JUDGMENT : STANLEY, BANERJI, JJ. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiff respondent, Muhammad Ismail, for a declaration that a deed of gift, dated the 29th of June 1908, executed by Musammat Saleh-un-nissa, is void on the grounds, first, that she was suffering from death-illness at the time of executing the document, and secondly, that the property was under the management of the Collector under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and under section 325(A) of Act No. XIV of 1882 the lady was not competent to make the gift. The court of first instance decreed the claim and the lower appellate court has affirmed that decree. It has been found that the lady was suffering from death-illness when she executed the deed of gift. It has also been found on the issue referred by us to the court below, namely, whether she was in possession of her senses and had full knowledge of the contents and effect of the deed of gift, that she was in possession of her senses and was fully cognisant of the contents and effect of the document. Upon these findings it is contended before us that the gift being one made during death-illness is a will under the Muhammadan Law and is valid as regards one-third of the property comprised in it, and that it is not valid in so far as it bestows any part of the property on the heirs of the deceased and also as regards two-thirds of the remainder. Now under the gift in question half of the property was given to Muhammad Saiyeed, the paternal uncle of the lady, and out of the remaining half, one-third was given to her daughter and two-thirds to her son-in-law, the husband of another daughter, in so far as the document bestows any part of the property on the daughter Asghar-un-nissa, it is admittedly void as a will. It is conceded that if section 325(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure was no bar to the right of the lady to make a will, the document is a valid will as regards one-third of the property given to Jawad Husain and Muhammad Sayeed, that is to say, that it is valid in regard to one-sixth share obtained by Muhammad Sayeed and one-ninth obtained by Jawad Husain. It is not denied that under the Muhammadan Law a gift made during death-illness operates as a will. So that if section 325(A) is not a bar to the right of the lady to make the will, it would operate in respect of the one-sixth and the one-ninth shares mentioned above and would not be void as regards those shares. We have therefore to determine whether section 325(A) precluded Musammat Saleh-un-nissa from making a will of her property. That section provides that so long as the Collector can exercise or perform in respect of the judgment-debtor's immovable property, or any part thereof, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on him by sections 322-325, the judgment-debtor or his representative in interest shall be incompetent to mortgage, charge, lease or alienate such property or part except with the written permission of the Collector. It is urged that a will comes within the term “alienate” as mentioned in the section. We are unable to agree with this contention. The word “alienate” in our opinion was used ejusdem generis with the words preceding, namely, mortgage, charge, lease, and manifestly contemplates a transfer which would have present effect and not a devise which can only have operation after the death of the testator. In this view the will was not void and the lady was not incompetent to make it. That being so, the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed in so far as it relates to a one-sixth share acquired by Muhammad Sayeed and a one-ninth share acquired by Jawad Husain under the document in question, treating it as a will, and as regards the rest the said document is void. We accordingly allow the appeal and dismiss the claim as regards a sixth share of the property acquired by Muhammad Sayeed and a ninth share, acquired by Jawad Husain. We affirm the decree of the court below as regards the remainder of the claim. Under the circumstances we direct the parties to pay their own costs in all courts.