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1910 DIGILAW 5 (ALL)

Kanhai Ram v. Musammat Amri

1910-01-05

BANERJI, SIR JOHN STANLEY

body1910
JUDGMENT : STANLEY, BANERJI, J. This appeal arises out of a suit to recover possession of property which formerly belonged to one Ganga Dan. Ganga Dan was one of the two sons of Salig Ram, Sheo Lal being the other. Ganga Dan had a son named Khushal Ram, who died in his father's life-time, leaving a widow, Musammat Ishri, him surviving. The other son of Salig Ram, namely Sheo Lal, had a son named Narain Das and his wife was one Musammat Amri, a defendant in the suit. Ganga Dan died in the year 1882 or 1883, leaving his daughter-in-law Musammat Ishri him surviving, who upon his death entered into possession of his property and continued in possession until the year 1899, when she died. It has been found by the court below, and there is no controversy as to this, that Musammat Ishri acquired an absolute title to the property of Ganga Dan by adverse possession. The plaintiffs claiming to be tile nearest reversionary heirs of Musammat Ishri instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen-for recovery of possession of the property. The court below has dismissed their claim on three grounds. First of all, the court held that the suit was barred by limitation, it not having been brought within 12 years from the death of Ganga Dan. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the plaintiffs' claim was as reversionary heirs of Ganga Dan for the recovery of his property; but upon a perusal of the plaint it will be seen that their claim was not based on their heirship to Ganga Dan but on their heirship to Musammat Ishri, in the third paragraph of their plaint the plaintiffs say that they are the heirs and next reversioners of Musammat Ishri and are entitled to the possession of the property is dispute. Musammat Ishri having acquired title by adverse possession, it passed upon her death to her heirs, whoever they may be, as her stridhan. She died in 1899 and the present suit was instituted on the 8th of May, 1906, that is, well within the period of 12 years. Musammat Ishri having acquired title by adverse possession, it passed upon her death to her heirs, whoever they may be, as her stridhan. She died in 1899 and the present suit was instituted on the 8th of May, 1906, that is, well within the period of 12 years. The learned Subordinate Judge thinks that property acquired by a female by adverse possession is not her stridhan: but this is contrary to the views expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Rani Janki Koer, (1877), L.R., 5 I.A., 1; S.C., 1 C.L.R., 318 and also contrary to the decision in Mohim Chunder Sanyal v. Kashi Kant Sanyal, (1897) 2 C.W.N., 161. See also the decision of this Bench in the case of Balwant Singh v. Musammat Ram Dei, S.A. No. 414 of 1905, decided on the 7th of December, 1906, which has not been reported. It is clear upon the authorities that property so acquired by a female is her stridhan and as such stridhan passes to her heirs. Then the learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the suit was barred by section 43 of the former Code of Civil Procedure for these reasons:—Musammat Amri, the widow of Narain Das, entered into possession of her husband's property upon his death. She made a gift of portion of it to one Gopal Sahai; whereupon the plaintiffs, claiming to be the reversionary heirs of Narain Das, instituted a suit to have this gift in favour of Gopal Sahai set aside as against them he gift was set aside on the ground that Musammat Amri had only a widow's life estate and was not entitled to dispose of the property, of Narain Das beyond her life estate. The court below was of opinion that the plaintiffs in that suit ought to have claimed the property which they seek to recover in this suit, but in this the learned Subordinate Judge is clearly in error. The claim in the former suit to have the deed of gift set aside was based on a distinct cause of action. It was not incumbent on the plaintiffs in it to join a claim to recover the property owned by Musammat Ishri. The claim in the former suit to have the deed of gift set aside was based on a distinct cause of action. It was not incumbent on the plaintiffs in it to join a claim to recover the property owned by Musammat Ishri. The preliminary grounds upon which the court below dismissed the suit are untenable, and it will be necessary therefore to remand the suit to that court for trial upon the merits. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below, and remand the suit to that court under the provisions of order 41, rule 23, of the Code of Civil Procedure, with directions that it be readmitted in the file of pending suits and be disposed of according to law. The appellants will have the costs of this appeal in any event. All other costs will abide the event. Appeal allowed and cause remanded. STANLEY, KNOX, J. In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen the plaintiff appellant Balwant Singh claimed to be entitled to the possession of a certain house which formerly belonged to his relatives Ram Chandra and Lachman. In his plaint he sets forth the death of Lachman in the year 1875, the death of Ram Chandra in the year 1876, and states that after the death of Lachman his widow Musammat Jamna Dei had been in possession and occupation of the house first jointly with Ram Chandra during his life time and subsequently with Musammat Chinti, the daughter of Ram Chandra. Then the plaint sets forth the death, childless, of Musammat Chinti in 1886, and that since that date Musammat Jamna Dei had been in exclusive possession of the house until her death on the 18th of January, 1903. The plaintiff then alleges that he is the nearest reversioner of Lachman and Ram Chandra and upon these facts he bases his claim to possession. The plaintiff then alleges that he is the nearest reversioner of Lachman and Ram Chandra and upon these facts he bases his claim to possession. Included in the prayers for relief is a prayer that “having regard to the facts of the case, any additional relief or any relief in place of the relief sought which the court may be able to grant may also be granted.” The court of first instance settled, amongst other issues, the issue whether Musammat Jamna Dei had been in adverse possession of the house for over 12 years and had become absolute owner at the time of her death, and if so whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to inherit that property. He held that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed as the reversionary heir of Ram Chandra and Lachman, but that even if Musammat Jamna Dei became absolute owner by adverse possession for over 12 years that would make the property her personal property and in respect of it the plaintiff as her husband's nearest heir was entitled to succeed. On appeal the learned District Judge reversed the decision of the court below holding that in his plaint the plaintiff did not claim to be entitled to the property as the heir of Musammat Jamna Dei, but that he merely claimed it as the nearest heir of Lachman and Ram Chandra. He says in his judgment that, finding that Musammat Jamna Dei had acquired title by adverse possession, he need not go into the other points as to whether the suit being brought on the present plaint, a decree in favour of respondent as heir of Jamna Dei could be passed. “It was not prayed that respondent should be put into possession of the property as heir of Musammat Jamna Dei: no issue was struck as to whether the respondent was her heir, to decide which it night even be necessary to consider the question of stridhan, the heirs being different according to the kind of stridhan the property in question was.” This is altogether in our opinion too narrow a construction to place upon the language of the plaint. The plaintiff set forth all the facts material for the determination of his rights in respect of the property, and whilst he asked for proprietary possession as the nearest reversioner of Lachman and Ram Chandra he also asked that “having regard to the facts of the case any additional relief or any relief in place of the relief sought which the court may be able to grant, may also be granted” to him. We think that the learned Additional Judge ought to have determined the question which was knit between the parties in the court of first instance, namely, whether in view of the facts the plaintiff was entitled to inherit the property, whether as heir of Lachman and Ram Chandra or as heir of Musammat Jamna Dei. Befora therefore we can determine this appeal we must refer the following issue to the learned Additional Judge for determination, namely:—“Is the plaintiff the nearest reversionary heir of Musammat Jamna Dei and as such entitled to her stridhan, including the house in question?” We refer this issue under the provisions of section 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure and direct that the lower appellate court shall take such additional relevant evidence as may be adduced by the parties. On return of the finding the parties will have the usual ten days for filing objections.