JUDGMENT George Knox and Griffin, JJ. - Lala Hanuman Prasad, respondent in the present appeal was plaintiff in the court of first instance. He came to court saying that he was the owner in possession of certain zamindari property, consisting of numbers which are given in the schedule do his plaint, of which the total amount is 14 bighas 9 biswas. He alleged that the defendant had no right or share in these plots of land, that in the same village, the defendant Lachman Das, now appellant had purchased at auction 2 bighas 5 biswas, which was a grave-yard, and of which the numbers were 979 and 1518. He makes other allegations regarding the defendant Lachman Das' possession quad these plots, but we are not concerned with these allegations in this appeal. He then goes to say that Bilas Rai, one of the co-sharers in Kasba Khair, applied to the Revenue Court in 1905 for the partition of the kasba Khair. The usual proclamation regarding partition was issued, and before the time allowed by the proclamation had expired, Hanuman Prasad came before the Collector and said that he had no objection to the partition and asked that a separate lot might be prepared of his property. Apparently Lachman Das had notice of the application of Bilas Rai, and it is admitted that he was present at the partition proceedings which ensued. According to Hanuman Prasad, when their proceedings had gone on some way, namely, in October 1907, and after the amin had drawn up lots, Lachman Das put in a petition to the effect that he was a co-sharer in khata No. 34. Hanuman Prasad says that do notice was given to him of this petition, and that behind his back the Revenue Court passed an order on the 21st of October, 1907, to the effect that Lachman Das was to have a share in the whole of the khata corresponding to the amount claimed by him, the result of which was that, instead of Lachman Das being given merely the two plots of grave land, he was given a share in the lands of the khata and, amongst that, of laud which the plaintiff had asked to be marked out in a separate lot in his favour. Upon this Hanuman Prasad, on the 22nd November, 1907, instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, asking for a declaration that he was the owner and in possession of the plots in suit. 2. The court of first instance, holding that the plaintiff ought to have applied to the Revenue Court and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge, holding that Hanuman Prasad had no opportunity to assert his title in answer to the petition put in by Lachman Das and could maintain a suit in the Civil Court, which could adjudicate upon the question of title raised before it, set aside the decree of the first court and remanded the case for trial on the merits. In appeal, Lachman Das urged that section 233(k) of Local Act No. III of 1901 bars the suit. He further contended that the plaintiff ought to have raised any question of title he possessed when he appeared in answer to the original proclamation for partition, and also that the decision of the Revenue Court operated as res judicata to the present claim, The partition proceedings, we are told, were not completed until the 16th of April, 1909, some 18 months after Hanuman Prasad instituted his suit in the Civil Court. So far as we can judge from the papers before us, the petition put in by Lachman Das was untrue, misleading and put in before the Revenue Court out of time. The allegation of Hanuman Prasad is that he holds the land in severalty. This appears to be the fact, and the allegation appears to have commended itself to the partition offices and he acting, as he would, u/s 117 of Act III of 1901, allotted to Hanuman Prasad the lands hold by him in severally. The only lands, if any, to which the defendant was entitled were the two plots which we may term in this judgment the cemetery land. The procedure of the court, so far as we may say anything about it, after Lachman Das' application was entirely irregular. At the same time we are also compelled to hold that Hanuman Prasad should have gone to the Revenue Court and to get put right the manifest irregularity in procedure which he says was committed by the Revenue Court. The procedure of the court, so far as we may say anything about it, after Lachman Das' application was entirely irregular. At the same time we are also compelled to hold that Hanuman Prasad should have gone to the Revenue Court and to get put right the manifest irregularity in procedure which he says was committed by the Revenue Court. Had he done so, and if his allegations are correct, we have little doubt that the Revenue Court would have put matters right. Instead of that he has come to this court and he is met by the bar contained in section 233(k) of the Land Revenue Act. Section 233(k) says that no person shall institute any suit or other proceedings in a Civil Court with respect to the partition or union of mahals except as provided by sections 111 and 112. Unless Hanuman Prasad can show that his case comes clearly within the provisions of section 111, his suit is barred by section 233(k). He attempts to show this by saying that Lachman Das in his application of the 21st of October, 1907, raised a question of title, and as he never had any opportunity to answer that question of title, and in this way he tries to bring his case within the rulings in Khasay v. Jugla (1906) I.L.R., 28 All., 432 and Muhammad Jan v. Sadanand Pande (1906) I.L.R., 28 All., 394. Both these cases are clearly distinguishable from the present case. We can only repeat here what was laid down in the Full Bench case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram (1901) I.L.R., 23 All., 291, in which it was held that any exercise of jurisdiction of a Civil Court which would disturb or in any way affect the distribution of land made by partition is barred by section 241(f) of Act XIX of 1873, now section 233(k) of Act No. III of 1901, no matter whether a question of title or any other question is raised in the suit. 3. We decree the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and restore the decree of the court of first instance. We make no order as to costs.