests upon proof of a custom, but at p. 541 of the report their Lordships make some observations which are pertinent to the present case and serve to distinguish it and the Tipperah Case (1) from the Madras cases. They say the truth is, the title to the throne and the royal lands is, as in this case, one and the same title; survivorship cannot obtain in such a possession from its very nature.....As there can be no such survivorship, title by survivorship when it varies from the ordinary title by heirship cannot in the absence of custom furnish the rule to ascertain the heir to a property which is solely owned and enjoyed and which passes by inheritance to a sole heir. " In one of the Madras cases it was said that the Tipperah Case(( 1869) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 523.) was distinguishable on the ground that it was governed by the law of the Dayabhaga which does not recognize survivorship as determining the devolution of property. " In one of the Madras cases it was said that the Tipperah Case(( 1869) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 523.) was distinguishable on the ground that it was governed by the law of the Dayabhaga which does not recognize survivorship as determining the devolution of property. This is true, but the rule of inheritance by survivorship under the Mitakshara also applies only to joint property. In the present case the Rajpur Keotana estate was in the hands of Raghuraj Singh as his separate property. His father was dead and he had no children. His uncle Narpat Singh receive a separate grant from Government, so also did the children of his deceased uncle Jugraj Singh (for the history of the family see Narpat Singh v. Ali Hussain (( 1884) I. L. R. 11 Calc. 1.)). The estate being the separate property of Raghuraj Singh, the Madras decisions which rest on the rule of survivorship are not applicable. "The plaintiff has, in my opinion, failed to shew that there is any rule of Hindu law by which impartible estates which are not the property of a joint family descend by the rule of lineal primogeniture. "Therefore the plaintiff in order to succeed must shew that the word primogeniture in s. 8 of the Act denotes lineal primogeniture. It was contended on his behalf that it has been held twice by the Privy Council that the word is used there in this sense. " The first case referred to was that of Achal Earn v. Udai Partab Singh. (( 1883) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51; S. C. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 511,) That case related to an estate entered against the name of Pirthipal Singh in Lists 1 and 2 which on the death of Pirthipal Singh before 1869 had devolved on his widow, and after her death on their daughter. On the death of the daughter her husband, Achal Earn, who had no right whatever, had taken possession of the estate. The plaintiff was a collateral relative of Pirthipal, but not the nearest collateral. In order to succeed he had to establish a rule of descent by lineal primogeniture. There was no evidence that the estate had ever descended according to such a rule. The plaintiff was a collateral relative of Pirthipal, but not the nearest collateral. In order to succeed he had to establish a rule of descent by lineal primogeniture. There was no evidence that the estate had ever descended according to such a rule. The argument of the plaintiff before their Lordships was that as Pirthipal Singhs name was in List 2, it should be presumed that the heir was to be ascertained by the rule of lineal primogeniture. Their Lordships repelled this contention, saying that they were of opinion that ‘when a taluqdars name is entered in the second list and not in the third list the estate although it is to descend to a single heir is not to be considered as an estate passing according to the rules of lineal primogeniture. "The other case relied on was that of Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77; S. C. I. L. R. 20 Calc. 649.), in which Lord Hobhouse said The estate is in Oudh, and was granted by the Crown to one Pirthipal Singh after the confiscation, and it is placed in class 2 of Act I. of 1869, and not in class 3. The effect of that is that the estate is labelled as one which, according to the custom of the family, descends to a single heir, but not necessarily by the rule of lineal primogeniture. It may be, and it has so happened in this case, that the heir according to lineal primogeniture is more remote in degree from the ancestor than other collaterals or other persons in the line of heirship. If so, the degree prevails over the line according to the classification under the Act; though if two collaterals, or persons in the line of heirship, are equal in degree, then as the property can only go to one, recourse must be had to the seniority of line to find out which that one is. If so, the degree prevails over the line according to the classification under the Act; though if two collaterals, or persons in the line of heirship, are equal in degree, then as the property can only go to one, recourse must be had to the seniority of line to find out which that one is. " It must be admitted that it was not necessary for their Lordships in either case to decide the question whether an estate in List 3 devolves under clause (11.) of s. 22 according to the rule of lineal primogeniture, but they had to consider incidentally the effect of the entry of an estate in List 3, and the language used by both Sir Barnes Peacock and Lord Hobhouse suggests strongly that they were of opinion that degree prevailed over line in the case of an estate in List 2, but that line prevailed over degree in the case of an estate in List 3. " It must be borne in mind that the application of the rule of primogeniture prescribed by s. 8 is limited to cases of suc cession by ascendants and somewhat remote collaterals of the deceased, and it is obvious and also admitted that the words rule of primogeniture do not import the succession of the first-born or eldest ascendant or collateral regardless of line and degree. It appears therefore that if primogeniture implies no more than the succession of the first-born of persons standing in the same degree of relationship to the deceased the rule of succession is the same for estates in Lists 3 and 5 as for estates in List 2 if the personal law is the same and no custom is proved. When the Legislature used the words rule of primogeniture they must have intended some known rule of succession the details of which in its application to collateral succession could be ascertained. There was no such rule known to the Hindu or Mohammedan Law apart from special customs the details of which are scarcely ever alike. They were providing a rule of succession which would be applicable to Hindus, Mohammedans, and Christians alike, and in the circumstances I do not think it is an extravagant assumption that they had in mind the rule of primogeniture as applied to the succession of real estate in England. They were providing a rule of succession which would be applicable to Hindus, Mohammedans, and Christians alike, and in the circumstances I do not think it is an extravagant assumption that they had in mind the rule of primogeniture as applied to the succession of real estate in England. It has been part of that rule since the time of Edward I. if not that of Henry III. that all the lineal descendants of any person deceased represent their ancestor, i.e., stand in the same place as the person himself would have done had he been living (see Hale on the Common Law, edition of 1794, chapter 11; Pollock and Maitlands History of the English Law, vol. 2, p. 257, and authorities there cited). " I gather from the language used by their Lordships in the two cases last mentioned that they considered that this rule of representation applied to the succession of estates in List 3. If so, the rule applies to estates in List 5 also." Mr. Sanders concurred, saying that when in clauses (1.), (2.), (3.), (4.), (6.), and (10.) of s. 22 of the Oudh Estates Act the rule of succession by lineal descent is prescribed, it does not appear too far-fetched an assumption that the Legislature intended that, on clause (11.) of the same section being reached, the person entitled to succeed in the case of estates in Lists 3 and 5 should be ascertained according to the rule of lineal primogeniture. Ross and Dube, for the appellant, contended that the rule of lineal primogeniture did not apply under the true construction of s. 22 (11.) of the Oudh Estates Act to the estates of taluqdars entered in Lists 3 and 4 prepared under s. 8. The rule of primogeniture applied under which the senior in age of the descendants takes precedence of the representative of the eldest line. The terms of the sanad and the true construction of the sanad prescribed the rule of primogeniture as distinct from lineal primogeniture. And on the true construction of s. 22(11.) it was contended that the estate did not descend as impartible property. The succession was in the events which had happened governed by the "ordinary law to which persons of the religion and tribe of the taluqdar are subject." In this case that law was the Hindu law of the Mitakshara school. And on the true construction of s. 22(11.) it was contended that the estate did not descend as impartible property. The succession was in the events which had happened governed by the "ordinary law to which persons of the religion and tribe of the taluqdar are subject." In this case that law was the Hindu law of the Mitakshara school. The appellant by that law was entitled as the nearest male heir to the last male holder living at his widows death. Reference was made to Act I. of 1869 as amended by Act X. of 1885 see ss. 8,10, 22 (5.), and 22 (11.) ; The Oudh Settled Estates Act (II. of 1900) (Luck-now ed., 1903), by R. G. F. Jacob, p. 103; Sykes Compendium, pp. 80, 81, 101, and 103 ; Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Singh (L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 51.) ; Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77, 79.); Balbhaddar Singh v. Sheo Narain Singh (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 194.) ; Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Janki Koer (( 1877) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.); Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Jagatpal Singh (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 173.) ; and Jagdish Bahadur v. Sheo Partab Singh. (( 1901) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 100.) De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, contended that the rule of lineal primogeniture applied for the reasons stated in the judgment of the Judicial Commissioners, and accordingly that the respondent in the elder line must be preferred to the appellant, who was his uncle in a junior line. Reference was made to Sykes Compendium, pp. 385, 386, 389, 391, and to the letter of October 10, 1859, scheduled to Act I. of 1869 ; Sheo Singh v. Raghubans Kunwar (( 1905) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 203, 213); Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Jagatpal Singh (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 173.) ; Jagdish Bahadur v. Sheo Partab Singh (L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 100, 107.); Pertab Narain Singh v. Subhao Koer (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 228, 234.) ; Haidar Ali v. Tassaduk Rasul Khan (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 82.) ; Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77.) ; and Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Janki Koer. (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. Ap. 100, 107.); Pertab Narain Singh v. Subhao Koer (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 228, 234.) ; Haidar Ali v. Tassaduk Rasul Khan (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 82.) ; Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77.) ; and Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Janki Koer. (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.) Ross replied, citing Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., pp. 742, 743, Sitla Baksh Singh v. Janki Kuar, No. 10 of 1874, and Kasim Khan v. Hari Singh, No. 171 of 1890, Select Cases in the Judicial Commissioners Court, edited by Jwala Parshad, 2nded., 1894. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This suit had reference to the succession to more than one estate, but the issue which remains contested on this appeal has regard solely to the taluq of Rajpur Keotana and other lands of which the defendant (appellant) had obtained possession on the death of the widow of one Raghuraj Singh. The respondent as plaintiff brought a suit against the appellant to obtain possession from him of that taluq. The Subordinate Judge, on September 13, 1906, dismissed the suit. On July 5, 1907, this judgment was reversed by a decree of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, and against that decree the present appeal is made. The situation of the parties is thus briefly described The Rajpur Keotana estate was conferred upon Raghuraj Singh by a Government sanad in the year 1860. Raghuraj Singhs name was entered in Lists 1 arid 5, mentioned in the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, s. 8. Raghuraj Singh died intestate and without issue in 1892. His estate passed into the possession of his widow, and her death occurred in the year 1904. The succession in the taluq to Raghuraj Singh is contested as between Debi Bakhsh Singh, defendant, and Chandrabhan Singh, plaintiff. Excluding therefrom the items which are irrelevant to the issue raised in this case, one may adapt the table of relationship from the appellants case thus Chandraka Bakhsh Singh | | | Ram Narain Singh Gur bl| Bakhsh Singh | | | | | | | Beni Sheo Gopal Debi Madho Singh Bakhsh Singh | Singh | | (defandent) . Excluding therefrom the items which are irrelevant to the issue raised in this case, one may adapt the table of relationship from the appellants case thus Chandraka Bakhsh Singh | | | Ram Narain Singh Gur bl| Bakhsh Singh | | | | | | | Beni Sheo Gopal Debi Madho Singh Bakhsh Singh | Singh | | (defandent) . | | Raghura j Chandrabhan Singh Singh (widow (Plaintiff) Rani Brijnath Kunwar It is thus seen that the plaintiff would be entitled to succeed to Raghuraj Singh under the rule of lineal primogeniture, but that the defendant (his uncle) would be entitled to succeed were the rule adopted not that of lineal primogeniture but of nearness in degree. The issue in this case is which of these rules governs the rights of the parties. The case was treated by the Courts below and in argument as one of great general importance as determining the rules of intestate succession to the taluqdars of Oudh; and it is no doubt true that, while both parties appeal to the provisions of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, an apparently serious repugnancy arises on a contrast of the provisions of s. 8 and s. 22 of that statute. By the 8th section it is provided that " Withinix months after the passing of this Act, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, subject to such instructions as he may receive from the Governor-General of India in Council, shall cause to be prepared six lists, namely—" and then follow the lists in their order. It is an admitted fact in the present case that Raghuraj Singh, whose succession is in question, had in 1860 the Rajpur Keotana estate conferred upon him, and that his name was entered in List 5 as well as List 1. List 1 was of a general character, namely, " 1st. A list of all persons who are to be considered taluqdars within the meaning of this Act." List 5 was as follows " 5th. List 1 was of a general character, namely, " 1st. A list of all persons who are to be considered taluqdars within the meaning of this Act." List 5 was as follows " 5th. A list of the grantees to whom sanads or grants may have been or may be given or made by the British Government up to the date fixed for the closing of such list, declaring that the succession to the estates comprised in such sanads or grants shall thereafter be regulated by the rule of primogeniture." Up to that point their Lordships do not think that any substantial difficulty would arise in the case. What appears to be contended for is that some other rule of primogeniture than the rule of lineal primogeniture should be applied. In the first Court a certain custom was appealed to, to make clear or illustrate what variation from lineal primogeniture was meant, but no success attended that plea and it was not maintained at their Lordships Bar. In their opinion, the language of the sanad emanating from the British authority was simply language conveying the ordinary meaning of the word " primogeniture " in the law of England. A much more serious difficulty arises on the construction of s. 22. That section provides "If any taluqdar or grantee whose name shall be inserted in the second, third or fifth of the lists mentioned in s. 8, or his heir or legatee, shall die intestate as to his estate, such estate shall descend as follows—" There are then inserted ten specific rules of succession, beginning, of course, with the right of succession of the eldest son. These need not be stated in detail, but two observations occur to their Lordships as important with regard to them. First, it is entirely clear that the estate the succession to which was there being dealt with was from beginning to end of these sections dealt with as an impartible estate; and, secondly, the preservation of the estate as impartible appears to their Lordships to be in entire accord with the language and policy of the legislation. The social and historical reasons for this have been the subject of frequent exposition and need not be entered upon, the matter being concluded by authority as after referred to. The social and historical reasons for this have been the subject of frequent exposition and need not be entered upon, the matter being concluded by authority as after referred to. After these ten rules of descent have, however, been given in s. 22, there occurs the following sub-section, namely —" (11.) or, in default of any such descendants, then to such persons as would have been entitled to succeed to the estate under the ordinary law to which persons of the religion and tribe of such taluqdar or grantee, heir, or legatee, are subject." It is maintained by the appellant that he is entitled to the succession because, by the ordinary law to which it must be supposed reference is here made, nearness in degree is preferable to lineal descent; and the contention accordingly comes to this, that sub-s. 11 amounts to a revocation or an abrogation of the rule of succession Laid down in the sanad under which the taluqdar received his property, and that s. 8 of the statute did not really amount to a declaration that the succession " shall thereafter be regulated by the rule of primogeniture," but only used that phrase in the course of a narrative identifying the fifth list of grantees. It is fairly clear, however, that, if a repugnancy does not arise within the statute itself, at least something which would have the same effect has been produced, namely, an inconsistency between the order of succession specified in the sanad and some other law of succession under the ordinary law of the taluqdars religion and tribe; and it is maintained that in these circumstances the statute, and the statute alone, must govern. The main authority for this proposition is the case of Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Ranee Janki Koer, Lal Shunkur Bux v. Ranee Janki Koer, and Lal Seetla Bux v. Ranee Janki Koer(L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 1.), in which Sir Barnes Peacock said —" As regards the succession their Lordships are of opinion that the limitation in the sanad was wholly superseded by Act I. of 1869, and that the rights of the parties claiming by descent must be governed by the pro visions of s. 22 of that Act. Ap. 1.), in which Sir Barnes Peacock said —" As regards the succession their Lordships are of opinion that the limitation in the sanad was wholly superseded by Act I. of 1869, and that the rights of the parties claiming by descent must be governed by the pro visions of s. 22 of that Act. By that section it was enacted that, if any such taluqdar whose name should be inserted in the second, third or fifth of the lists mentioned in s. 8, or his heir or legatee, should die intestate, such estate should descend in manner therein described." Now it has to be observed that, with reference to all the authorities cited, no one of them has decided the question now submitted on this appeal or any question as to Lists 3 or 5. The case just referred to was a case in which the name of the taluqdar was entered upon Lists 1 and 2. On the point of whether the estates of taluqdars must, for the . purposes of intestate succession, be treated as impartible, their Lordships hold that that matter is definitely settled by decision. In the appeal of Dewan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Rae Jagatpal Singh and Rae Bisheshar Baksh Singh v. Dewan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh and Rae Jagatpal Singh (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 173.), Sir Barnes Peacock, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, said "A question might arise upon the construction of clause 11 of s. 22 whether the estate descended as an impartible estate. Their Lordships are of opinion, looking to the provisions of Act I. of 1869, List 2, s. 8 and s. 22, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the estate should descend as an impartible estate." Again, in Jagdish Bahadur v. Sheo Partab Singh (L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 100.), the same law was affirmed in terms in the judgment of Lord Davey and the point taken to be concluded by authority. Ap. 100.), the same law was affirmed in terms in the judgment of Lord Davey and the point taken to be concluded by authority. It cannot, accordingly, in the first place be denied that, giving full effect to Act I. of 1869, the succession to a taluq must be to an impartible estate, and that whether the estate "ordinarily devolved upon a single heir," to quote the language of List 2 of s. 8, or whether the succession was to be regulated by the rule of primogeniture, to quote Lists 3 and 5 of s. 8. In the second place, it can hardly be doubted that s. 22, in so far as it describes in the first ten of its sub-sections the specific order of heirs preferred to the succession, must have force given to it to the effect of standing as a statutory substitute for any line of succession which might have been set forth in the sanad. In the third place, when sub-s. 11- a sub-section which comes at the close of the long list of specific stages of prescribed succession—sets up the rule that, in default of any one taking under the previous sub-sections, there should be preferred " such persons as would have been entitled to succeed to the estate under the ordinary law to which persons of the religion and tribe of such taluqdar or grantee, heir or legatee are subject," their Lordships do not see their way to hold that this is anything else than a general relegation of parties to the situation in which they would have been found apart from the statute. But that situation is found in the sanad itself; and it is also contained, either by way of affirmance or at least by way of narrative, in the fifth list of s. 8 of the statute. But that situation is found in the sanad itself; and it is also contained, either by way of affirmance or at least by way of narrative, in the fifth list of s. 8 of the statute. So far as the sanad was concerned, the provision was as follows "It is another condition of this grant that, in the event of your dying intestate, or any of your successors dying intestate, the estate shall descend to the nearest male heir according to the rule of primogeniture." While, as has been said, the specific rules of succession in Act I. of 1869 must be held to displace this, the general reference to what is not covered by those specific rules must include a reference to the rights of parties as contained in the sanad, which was the original title to the property. By this simple construction the alleged repugnancy disappears. It must be added, with reference to the body of decisions cited in the judgments of the Court below and at their Lordships Bar, that, as the decisions refer to the property descending, in the language of List 2, to a " single heir," there was therefore necessitated the search for that heir according to the law of the religion and tribe as referred to in s. 22, sub-s. 11. But it does not appear that the ordinary law of the religion and tribe would have fixed upon any different person as entitled to succeed where the " rule of primogeniture " had been the acknowledged rule of the succession—any different person from the respondent and plaintiff in this suit, who has succeeded under the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner. If reference be made to s. 23, the result reached is the same. If reference be made to s. 23, the result reached is the same. That section provides that " Except in the cases provided for by section 22, the succession to all property left by taluqdars and grantees, and their heirs and legatees dying intestate, shall be regulated by the ordinary law to which members of the intestates religion and tribe are subject." This expression, namely, that the succession shall be regulated by." is the same form of words as that employed in the List 5 of s. 8 which declared of inter alia the present succession that it " should be regulated by the rule of primogeniture." This declaration and condition of the sanad being part of the original title to the property is an essential part of that regulation of the ordinary law of the religion and tribe and would have . been respected accordingly. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the judgment passed by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh dated July 5, 1907, is correct, and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.