JUDGMENT John Stanley Knight, C.J. and Banerji, J. - The facts of this case are fully set forth in the judgment of the learned Judge of this Court from whose decision this appeal under the Letters Patent has been preferred, and it is unnecessary to recapitulate them. The plaintiffs acquired the property claimed by them under an auction purchase which took place on the 20th of November, 1891. Formal possession was delivered to their predecessors in title on the 25th of November 1892. At that time Sumeran, whose rights the plaintiffs' father, Ram Sahai, purchased at auction, was dead and his legal representatives were out of possession. A trespasser, namely, the mortgagee from the sons of Pheuku Rai, was actually in possession. It was in 1897 that the present defendants appellants obtained actual possession of the property by virtue of a decree which they obtained in a suit to which the plaintiffs, or their predecessor in title, was no party. It is contended that the claim comes within the purview of article 137 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act of 1877. We agree with our learned colleague that that article only applies to a suit against a third party and not to a suit against the judgment-debtor or his representative. This is manifest from the language of the third column of the schedule as pointed out by our learned brother. We are also of opinion that article 142 is inapplicable. The plaintiffs were never in actual possession and were not dispossessed. The only article therefore of the Limitation Act which can apply is article 144, Rod the period of limitation is 12 years from the date on which the defendant's possession became adverse to the plaintiffs. The word "defendant" by its very definition includes a person from or through whom the defendant derives his liability to be sued. Therefore the adverse possession of the defendant, referred to in the article, necessarily means the adverse possession of the defendant himself or of any person from or through whom he derives his possession. In the present case the defendant did not derive his possession from or through the sons of Phenku or their mortgagee. Therefore the defendants are not entitled to add to their own possession the period of the possession of the first set of trespassers. In the present case the defendant did not derive his possession from or through the sons of Phenku or their mortgagee. Therefore the defendants are not entitled to add to their own possession the period of the possession of the first set of trespassers. In the year 1897 when the defendants actually obtained possession, the plaintiffs had a subsisting title to the property, more than 12 years not having elapsed from the date of their auction purchase. It is from the date on which the defendants obtained delivery of possession in execution of the decree obtained by them that their possession can be regarded as adverse, and, as such possession commenced only in 1897, they have not been in possession for a period sufficiently long to extinguish the plaintiff's rights. The claim is therefore not time-barred, and the decision of the learned Judge of this. Court is correct. We dismiss the appeal with costs.