JUDGMENT 1. These three appeals arise from a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Midnapur decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for only half of certain resumed chowkidari chakran lands of the village of Kumarpur in Mehal Lat Jhankra bearing Towzi No. 475. The area now sued for is 59 bighas odd valued at Rs. 300. It was held by Defendant No. 1, Madhab Chandra Singh, a pharidar as a service tenure, a portion was sublet to the Defendants Nos. 2 to 9, and a portion to Ambika Charan Rai and others Defendants in the suits out of which Appeals Nos. 2299 and 2779 arise many years ago; but he, Defendant No. 1, has continued to cultivate 50 bighas himself. The Plaintiff was proprietor of 8 annas of the Mehal and the Defendant Nos. 10 and 11 were his co-proprietors in the other 8 annas. They mortgaged their share of the Mehal to the Eastern Mortgage and Agency Company on the 20th January 1891. The chowkidari chakran lands were released mouzah by mouzah within the one Mehal by the Collector on the 16th May 1901. They were released jointly to Plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 10 and 11 who were still de facto proprietors of the two 8 annas shares. 2. The Bank had obtained a decree on their mortgage in 1900 and on the 19th July 1902 they put up the 8 annas share of the Defendants Nos. 10 and 11 in the Mehal to sale under the decree. It was purchased by Plaintiff who thus became 16 annas proprietor of the Mehal. 3. The Munsif in the Court of first instance gave the Plaintiff a decree in full with mesne profits. 4. The learned Sub-Judge in the lower Appellate Court has held that at the time the transfer by the Collector was made the Plaintiff had only a title to 8 annas of the chowkidari chakran lands and that as those lands did not pass by the sale of the Mehal under the mortgage decree Plaintiff has failed to prove his title and cannot succeed in ejectment. The Appellant, in appeal No. 2297, is Rakhal Das Mukherjee, the 8 annas proprietor and purchaser of the other 8 annas in auction sale This appeal is in respect of the half share disallowed by the Subordinate Judge. The Appellant, in appeal No. 2297, is Rakhal Das Mukherjee, the 8 annas proprietor and purchaser of the other 8 annas in auction sale This appeal is in respect of the half share disallowed by the Subordinate Judge. Appeal No. 2779 is by the same Plaintiff in respect of the mesne profits disallowed. As this is under Rs. 500 it is conceded that no appeal lies and this appeal is therefore dismissed with cost on the amount disallowed. Appeal No. 2299 is by another Plaintiff, a lessee of Rakhal Das, over 8 bighas odd of the chowkidari chakran lands. Now at the outset we are confronted with the fact that the Plaintiff's title to the 16 annas was declared by the Munsif in the presence of the only other possible title-holders the Defendants Nos. 10 and 11 and those Defendants did not appeal to the Subordinate Judge. 5. The first ground of appeal therefore which is urged before us is that the Defendant No. 1 had no right to re-open the issue which is the only point on which he relies whether the auction-purchaser Rakhal Das or his lessee Keshab has got any right to the 8 annas share of the chakran lands settled by the Government with Defendants Nos. 10 and 11. 6. We think on the authority of Bhugobutty Misrain v. Domun Misser 24 W. R. 365 (1875) that this contention must succeed. It is useless for the Defendant No. 1 to say that he does not claim under Defendants Nos. 10 and 11. In the case cited the Defendants did not claim under Jogmaya they only set up her rights to defeat those of the Plaintiffs. They said whatever the Plaintiffs might claim Jogmaya was the heir and the Plaintiffs not having established their title could not succeed. That is the case here. Defendant No. 1 if he is not the tenant of Defendants Nos. 10 and 11 is a mere trespasser and a trespasser can certainly be ejected by a Plaintiff who has fully established his title to the 16 annas. The Defendant No. 1 alleges in his written statement that he is still pharidar and is therefore being paid out of the chowkidari assessment which the Plaintiff has to pay Government as consideration for the resumption of the chowkidari lands. The Defendant No. 1 alleges in his written statement that he is still pharidar and is therefore being paid out of the chowkidari assessment which the Plaintiff has to pay Government as consideration for the resumption of the chowkidari lands. It is therefore a singularly audacious claim on his part to assert a right to hold over the service lands which were granted to him in lieu of pay. But he bases his contention on the theory that the resumed chowkidari chakran lands constitute an entirely separate estate which has no further connection with Mehal Khankra, Towzi No. 475, when once it has been transferred to the zemindars with a separate assessment under the Chowkidari Act. He also says that it could not have been included in the mortgage security of 1891 and the Plaintiff not being himself mortgagee but only a purchaser of a fraction of the estate can only have purchased what was included in the mortgage and the sale certificate. 7. He therefore contends that the broader question whether chowkidari chakran lands are part and parcel of the zamindari need not be decided. The narrower question here is what passed by the mortgage sale. 8. Taking however the broader question first, since it was hotly argued on the authority of Kashim Sheikh v. Prasanna Kumar I. L. R. 33 Cal. 596 : s. c. 10 C. W.N. 598 (1906), which the learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below considered to be on all fours with "this case, we are not aware that any decision of this Court has gone so far as to say that the chowkidari chakran lands did not form part of the estate before resumption and re-settlement by the Collector. But this is what we should have to hold before we could come to the conclusion that these lands were not included in the mortgage to the Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co., in 1891. 9. It was found necessary to distinguish this ruling in the case of Kazi Newaz v. Ram Jadu I. L. R. 34 Cal. But this is what we should have to hold before we could come to the conclusion that these lands were not included in the mortgage to the Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co., in 1891. 9. It was found necessary to distinguish this ruling in the case of Kazi Newaz v. Ram Jadu I. L. R. 34 Cal. 109: s. c. 11 C. W. N. 201 (1906) in so far as that ruling held that the chowkidari chakran lands were " detached from the parent estate, and one of the learned Judges directly dissented from the finding but it was not necessary to refer the matter to a Full Bench as the rights of the putnidar were saved by his contract and by sec. 51 of the Act. We agree with the learned Judges who decided Kazi Newaz Khodd's case I. L. R. 34 Cal. 109: s. c. 11 C. W. N. 201 (1906) that the doctrine of detachment has been carried too far in the case of Kashim Sheikh v. Prasanna Kumar I. L. R. 33 Cal. 596: s c. 10 C. W.N. 698 (1906). inasmuch as the assessment under the Chowkidari Act does not appear to us be a revenue assessment although it is recoverable as if it were just as many other charges on land are. There can be no doubt the revenue was assessed on the whole parent estate including the chakran lands at the original settlement and the land taken by Government to support the watch and ward in the villages was not separated from the parent estate, being taken as security that the duties of watch and ward, which were one of the incidents of the zamindari itself for which the zemindar was responsible, because he held settlement of the whole estate, were properly performed not only in the interests of the zemindar but of Government and the public. On their resumption they form a separate estate for one purpose that is as being hypothecated for the payment of the chowkidari assessment, an incident which does not apply to other parts of the estate. For this purpose only it appears to us that they are separate. It is not necessary however to carry this question further inasmuch as it is admitted that the only question here is whether they were mortgaged at a time when there had been no settlement. 10. For this purpose only it appears to us that they are separate. It is not necessary however to carry this question further inasmuch as it is admitted that the only question here is whether they were mortgaged at a time when there had been no settlement. 10. Reading the mortgage deed and the sale certificate we can have no doubt that they were. The deed includes all jaghirs, lands, hereditaments and all manner of rights, liberties, easements, privileges, profits, commodities, emoluments, advantages and appurtenances whatsoever in the lands described in the first schedule. Now, the first schedule includes all the 8 annas share of the mortgagors of and in all that estate known as Lat Jhankra, Pergunnah Chandrakona and although we observe that the Towzi No. 713 was different in 1891 and this has of course been copied into the High Court sale certificate of 1902. this was not commented on by either party at the bar and there is no contention that this Lat Jhankra is not the Mehal from which the chowkidari chakran lands were derived. 11. The sale certificate exactly follows the schedule and there can be no doubt that the whole 8 annas of the Mehal was sold including everything that appertained to it in any way at the time of the mortgage. The Defendant's contention that the chowkidari chakran lands were not mortgaged and sold therefore fails. 12. Another branch of the contention is with regard to the operation of sec. 70 of the Transfer of Property Act. There also we think the Plaintiff must succeed. Whatever be the view as to the character of a resumed chowkidari chakran estate we do not think that it can stand independently of the parent estate which is the way the Defendant's learned Vakil puts it and it certainly falls within the rule laid down in Rakestraw v. Brewer 2 P. Wms. 511. that " as coming from the same root it would be subject to the same equity," a rule which the Judicial Committee say in Raj Kishendatt Ram v. Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan (5) has never been impeached. This principle was, as their Lordships point out, enforced against a mortgagor in the case of Doe v. Pott 2 Doug. 511. that " as coming from the same root it would be subject to the same equity," a rule which the Judicial Committee say in Raj Kishendatt Ram v. Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan (5) has never been impeached. This principle was, as their Lordships point out, enforced against a mortgagor in the case of Doe v. Pott 2 Doug. 710(1781) We therefore find that the chowkidari chaktan lands on release would be accretions to the mortgage and as the mortgagors were parties in this suit and are concluded by the judgment of the Munsif against which they did not appeal the Defendant No. 1 cannot now be heard to say that they are not accretions. We find therefore that the Plaintiff in appeal No. 2297 must succeed as against Defendant No. 1. 13. Then as regards the Defendants Nos. 2 to 9, they claim to have acquired a right of occupancy and reliance is placed by them on the ruling in Ram Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Ram Newaj (7). The learned Munsif in the case of Court instance held on the authority of Shaikh Jonab Ali v. Rakibuddin 9 C. W. N. 571(1905) and Mritunjoy Roy Chowdhry v. Kanatullah Narya 11 C. W.N. 46(1906) that no occupancy right can be said to arise in service holdings and he therefore decreed khas possession. The Defendants Nos. 2 to 7 did not appeal to the Subordinate Judge and the Plaintiffs' appeal as against them is that their case was not before the Subordinate Judge and that he had no jurisdiction to deal with it. We think this contention must prevail and that the Munsif's decree is final as against them. The result is that the appeal No. 2917 must be decreed and the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate court set aside and that of the Munsif restored except in regard to mesne profits as regards which the appeal No. 2779 has already been dismissed and the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge affirmed. The Plaintiffs will get his cost in all Courts in appeal No. 2297. 14. As regards appeal No. 2299 however which is in respect of 8 3/4 bighas leased to Keshab Chandra Shaw we find that the tenants on that land Ambica Charan Rai and others did appeal to the Subordinate Judge and the question whether they have acquired occupancy lights has therefore to be considered. 15. 14. As regards appeal No. 2299 however which is in respect of 8 3/4 bighas leased to Keshab Chandra Shaw we find that the tenants on that land Ambica Charan Rai and others did appeal to the Subordinate Judge and the question whether they have acquired occupancy lights has therefore to be considered. 15. The ruling in Ram Kamar Bhattacharjee v. Ram Newaj I. L. R. 31 Cal. 1021 (1909) appears to apply to them on the Subordinate Judge's finding that they are holding the land for fifty years or so. The ruling in Mritunjoy Roy Chozvdhry v. Kanatullah Narya 11 C. W. N. 46 (1906) refers to a service tenure held by a chowkidar direct from the zemindar a tenure which terminates with his death or as laid down by Mookerjee, J., in Ansar Ali Jemadar v. C. E. Grey 2 C. L. J. 403 (1905). on his dismissal for failure to perform his duties. The distinction between such a case and that of a grant for services of a public nature is pointed out in the latter case and the ruling in Mritunjoy Roy Chowdhry v. Kanatullah Narya 11 C. W. N. 46 (1906) cannot therefore be said to have any application to the case before us. See also Radha Pershad v. Budhu Dashad I. L. R. 22 Cal. 938 (1895) 16. The case in Shaikh Jonab Ali v. Rakibuddin 9 C. W. N. 571 (1905) cannot in any way help the Plaintiff. That was a case where the 8 annas proprietor gave a lease of 16 annas (sic)esumed a chowkidari chakran lands to a tenant after they had been re-settled with him by a mistake of the Collector who ought only to have re-settled 8 annas with him. A year after the lease was granted the mistake was discovered and the chakran lands re-settled in the proper proportion of 8 annas each with each of the proprietors. It was held the lessees had obtained no title to the 16 annas chakran land. Nor is he helped by the decision in Krishna Kinkar Dutt v. Mahanto Bhagaban Das 12 C.W.N. 161(1907) where the tenancy was granted after the Bengal Tenancy Act came into force. It was held the lessees had obtained no title to the 16 annas chakran land. Nor is he helped by the decision in Krishna Kinkar Dutt v. Mahanto Bhagaban Das 12 C.W.N. 161(1907) where the tenancy was granted after the Bengal Tenancy Act came into force. We are therefore bound to hold on the authorities that the Defendants have obtained occupancy rights in the 8 3/4 bighas leased to Keshab Chandra Shaw and his appeal No. 2299 must be dismissed with costs. We observed that a great deal of unnecessary matter has been incorporated in the paper-book. The Respondents will be exempted from printing costs of schedules of chakran lands from pp. 20 to 225 except the orders of transfer and of quinquennial papers, bilabundi katkina settlement and latbandi, pp. 229 to 289.