JUDGMENT John Stanley, C.J. and Banerji, J. - The question for determination in this appeal is whether or not an application of the 10th of August, 1907, made by the judgment-creditor respondent, was an application in execution of his decree made in accordance with law. The respondent obtained a decree against the appellant on the 19th of November, 1904, and on an application for execution made on the 7th of July, 1905, the judgment-debtor was arrested and sent to jail. He then applied to be declared an insolvent, and by the order of the District Judge of the 28th of July, 1905, an interim order was passed for his release from imprisonment. Subsequently the application of the appellant for declaration of insolvency was rejected. An application was then made by the judgment-creditor on the 10th of August, 1907, for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. An objection was raised to this application that it does not save the operation of the Statute of limitation by giving a fresh start for limitation, it being contended that it was not made in accordance with law. An application was made on the 3rd of September, 1908, praying for the attachment of certain property of the judgment-debtor, and to this application the plea of limitation was set up. The court of first instance came to the conclusion that the application of the 10th of August, 1907, was an application in accordance with law, and that therefore the execution of the decree was not barred by limitation. The judgment-debtor appealed, with the result that his appeal was dismissed. He then filed a second appeal, which was also dismissed, and now he comes before us in appeal under the Letters Patent. 2. The learned Judge of this Court, after a review of the authorities, came to the conclusion that the application of the 10th of August, 1907, was in accordance with law, and that application saved the operation of limitation. We think in this view our learned brother was correct. 3. The present appeal has been ably argued by Mr. Dube. His argument was based largely upon a ruling in the case of Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. We think in this view our learned brother was correct. 3. The present appeal has been ably argued by Mr. Dube. His argument was based largely upon a ruling in the case of Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. Judah, (1885) ILR (Cal) 652 In that case the learned Chief Justice, Sir Comer Petheram, undoubtedly laid down that, under circumstances similar to those in the present case, a re-arrest of a judgment-debtor was not in accordance with law. He was clearly of opinion that "the Code only contemplates one arrest, and that if the defendant is to be remitted to jail, or if he is in custody now, be is in custody under the original arrest, and can be in custody under no other." It seems to us, with all deference, that the learned Chief Justice did not give a true interpretation to the language of section 341 of the CPC of 1882. That section provides that a judgment-debtor shall be discharged from jail in certain events, and amongst others, on the decree being satisfied," or at the request of the judgment-creditor, or on the judgment-creditor omitting to pay the allowance directed to be paid for diet, et cetera. It further prescribes that a judgment-debtor discharged under the section is not thereby discharged from his debt, but that he cannot be re-arrested under the decree in execution of which he was imprisoned. 4. In the present case the judgment-debtor was not discharged under that section. He obtained an interim discharge by the Court in the insolvency matter u/s 349. It seems to us that the discharge so obtained by him cannot be deemed to be a discharge within the meaning of section 341 of the Code of 1882, as the learned Chief Justice seemed to think. 5. The case of The Secretary of State v. Judith, was the subject of consideration by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shamji Deokaran v. Poonja Jairam (1902) I.L.R., 26 Bom., 652. In that case it was held by the learned Chief Justice, Sir Lawrence Jenkins and Crowe, J., that a judgment-debtor who has been arrested and imprisoned in execution of a decree and has obtained an interim protection order u/s 13 of the Indian Insolvency Act, is liable to be re-arrested in execution of the same decree. In that case it was held by the learned Chief Justice, Sir Lawrence Jenkins and Crowe, J., that a judgment-debtor who has been arrested and imprisoned in execution of a decree and has obtained an interim protection order u/s 13 of the Indian Insolvency Act, is liable to be re-arrested in execution of the same decree. In this case there was an appeal from a decision of Stabling, J., and the appeal came before Jenkins, C.J., and Crowe, J. in his judgment the learned Chief Justice reviewed the authorities and criticised at length the judgment of Petheram, C.J., to which we have referred. The learned Chief Justice observed:--"I confess I do not follow the train of reasoning which led Sir Comer PETHERAM to the conclusion that the Code only contemplates one arrest, if by that is meant that there is anything in the Code, which forbids a second arrest apart from the express prohibition it contains. If the Chief Justice's proposition is correct, then it is difficult to see why a special prohibition was inserted in section 341. The mere fact that a general power of retaking the person is not expressly given by the Code cannot be a prohibition, for were it so, then a retaking of property in attachment would equally and by parity of reasoning be illegal; but that no one suggests." "We entirely agree in the view thus expressed and in the conclusion arrived at by our learned brother against whose decision this appeal has been preferred. We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.