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1910 DIGILAW 321 (ALL)

Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bank of Upper India, Limited and Digambar Singh

1910-10-29

body1910
JUDGMENT John Stanley Knight, C.J. and Banerji, J. - In the suit which has given rise to this appeal, the Secretary of State for India seeks for a declaration of his proprietary right to a plot of land known as No. 4 Rajpore Road, Dehra Dun, containing 86 odd local bighas. He also asks for an assessment of the land to ground rent and for the execution of a lease for 90 years by the defendants and in the event of refusal by the defendant to pay the rent when fixed for possession of the lauds by their ejectment therefrom. The plaintiff further claims a sum in respect of rent from the 26th of December 1904 to the date of the institution of the suit. 2. The main defence of the defendant Bank is a plea of limitation, the allegation of the Bank being that the Bank and its predecessors in title have been in adverse possession of the property for a period of upwards of 60 years. 3. The history of the property takes us back to the beginning of the 19th century, when an incursion was made into Dehra Dun and the adjoining territory, then belonging to the Raj of Garhwal by the troops of the King of Nepal, and this territory was wrested from the Raj. Then followed a war between the troops of the British Government and the Garkha troops, with the result that the Gurkhas were ultimately defeated and the territory in question was ceded to the British Government in the year 1816. Portion of the territory so ceded was restored to the Raj of Garhwal, but Dehra Dun was retained by Government. About this time a young officer, Lieutenant Young, who afterwards attained the rank of Colonel, raised a Gurkha regiment and located it in Dehra Dun. A cantonment was formed which was demarcated by pillars which are still standing. Within this cantonment, Lieutenant Young built a house for himself, and he appropriated the piece of ground which is the subject-matter of this litigation. This piece of land is situate within the boundary pillars at the north end of the cantonment. This cantonment remained under the control of the military authorities, subject to the regulations governing lands in cantonments, until it was made over by the military to the civil authorities on the 17th of August, 1874. This piece of land is situate within the boundary pillars at the north end of the cantonment. This cantonment remained under the control of the military authorities, subject to the regulations governing lands in cantonments, until it was made over by the military to the civil authorities on the 17th of August, 1874. No evidence is forthcoming as to the authority under which Lieutenant Young appropriated the land in question. It may be presumed that as he raised the regiment and formed the cantonment, he built his house and appropriated the land surrounding it without any specific authority being given to him for so doing. He was a man of considerable ability and force of character, as his letters which are on the record show, and in 1828 he was appointed Superintendent of the Dun. He appears to have transferred the property to an Assistant Surgeon, named Bruce, prior to 1843. B(sic)ce in turn transferred his interest to one Lead beater and on the 28th of January 1864, the Administrator-General of Bengal as the Administrator with the will annexed of Leadbeater "according to his estate, right, title and interest therein, and be far as he could or might at law or in equity as such Administrator as aforesaid and not further or otherwise" granted and confirmed unto the Rev. John Simms Woodside "according to the nature of the premises," the dwelling house with the land belonging thereto, described as being" in the north end of the military cantonments at Dehra Dun and formerly the property of Collector Young." Mr. Woodside transferred his interest in the property to Colonel Peter Abbot in 1859, and ultimately after divers mesne transfers, the defendant appellant Bank purchased it, 4. So long as the property remained in cantonments, it appears to us clear that Colonel Young and his successors in title could acquire no title thereto by adverse possession. Colonel Young was an officer of Government and Superintendent of the Dun, and it must, we think, be presumed that he built the house in question and occupied the land adjoining it, subject to the regulations governing lands in cantonments and as Government property. In fact, he recognised throughout that the property belonged to the Crown. Colonel Young was an officer of Government and Superintendent of the Dun, and it must, we think, be presumed that he built the house in question and occupied the land adjoining it, subject to the regulations governing lands in cantonments and as Government property. In fact, he recognised throughout that the property belonged to the Crown. We have on the record a letter under his hand when Superintendent of the Doon, dated the 22nd of October 1829, in which he admitted that the zemindari or proprietary right in the property was vested in Government. In reply to a letter of one Captain McMullin, Executive Officer of the XIth Division, Meerut, he writes:--"I have the honour to inform you that the lands in the cantonments of the Sermoor Battalion (i.e., the old cantonments) are held on the following terms, the zamindari or proprietary right being vested in Government: Lands farmed to thikadars and included in the last settlement and taken into cantonments subsequently, 23 pacca bighas, 16 biswas and 15 biswansis for which Government pays Rs. 18, The claim ceases with the existing settlement. There are 23 pacca bighas, 16 biawas and 5 biswansis belonging to the muafi lands of Mahant Sarup Das, for which nothing is paid, no claim having been made. The remaining land, that is, 277 bighas pacca, 4 biswas and 10 biswansis is Government land." It is obvious from this letter that Lieutenant Young did not then set up any claim to the absolute ownership of the property. So long as that; property remained in cantonments, it must; be regarded, we think, as land held for Government under Government regulations. If this be so, it follows that the plea of the statute of limitation must fail, inasmuch as the old cantonments remained under military authority up to the 17th August, 1874, when the control was handed over to the civil authorities. From that date up to the date of the institution of this suit 60 years have not elapsed. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge has very fully dealt with the facts of the case in his judgment, and we do not think it necessary to recapitulate them. He found against the defendant Bank on the plea of limitation, and we think rightly. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge has very fully dealt with the facts of the case in his judgment, and we do not think it necessary to recapitulate them. He found against the defendant Bank on the plea of limitation, and we think rightly. The case is not unlike that which was the subject of decision by Straight J., in The Secretary of State for India v. Jagan Prasad (1881) ILR 6 All. 148. In that case it was held that a party who built a house in cantonments must be taken to have derived his title to occupy the land from the military authorities and that their power to make a grant of it could only be co-extensive with their own tenure of the property, and that no assignment by them could subsist beyond the period the land might remain subject to cantonment regulations. Under the various transfers from Lieutenant Young and his successors in title the only interest in the land which passed was, whatever interest Young possessed. He could not under the circumstances dispose of the absolute interest, which 'belonged to Government. This accounts for the guarded manner in which the Administrator-General of Bengal purported to convey the property in the deed of transfer of the 28th of January 1854. He merely granted it according to his estate and interest therein; and so far as he could at law or equity do so. This being the state of things up to the year 1874, when possibly adverse possession for the first time might, with some show of reason, be setup, the defendant's plea of limitation must fail, 60 years not having elapsed from that year. 5. The fairness of the terms upon which a lease is offered by the Government to the defendant Bank has not been questioned before us. These terms appear to be just and reasonable. 6. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs, 7. We are asked by Mr. O'Conor on behalf of the defendant Bank to fix a time within which the lease should be executed. Mr. Wallach, on behalf of the respondent, raises no objection. We think that the lease should be executed within a period of two months from this date, and so we direct.