JUDGMENT Jenkins, C.J. - These are two appeals from two decrees of the District Judge, by one of which he granted the Respondents in appeal No. 193 of 1908 letters of administration with the Will annexed of the property and credits of one Jadab Chandra Chowdhury of Narainpur, and by the other of which he rejected an application for letters of administration on the assumption of Jadab's intestacy. The substantial question in these two appeals is whether or not a document propounded as the last Will and testament of Jadab Chandra Chowdhury and bearing date the 14th of Agrahayan 1313 (30th of November 1906) is or is not a genuine document. The fates (sic)tion to this document(sic) the date (sic) on the 12th of January 1907 the application was made out of which appeal No. 193 of 1908 arises. The learned District Judge held that the Will was genuine. It appeared to him, however, that there were no executors appointed either expressly or by implication, and he therefore granted letters of administration with copy of the Will annexed to the Respondents in appeal No. 193 of 1908, they being the persons indicated by the Will as shebaits of the deity, Narain, the universal legatee under the document. In support of this document a number of witnesses have been called, and these witnesses were the writer of the document and five gentlemen who purport to have attested its execution. With regard to these witnesses the learned Judge says that he thought it ought to be held that the witnesses who deposed in support of the Will are reliable. That is an expression of opinion which must carry very great weight with us sitting in appeal. It is urged, however, that there are circumstances which cast such a doubt on the whole transaction that we ought to hold that the learned Judge has misappreciated the oral evidence adduced before him. Thus it is said that the story of those attesting witnesses who deposed to their being seated in courtyard and not in the verandah is a story of such improbability that it casts a serious doubt on the whole transaction as narrated. I fail to perceive that. Why, if the story was an untrue one, it should have been marred by this supposed improbability I fail to see. In (sic)othing on the record which (sic) is any improbability in (sic). I fail to perceive that. Why, if the story was an untrue one, it should have been marred by this supposed improbability I fail to see. In (sic)othing on the record which (sic) is any improbability in (sic). But as a matter of fact we do find that there were two co-villagers present on the occasion, and, as far as can be judged, the other attesting witnesses are people of respectability. I do not overlook the fact that Nerode Nath Sanyal was not examined as a witness though apparently he was present on five days and is said to have been one of the attesting witnesses. Nor do I leave out of mind the evidence that is suggestive of his having been elsewhere on the 14th of Agrahayan. But that evidence is by no means conclusive, and I see no sufficient reason, for holding that the failure to call Nerode, as to which we have not sought an explanation should lead us to hold that the learned District Judge wrongly estimated the value of the oral evidence adduced before him. In my opinion, therefore, this document which unquestionably bears the signature of the testator was rightly held by the District Judge to be a genuine document. 2. The only remaining question is whether the Appellant before us is entitled to take exception to the grant of letters of administration. It may be that the Judge might have followed the course adopted in the case in Brojo v. Raj Kumar 6 C. W. N. 310 (1901)., where in circumstances substantially resembling the present, probate was granted to a shebait as being an executor by implication. But seeing that the estate is very small and also that the letters of administration have actually issued and that the Appellant in appeal No. 193 has no interest in the matter and could only embarrass the position if any concession were made in his favour, I think we need not interfere with that part of the District Judge's decree. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be dismissed and the decree of the District Judge confirmed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at seven gold mohurs.