Judgement Appeal by special leave from a decree of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (November 27, 1906) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow (March 29, 1905). The suit was brought by Gur Bakhsh Singh, the father of the first appellant, and other plaintiffs interested with him against the first respondent and others for proprietary possession of the property mentioned in the lists attached to the plaint, which included the Amethi taluqa, and was dismissed with costs. It raised for decision two questions of law (1.) The validity of the transfer of an estate by an oral gift under Act I. of 1869 (the Oudh Estates Act). (2.) The proper construction of a document dated May 5, 1887, executed by a former taluqdar, Raja Madho Singh, in favour of his adopted son, Lachhman Singh. Gur Bakhsh Singh in his plaint made title to the property in suit in the following manner. He alleged that Raja Madho Singh, prior to the execution of his will, dated May 26, 1883, formally adopted Lachhman Singh as his son, that in the year 1886 he transferred to Lachhman Singh all proprietary interest in the taluqa and effected mutation of names in his favour, and by the said deed dated May 5, 1887, made a gift of the said taluqa to his said adopted son. The plaintiffs claimed that on the death of Lachhman Singh on April 12, 1891, his estate passed by inheritance to his widow Punpal Koer; that on her death on August 10, 1893, his mother Ajit Koer succeeded to a Hindu females estate of inheritance ; that when Ajit Koer died on December 17, 1893, Prag Parshad, the father of Gur Bakhsh Singh, succeeded as next heir to Lachhman Singh. During the course of the trial the plaintiffs set up an oral gift made by Raja Madho Singh to Lachhman Singh in the year 1886, just prior to the first application for the entry of Lachhman Singhs name in the revenue registers. The main defences to this case were (1.) that no oral gift as alleged had ever been made; (2.) that an oral gift, if made, was invalid in law ; and (3.) that the deed dated May 5, 1887, was incapable of being construed as a deed of gift in prsesenti in favour of Lachhman Singh. The main defences to this case were (1.) that no oral gift as alleged had ever been made; (2.) that an oral gift, if made, was invalid in law ; and (3.) that the deed dated May 5, 1887, was incapable of being construed as a deed of gift in prsesenti in favour of Lachhman Singh. It appeared in evidence that Madho Singh died on August 24, 1891, leaving a will dated May 1, 1891, by which he left his property to Raja Bhagwan Bakhsh Singh, the first respondent who obtained possession thereof after the testators death. He had on April 30, 1891, applied for reinstatement of his name in the revenue registers, a final order being made in his favour on June 10, 1891, in these terms " The applicants name as real proprietor be as before entered in place of Lal Lachhman Singh deceased in registers Nos. 2 and 3 on the basis of possession." The Subordinate Judge found that Raja Madho Singh during his lifetime did transfer his estate to Lachhman Singh, who con tinued in possession till his death in April, 1891, and that it was not a benami or fictitious transfer, as alleged by the first defen dant, but he held that it was a conditional transfer and also an invalid one under s. 16 of Act I. of 1869, as well as under s. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act IV. of 1882), as it was not made by an instrument in writing. With regard to the deed dated May 5, 1887, he found that as it was not duly stamped it did not constitute a valid transfer in favour of Lachhman Singh. In this view of the matter he observed it was not necessary to consider whether the terms of the deed shewed it to be a deed of transfer, as was contended by the plaintiffs, or only a deed of adoption and will, as was con tended on behalf of the defendant. He added that the point was "not free from doubt and difficulty," having regard to the 6th and 7th clauses of the deed. He added that the point was "not free from doubt and difficulty," having regard to the 6th and 7th clauses of the deed. With regard to the two points raised in appeal before their Lordships the Appellate Court held (1.) that under Act I. of 1869 a registered document was required to effect a transfer of the Rajas property to Lachhman Singh, and (2.) that the deed of May 5, 1887, was not, and was not intended to be, a deed of gift, but was a testamentary instrument. The material portion of the Judicial Commissioners judgment which sets forth the finally accepted translation of the deed of May 5, 1887, and the construction thereof which is approved in the judgment of their Lordships, is as follows— "I have so far assumed that the deed of May 5, 1887, required a stamp, but after careful consideration of its terms I have come to the conclusion that it is not and was not intended to be a deed of gift, but is what it purports to be, namely, a deed of adoption and a codicil to a will, and, therefore, does not require any stamp. “The following translation of the deed has been examined by both parties and is admitted to be correct with one exception. Counsel for the defendant say that the words I have absolutely and unconditionally relinquished all rights in the 6th clause should be I absolutely and unconditionally relinquished all rights,’ and they contend that this passage refers to what occurred in 1886. The plaintiffs counsel on the other hand say that it refers to the time of the execution of the deed and that it means I have by this deed absolutely and unconditionally relinquished all my rights. "Whereas I, Raja Madho Singh, son of Lal Arjun Singh, Rais and Taluqdar of Garh Amethi, &c, resident of Amethi, District Sultanpur, had got a deed written and registered on the 26th of May, 1883 according to which I had appointed, under certain conditions, my adopted son, barkhurdar (a term of endearment) lakht-a-jigar (lit. "Whereas I, Raja Madho Singh, son of Lal Arjun Singh, Rais and Taluqdar of Garh Amethi, &c, resident of Amethi, District Sultanpur, had got a deed written and registered on the 26th of May, 1883 according to which I had appointed, under certain conditions, my adopted son, barkhurdar (a term of endearment) lakht-a-jigar (lit. a piece of my heart) Lal Lachhman Singh as my successor (jainashin) to the whole of my property (jaedad) ; and by the same deed had formally (bazabta) made a written declaration and completed (the requirements of) adoption, but after the execution of the said deed I obtained " relief" (faraghat hasil ki) by performing the ceremonies of janeo (investiture with the sacred thread) and of marriage of the said barkhurdar; and after having closely observed the good behaviour (of the said son), I have obtained every kind of satisfaction. For this reason it has become necessary to amend some of the provisions (sharaet) of the above mentioned document and therefore I write as follows— " First, Lal Lachhman Singh, my adopted son under section 22, clause 5, of Act I. of 1869, is, and will be, my permanent successor (jainashin, lit. locum tenens); and with a view to giving no one any loophole (gunjaish) for future dispute I have, during my lifetime, had Dakhil-Kharij of the Ilaqa made in his (Lai Lachhman Singhs) favour, and have completed the process of putting him in my place by the action which I took (maratib jainashini ke bazarie amal-daramad takmil kardya). locum tenens); and with a view to giving no one any loophole (gunjaish) for future dispute I have, during my lifetime, had Dakhil-Kharij of the Ilaqa made in his (Lai Lachhman Singhs) favour, and have completed the process of putting him in my place by the action which I took (maratib jainashini ke bazarie amal-daramad takmil kardya). "Secondly, though at the time of adopting barkhurdar Lal Lachhman Singh I performed, in every particular, all the ceremonies relating to adoption according to the Shastras, to which people of my tribe and family are subject, and after doing so, received him in adoption; and have also done all that was necessary to be done after adopting him; but in order to prevent all controversies I (hereby) declare that should it be shown at any time that in the adoption of Lal Lachhman Singh any of the essentials (sharaet) or ceremonies as Laid down in the Dharmashastra, was omitted, then such omission should not, in any way, be considered a defect in the factum of adoption; but that under this deed Lal Lachhman Singh, in the existing circumstances, shall be considered and acknowledged, in accordance with the intention of Act I. of 1869, as a permanent (mustaqil) and perfect (mukammal) successor and adopted son; and no ones claim for any article or any office, or any dignity (lakab) or for any right against the said successor, in respect of any property or right of mine, will be worthy of consideration. Thirdly, if after the writing of this (deed) a male natural child (farzand) is born to any of my present Hindu Ranis of the same caste as myself, then the mere fact of such birth will not be sufficient to deprive barkhurdar Lal Lachhman Singh of his successor ship (jainashini) until I revoke or amend this deed by another deed, drawn up in this formal way (i.e., like the present deed), and registered. "Fourthly, as regards the expenses of the Deoasthans (i.e., places of worship, temples, &c), mentioned in clause 2 of te deed of 28th May, 1883, the following sums, as detailed below, are fixed irrevocably in perpetuity; and as regards ordinary incidental expenses (raqum mutasarrifa) and benefactions which are not fixed my successor will have the option either to continue them or to stop them, or to make any change in them as he thinks proper. Detail of the yearly expenses of the Deoasthans "1. Temple of Bhagwati, situate in Kot Ramnagar, Rs.1000 yearly. "2. Debi Bindhachal, Rs.500 yearly. "Fifthly, as regards the expenses for the temple situate in Benares, I have secured them permanently by a deed, dated 16th March, 1878. In respect of these expenses my successor, in the capacity of (bahaisiat) my adopted son and representative (qaim maqam), will have only the same right of supervision over them as I have myself during my lifetime; but in any case, it shall be incumbent on my successor and his representatives to maintain the temple, and to keep intact the property attached to it. "Sixthly, the instrument, dated 1st June, 1878, which I had executed, in the interests of management (intizaman) and expediency (maslahatan), in favour of Babu Sarabjit Singh, Taluqdar of Tikari, in whose favour Dakhil-Kharij was also made; I have had it (the said instrument)—after taking it back, with our mutual consent, from the said Babu Saheb—annulled, destroyed and cancelled; and the said Babu Saheb after absolutely relinquishing that (us) right and after revocation of the gift again put me in possession of the property mentioned in the said instrument; and the said Babu Saheb, after getting his name expunged from the revenue registers, had published the fact of the relinquishment by him ; and (moreover) executed and registered a deed of agreement, dated 29th May, 1883, on a fully stamped paper; and after getting possession I made over (hawala kiya) the whole of the said property to my adopted son and permanent successor, barkhurdar Lal Lachhman Singh, in virtue of being my representative (qaim muqam khud), and I delivered possession to him and caused my own name to be removed from the Government office and that of the said barkhurdar to be formally substituted ; and, as against the said barkhurdar, I have absolutely and unconditionally relinquished all rights (haquq) and proprietorship (milkiyat) as well as ceased interference (madakhilat) with the property (jaedad). Therefore, neither Sarabjit Singh himself nor his representatives have any right left to make a claim under the deed of 1st June, 1878. "Seventhly, in virtue of this deed barkhurdar Lal Lachhman Singh, as an adopted son who is to be regarded (mutsawwar) as a natural son with respect to all rights and privileges (ikhtiarat) has become, and will continue to be (honge, lit. "Seventhly, in virtue of this deed barkhurdar Lal Lachhman Singh, as an adopted son who is to be regarded (mutsawwar) as a natural son with respect to all rights and privileges (ikhtiarat) has become, and will continue to be (honge, lit. will become), like myself, in place of me, my full and permanent successor (jainashin) and it will be his duty (farz hoga), like my natural son, to exercise forethought in the management of all my property and to take (len) all my movable and immovable property, and to give an allowance of Rs.2000 a year as mentioned below to my Rani during her lifetime, and to have regard to the preservation of her honour and chastity, and should any woman, except the Rani whose name is given below, claim to be my wife, and does not produce a registered document from me then such woman will not be entitled to any allowance from my estate. The name of the Rani Sahiba is this Rani Ajit Kunwar Saheba. "Eighthly, the stipulations (sharait) of the deed of May 26th, 1883, so far as they are inconsistent with this last deed are hereby (lit. by this instrument) amended ; but there shall be no change in the essential facts (amar, lit. fact), namely, the fact of appointment as successor to the property and the fact of the adoption, which have been accomplished from before (pahla se ho chuka hai); and Lal Lachhman Singh will be as my adopted son and donee (mauhublahu) and legatee (musilahu) under the deed, dated 26th May, 1883, as well as under this deed—(my) full (mukammal) successor, and will be entitled to all rights—legal, customary and Shastraic—in respect of all my movable and immovable property which has already been acquired, or which may be acquired hereafter during my lifetime, or which may come to me by inheritance, or to which I may become entitled. Therefore, while in a state of sound health and sound mind and sense, I have of my free will and of my own motion written this deed by way of a deed of adoption and codicil to a will, in order to amend and rectify (islah) the deed of 26th May, 1883, by adding some necessary provisions to it so that it may remain on record. "The first thing to notice about this document is that the executant does not call it a deed of gift, but a deed of adoption and a codicil to a will. In this respect the difference between this deed and the deed of June 1, 1878, referred to in the 6th clause, is very striking. In that deed the executant says I have given and granted (hiba kiya aur bakhsh dya) the whole of the property the subject of this deed.....Subject to the conditions stated below the donee has hereby acquired full proprietary authority over the property.....Therefore I have written this as a deed of gift (hiba-namah). The word hiba, which is the word usually employed to denote a gift, does not appear at all in the deed now in question. The word jainashin, which occurs in several places in the deed, means literally sitting in the place of. It is used in a purely testamentary document with reference to a devisee or, representative, but it may also be used with reference to a donee in a deed of gift operating inter vivos. For example, in the preamble the Raja says that he appointed Lachhman Singh his jainashin by the deed of 1883, a deed which was certainly not intended to transfer any immediate title to Lachhman Singh. In my opinion the use of the word jainashin is not conclusive either way. The exact sense of the words maratib jainashini in the first clause was the subject of some discussion, but ultimately both parties accepted the translation given above. The word maratib means literally steps. It appears to me that the Raja is here referring to the transfer of possession or to the mutation of names effected in 1886 or to both. The plaintiffs rely principally upon the 6th, 7th, and 8th clauses of the deed. The conflict between the parties as to the meaning of the penultimate sentence of this clause has already been noticed. "In my opinion the construction and translation advocated by the defendant are correct. The whole clause with the exception of the last sentence appears to me to be a recital of what occurred long before the deed, and the disputed passage seems to refer to the action taken by the Raja in 1886. "In my opinion the construction and translation advocated by the defendant are correct. The whole clause with the exception of the last sentence appears to me to be a recital of what occurred long before the deed, and the disputed passage seems to refer to the action taken by the Raja in 1886. It was said that the words absolutely and unconditionally were inapplicable to the terms of the Rajas application for mutation of names, because at the end of the application the Raja said that, if the connection of Lachhman Singh with the estate should be severed, the estate should revert to the Raja, and this was, as the Court below held, a condition. But the provision referred to can scarcely be described as a condition. The disputed passage in the deed does not, in my opinion, mean I have hereby relinquished or I hereby relinquish all my rights. In the first place when the executant wishes to say that a certain result should follow from the deed he uses the familiar words " by means of this document (bazarie is dastawez ke) (vide the 2nd and 8th clauses). Next, the 6th clause of the deed can only refer to property affected by the deed of June 1, 1878, namely, Mahal Udyaon. It seems quite certain that the executant intended that the operation of the deed should be the same with regard to all his property (see the very clear language used at the end of clause 8). I think, therefore, that it is impossible to accept the contention that the 6th clause of the deed was intended to operate in praesenti as a gift of Mahal Udyaon. Nor do I find anything in the 7th clause which can be construed as a gift of property in praesenti. According to this clause Lachhman Singh is to become the full and permanent jaenashin of the Raja as his adopted son, that is to say, because he is his adopted son who takes the place of a natural son. The mood of the word take in the passage take all my movable and immovable property indicates something to be done in the future. The Raja lays upon Lachhman Singh the duty of taking his property. The mood of the word take in the passage take all my movable and immovable property indicates something to be done in the future. The Raja lays upon Lachhman Singh the duty of taking his property. No one seems to have supposed that it was the duty of Lachhman Singh to give the Rani the allowance here mentioned from the date of the deed, for it is not suggested that the allowance was ever given by him. "According to the 8th clause the real things to be accomplished were the appointment of a successor and the adoption of a son who would be the Rajas full successor and be entitled to all his movable and immovable property then existing or to be acquired thereafter or which might devolve on him by inheritance. The words chiefly relied upon in this clause are donee (mahub-lahu) and legatee (musi-lahu). It is true that the former is the word employed to denote a person who takes under a hiba or gift, but the context seems to shew that the Raja considered that Lachhman Singh was as much a donee under the deed of 1883 as under the deed of 1887, and the reference to the property to be acquired thereafter negatives the idea of an immediate gift of all the executants property and points to testamentary intention. The 8th clause appears to me as clearly testamentary as the 5th clause, which is admittedly testamentary. "Under the Stamp Act of 1869 the duty payable on a deed of gift was Rs.16, whatever the value of the property might be, and the deed of gift mentioned in the 6th clause of this deed bore a stamp of that amount. Under the Act of 1879, which was in force in 1887, the duty on a deed of gift was 1 per cent, on the value as set forth in the instrument. It is admitted that the value of the Rajas property in 1887 was not less than thirty lakhs of rupees, therefore if this deed was intended to be a deed of gift the value should have been set forth in it and a duty of thirty thousand rupees should have been paid. It is admitted that the value of the Rajas property in 1887 was not less than thirty lakhs of rupees, therefore if this deed was intended to be a deed of gift the value should have been set forth in it and a duty of thirty thousand rupees should have been paid. The Rajas attention had in 1886 been prominently drawn to the possibility of Lachhman Singhs dying in his lifetime and a clause has been inserted in the application for mutation of names to meet that possibility, and it is admitted that the Raja was an extremely careful, not to say a close-fisted, man. It is therefore a priori improbable that he would execute an out and out gift of his entire property to Lachhman Singh or run the risk of having to pay such a large sum on account of stamp duty. In this connection it must be remembered that] it was the duty of the registering officer to see that the deed bore a proper stamp, so that the Raja would have run a great risk in presenting for registration what was on the face of it a deed of gift. If the Raja intended by this deed to transfer the title to his property he must have deliberately avoided using the ordinary language of a gift, and as faras I can see his only object can have been to defraud the revenue. It is impossible to assume that he had any such intention, and one must look elsewhere for his reason for not employing the ordinary language of a gift. I do not believe that the Raja intended this document to be a deed of gift. There is in it no such description of the property as is required for a deed of gift, but the language is appropriate to a devise and bequest of a mans whole property. For these reasons I hold that the instrument of May 5, 1887, is not a deed of gift." Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Ross, for the appellants, contended that the transfer of his estate by Madho Singh to Lachhman Singh in 1886 was not invalid, and that a registered deed was unnecessary. They referred to Act I. of 1869, ss. 13 and 14, and s. 22, sub-s. 5 ; Act IV. of 1882, s. 2 (a) and s. 123, and ss. They referred to Act I. of 1869, ss. 13 and 14, and s. 22, sub-s. 5 ; Act IV. of 1882, s. 2 (a) and s. 123, and ss. 11,14,15, 16, and 17, and Thakurain Chhabraj Koer v. B. Gopal Lal (( 1906) 9 Oudh Cases, 113.) If a registered deed was necessary it was supplied by the deed of May 5, 1887. As to the construction of this deed see the following cases Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (( 1907) L. R. 3o Ind. Ap. 17.) ; Lalit Mohun Singh v. Chukkun Lal Roy (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 76); Mar car v. Sigg. (( 1880) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 83.) [SIR ARTHUR WILSON referred to Thakurain Balraj Kunwar v. Rae Jagatpat Singh. (( 1904) L. R. 31 Ind. Ap. 132.)] The true construction of the deed of May 5, 1887, having regard especially to its operative terms, was that it was a deed of gift which passed the estate in present and absolutely to Lachhman Singh. The decision of the High Court that it was of a testamentary character and of no actual and immediate effect was erroneous Sykes Compendium, pp. 256, 265. De Gruyther, K.C., Motilal Nehru, and B. Dube, for the first respondent, contended that, assuming an oral gift of the estate had been rightly inferred by the Subordinate Judge from conduct and especially from the mutation proceedings of 1886, both Courts were right in holding that it was invalid. An oral gift did not comply with the provisions of ss. 16 and 17 of Act I. of 1869 and of s. 123 of Act IV. of 1882 and was consequently ineffectual to pass title. In Harpurshad v. Sheo Dyal (( 1876) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 259, 277) the transfer dis cussed was executed before Act I. of 1869. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner, it was contended, rightly construed the deed of May 5, 1887, as one of a purely testamentary character and as not intended to operate as a gift inter vivos. If a gift inter vivos, it was inadmissible as not being stamped see Indian Stamp Act, 1879. Reference was made to Act I. of 1869, a. 22, sub-ss. 4 and 5; Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 72.); Registration Act III. of 1877, and Registers Nos. 2 and 3. If a gift inter vivos, it was inadmissible as not being stamped see Indian Stamp Act, 1879. Reference was made to Act I. of 1869, a. 22, sub-ss. 4 and 5; Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 72.); Registration Act III. of 1877, and Registers Nos. 2 and 3. If the deed had been a transfer inter vivos it would have come under Register No. 2 (see sect. 51) Thakur Ishri Singh v. Baldeo Singh (( 1884) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 135.) and Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram. (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 77.) Sir R. Finlay, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This is an appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow. The matter in controversy is the right of succession to the Amethi taluqa in the Sultanpur District of the Province of Oudh, formerly the property of Raja Madho Singh, deceased, whose name appears in lists I. and II. mentioned in s. 8 of the Oudh Estates Act (Act I. of 1869). Madho Singh died on August 24, 1891. Under his will, dated May 1, 1891, the respondent Bhagwan Bakhsh Singh has been in possession ever since Madho Singhs death. The respondents title is challenged by the first appellant, Babu Udai Raj Singh, representing the late plaintiff Gur Bakhsh Singh. The claimant Gur Bakhsh Singh deduced his title from one Lal Lachhman Singh, who was adopted by Madho Singh, but died on April 12, 1891, in the lifetime of his adoptive father. His case was that Madho Singh in his lifetime made over the estate to Lachhman Singh in one or other of two ways—either by a verbal gift to be inferred from Madho Singhs conduct and the circumstances of the case, or by a registered instrument which is dated May 5, 1887, and was intended, it is said, to take effect as an immediate transfer. The cause of action as alleged by the claimant accrued on the death of Madho Singhs widow, Lachhman Singhs adoptive mother, on December 17, 1893. But the suit was not instituted until August 22, 1903. At the trial there was a great mass of evidence on issues not material on this appeal. The cause of action as alleged by the claimant accrued on the death of Madho Singhs widow, Lachhman Singhs adoptive mother, on December 17, 1893. But the suit was not instituted until August 22, 1903. At the trial there was a great mass of evidence on issues not material on this appeal. The appeal, which was allowed by special leave, is confined to two questions 1. 1. Is immovable property in Oudh transferable by gift inter vivos otherwise than by a registered deed ? 2. 2. What is the meaning and effect of the instrument dated May 5, 1887? The Subordinate Judge, though he rejected as untrustworthy the testimony of a large body of witnesses who deposed to the fact of a verbal gift, thought that there must have been a gift of that sort, but he held the gift invalid having regard to the provisions of the Act of 1869. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner declined to go into the question of a verbal gift, holding that no transfer by-way of gift could be effected otherwise than by a registered deed. The point is too clear for argument. Sect. 16 of the Act of 1869 enacts that no transfer—a term which is defined in the Act as "an alienation inter vivos"—made by a taluqdar shall be valid unless made by an instrument in writing and attested by two or more witnesses. Sect. 17 requires, as a condition of the validity of a deed of gift, registration within one month from the date of the execution of the instrument. It was suggested in the course of the argument that this provision does not apply to a gift to a person in the position of an adopted son because s. 13, which is to be found in the preceding chapter of the Act headed " Powers of taluqdars and Grantees to transfer and bequeath," enacts that no taluqdar shall have power to give his estate to a person not being a member of a designated class (which includes an adopted son), except by an instrument executed not less than three months before the death of the donor and attested and registered as therein mentioned. It is difficult to discover any contradiction in these sections or to understand how it can be argued that a gift in contravention of s. 16 may be valid in case the object of the gift is exempt from the operation of s. 13, and the gift therefore is not subject to the additional fetter imposed by that section. The question as to the meaning and effect of the deed of May 5, 1887, is rather more difficult. The circumstances which led up to the execution of that instrument are as follows On June 1, 1878, by a registered deed of that date, Madho Singh made over the Amethi taluqa with the exception of certain Muafi villages and certain villages dedicated to the endowment of a temple at Benares to one Sarabjit Singh subject to certain conditions and provisions. On May 26, 1883, Madho Singh executed a will stating that he had adopted Lachhman Singh and giving him the entire taluqa, but making provision for the event of his leaving a natural-born son. On May 29, 1883, Sarabjit Singh executed a registered deed stating that he had relinquished the property and all proprietary rights acquired by him under the deed of gift of June 1, 1878, in favour of Madho Singh and declaring that the adoption of Lachhman Singh had been made at his instance. On April 28, 1886, Madho Singh effected mutation of names in respect of the Amethi taluqa (except the Muafi villages and the villages dedicated to the endowment of the temple at Benares) in favour of Lachhman Singh on an application which stated that if Lachhman Singhs connection with the estate should be severed during Madho Singhs lifetime then the whole estate would revert to him. Mutation of names in the case of the Muafi villages followed on a supplementary application by Madho Singh. On May 5, 1887, Madho Singh executed the instrument which has given rise to the present question. The document is not very clear, nor is it altogether intelligible. Mutation of names in the case of the Muafi villages followed on a supplementary application by Madho Singh. On May 5, 1887, Madho Singh executed the instrument which has given rise to the present question. The document is not very clear, nor is it altogether intelligible. In the last paragraph Madho Singh declares that he had written the deed " by way of a deed of adoption and codicil to a will in order to amend and rectify the deed of May 26, 1883, by adding some necessary provisions to it." The deed in the main is clearly testamentary in its character, but there are two paragraphs which gave some colour to the plaintiffs claim. The first five paragraphs have no material bearing on the present question. Paragraph 6 begins by stating that he (Madho Singh) had had the instrument of June 1, 1878, which he had executed in favour of Sarabjit Singh, cancelled and destroyed with the consent of Sarabjit Singh, and Sarabjit Singh had again put him in possession of the estate. Madho Singh then declares that after getting possession he had made over the whole of the said property to his adopted son and had absolutely and unconditionally relin quished all rights and proprietorship as well as ceased interference with the property, and he concludes the paragraph by saying, "therefore neither Sarabjit Singh himself nor his representatives have any right left to make a claim under the deed of June 1, 1878." In clause 8 Madho Singh describes Lachhman Singh as "my adopted son, and donee and legatee under the deed dated 26th of May, 1883, as well as under this deed ...... in respect of all my movable and immovable property which has already been acquired, or which may be acquired hereafter during my lifetime or which may come to me by inheritance or to which I may become entitled." Madho Singhs object in putting on record the statement con tained in paragraph 6 probably was to make the position of Lachhman Singh secure against the interference of certain relatives with whom, it is said, he had a blood feud, one of whom might possibly claim under Sarabjit Singh. Paragraph 8 carries the matter no further. In styling Lachhman Singh "donee" the document refers simply to what was given to him by the will and codicil. Paragraph 8 carries the matter no further. In styling Lachhman Singh "donee" the document refers simply to what was given to him by the will and codicil. Looking at the matter broadly their Lordships agree with the learned judges in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in holding that the instrument of May 5, 1887, was testamentary and cannot be construed as a deed of gift inter vivos. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal must be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the appeal.