AMEER ALI, LORD MACNAGHTEN, LORD MERSEY, LORD ROBSON, SIR ARTHUR WILSON
body1910
DigiLaw.ai
Judgement Appeals from decrees of the High Court (May 29, 1906) affirming decrees of the District Judge of Rungpur (April 22, 1904) which affirmed money decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Rungpur (December 23, 1903) in favour of the plaintiffs as prayed. 9 Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 7 ( 1910- 1911) Kumar Chandra Kishore Roy V. Prasanna Kumari Dasi 110 Two suits were brought by the respondents, the daughters of Kumar Shyam Kishore Roy, who died in 1879, leaving a will the material clause of which is set out in their Lordships1 judgment, to recover arrears of maintenance from the appellant, who was the adopted son of the testator in possession of his estate. The questions decided were whether the respondents were entitled under the will as claimed, and whether the suit was maintainable having regard to s. 187 of Act X. of 1865. With regard to the first point the appellant contended that on a true construction of the will the gift of maintenance was bad in law as it had been made dependent on the happening of a specific uncertain event, namely, marriage, which in each case happened after the death of the testator. With regard to the second point the respondents alleged in their plaints, and the appellant denied, that probate was granted to testators widow in 1879. The Subordinate Judge found that when these suits were instituted no letters of administration had been granted, and it appeared that the only letters that were ever granted were issued to the respondents mother after these suits had been filed and for the purpose of enabling them to be prosecuted. None of the orders passed in relation to this application for letters of administration were in evidence; but it appeared from the judgment of the High Court that the District Judge had granted general letters of administration in respect of the entire estate, and that on appeal the High Court had ordered that letters should be limited to the realization of the maintenance allowance. The administratrix was then ordered by the District Judge to bring her letters into Court that a fresh limited grant might be made to her. Before this could be done the administratrix died, the result being that the original letters remained formally un-cancelled.
The administratrix was then ordered by the District Judge to bring her letters into Court that a fresh limited grant might be made to her. Before this could be done the administratrix died, the result being that the original letters remained formally un-cancelled. The Courts below held that the legacy was valid and that, the will having been established in the administration proceedings, any legatee claiming under the will could sue notwithstanding that the High Court had directed that letters of a different and limited nature should be issued. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Eddis, for the appellant, contended that the respondents were not entitled to the maintenance claimed, as the bequests in their favour were on the true construction of the will given only in the uncertain event of marriage. No time was mentioned for the occurrence of that event, and, therefore, in order that the legacy should take effect the event should have happened before the fund bequeathed was distributable, that is, before the death of the testator. Reference was made, to the Indian Succession Act, ss. 111, 107 and its 111ustrations, 119, and 125. They also referred to ss. 180 and 181 and contended that in the absence of probate or effective letters of administration before suit the Court was incompetent to grant the relief sought. The letters granted after suit had been cancelled on appeal to the High Court and no fresh letters had been issued. De Gruyther, K.C., and OGorman, for the respondents, contended that on the true construction of the will the legacies in these cases were not made contingent upon marriage or any other uncertain and future event, and therefore s. 111 did not apply. With regard to s. 187, which was made applicable to Hindus by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870, s. 2), it was contended that probate had been granted within the meaning of s. 3 of Act X. of 1865, inasmuch as the Court had granted a certified copy of the will and letters of administration, and it was immaterial as regards the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain this suit whether the grant was before or after the date of the suit. They referred to Act V. of 1881, s. 154, and to Gordhandas v. Rai Ramcoover (( 1901) I. L. R. 26 Bomb. 267.) as to the meaning and effect of probate.
They referred to Act V. of 1881, s. 154, and to Gordhandas v. Rai Ramcoover (( 1901) I. L. R. 26 Bomb. 267.) as to the meaning and effect of probate. Eddis replied, citing Mohamidu Mohideen Hadjiar v. Pitchey. ([ 1894] A. C. 437, 442.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by 9 Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 7 ( 1910- 1911) Kumar Chandra Kishore Roy V. Prasanna Kumari Dasi 111 LORD MERSEY. These are two appeals from the judgment and decrees of the High Court at Fort William, in Bengal, dated May 26, 1906, confirming a decree of the District Judge of Rungpur, dated April 22, 1904, which confirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Rungpur, dated December 23, 1908. The suits were brought by two Hindu ladies, daughters of one Kumar Shyam Kishore Roy, deceased, against the appellant, who is the adopted son of the deceased, to recover arrears of maintenance alleged to be due to them under their fathers will. The appellant denied that the respondents were entitled to any maintenance under the terms of the will, and further objected that they were not competent to maintain their suits inasmuch as they had not obtained letters of administration to their fathers estate. The facts, so far as they relate to the first point, are as follows. On July 18, 1879, Kumar Shyam Kishore Roy died. He left no son, but he left two of his wives, namely, Rani Pran Kishori and Rani Basanta Kumari, surviving him. By the latter wife he had had two daughters, who are the present respondents. He had made a will dated January 28, 1878. This will, together with certain deeds previously executed by the testator, granted permission to the wives to adopt sons, and in accordance with this permission the widow Rani Pran Kishori adopted the appellant. At this time the appellant was a minor. The will makes provision for the wives and for the two daughters. The clause in the will relating to the two daughters, omitting irrelevant words, is as follows —" When they will be married and if they desire to live in separate houses the person in whose management my property will be at the time will make separate houses for them in the vicinity of my house from the income of my property. For the maintenance of my daughters I fix an allowance of Rs.
For the maintenance of my daughters I fix an allowance of Rs. 600 a year for Srimati Prasanna and Rs.600 for Srimati Surat. As long as the daughters will live in the separate houses in this place they will get the fixed allowances respectively ; but if the daughters do not live in this place they will get Rs. 10." The two daughters married, the one in 1888 and the other in 1889, and they went to live in separate houses. The estate was at this time under the management of the Court of Wards, the appellant being still a minor. The Court, after the respective marriages, paid to each of the ladies the Rs. 600 per annum as provided by the will. The appellant came of age in 1896 and then entered into possession of the estate. Since obtaining possession he has refused to make the allowance to the ladies, alleging that the clause in the will providing for the allowance is void by reason of the provisions contained in s. 111 of the Indian Succession Act (Act X. of 1865). Hence these two suits. Sect. 111 of the Succession Act is as follows " Where a legacy is given if a specified uncertain event shall happen, and no time is mentioned in the will for the occurrence of that event, the legacy cannot take effect unless such event happens before the period when the fund bequeathed is payable or distributable." It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the bequests to the daughters were given only in the uncertain event of marriage, and that as that event did not happen in the lifetime of the testator the bequests never took effect. Their Lordships are of opinion that this contention is not well founded. The payment of the maintenance is not made contingent on the marriage of the ladies. The will deals with the maintenance in a clause which stands by itself and which must be read by itself. The clause contains no reference to marriage or to any other future event. Sect. 111 therefore has no bearing on the construction to be put on the bequest. The facts relating to the second point are as follows.
The will deals with the maintenance in a clause which stands by itself and which must be read by itself. The clause contains no reference to marriage or to any other future event. Sect. 111 therefore has no bearing on the construction to be put on the bequest. The facts relating to the second point are as follows. At the time when these suits were instituted (September, 1900) no letters of administration had been granted ; but while the suits were pending, namely, on October 7, 1901, the widow Rani Pran Kishori obtained from the District Judge of Rungpur 9 Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 7 ( 1910- 1911) Kumar Chandra Kishore Roy V. Prasanna Kumari Dasi 112 a grant of letters of administration with the will annexed. This grant was subsequently modified by a judgment of the High Court, dated February 24, 1903, by limiting it to the realization of the maintenance allowance provided for the widow by the will. Before the District Judge could recall and alter the said letters so as to bring them into conformity with the judgment of the High Court the widow died. Thus the said letters never were formally altered. Upon these facts the appellant contended that, having regard to s. 187 of the Indian Succession Act, the Court was not competent to grant the relief prayed for. Sect. 187 is as follows " No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction within the province shall have granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or shall have granted letters of administration under the 180th section." The 180th section here referred to relates exclusively to wills proved elsewhere than within the province and provides for grants of letters of administration upon the production of authenticated copies of such wills; the section has no relevancy to the case now under consideration, for here the letters of administration were granted within the province. The question therefore turns entirely on the effect of the first part of s. 187, which requires that, before the right of a legatee can be established, probate of the will shall have been granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction within the province.
The question therefore turns entirely on the effect of the first part of s. 187, which requires that, before the right of a legatee can be established, probate of the will shall have been granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction within the province. By clause 3 of the Act "probate" is defined as meaning "the copy of a will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction, with a grant of administration to the estate of the testator." Their Lordships are of opinion that u probate " as defined was in fact obtained. The will was proved before a Court of competent jurisdiction within the province, and that Court duly issued to the widow a certified copy of the will under the seal of the Court with a grant of administration to the estate of the testator. The provisions of the section were therefore strictly complied with. The subsequent limitation of the grant to so much of the estate of the deceased as might be sufficient to satisfy the widows claim, even if right, appears to their Lordships to be immaterial. It is then said that even if the provisions of s. 187 were complied with, the compliance was after suit commenced and was therefore too late. Their Lordships, however, are of opinion that, as the compliance was before decree, the Court was fully competent to deal with the case. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and with costs.