JUDGMENT 1. This was a rule calling on the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum as also the Opposite Party to show cause why the conviction and sentence passed on the Petitioner under Act XIII of 1859 should not be set aside, and from the order passed by the Bench which issued the rule that the contract should be translated and copies thereof furnished to the Court/we presume that the reason why this rule was issued was that the Bench was of opinion that such contract might not be enforcible under this Act. It is not necessary for us to consider the other point whether the contract on which the advance was made is still in existence, and whether its determination by the closing of the factory does not bring the case within the principles laid down in the case of Narsing Prosad v. King-Emperor 12 C. W. N. 869 (1908), for we think that this rule must be made absolute on the simple ground that a contract of the nature of the contract in this case does not bring a person who committed a breach of it within the purview of sec. 2 of this Act. The contract is entirely indefinite and is of the same nature as the contract which was animadverted upon by the High Court of Madras in their proceedings in December 1873, (Proceedings, 12th Dec. 1873 7 Mad. H. C. R., Rl xxx (1873).] where the Defendant in consideration of an advance of 95 rupees received from the complainant bound himself to work for the complainant until the repayment of the amount advanced, just as in this case. For the breach of this contract the complainant proceeded against the Defendant under the provisions of Act XIII of 1859 and the third class Magistrate directed him to perform the work according to the terms of this contract. The District Magistrate referred that order to the Madras High Court as illegal on the ground that it sanctioned a species of slavery, and the High Court found that the contract was clearly not within the Act. A construction of the Act must not be adopted which would enforce a contract in violation of a law of a more stringent nature. This is precisely the view which we hold with respect to this contract. Much reliance is placed upon sec. A construction of the Act must not be adopted which would enforce a contract in violation of a law of a more stringent nature. This is precisely the view which we hold with respect to this contract. Much reliance is placed upon sec. 4 of the Act, which enacts that " the word contract as used therein shall extend to all contracts and agreements, whether by deed or written or verbal, and whether such contract be for a term certain, or for specified work, or otherwise," and it is contended on the strength of the last words " or otherwise " that the penalty provided by this Act is applicable to breaches of all kinds of contract between, speaking generally, employer and workman. 2. But sec. 4 is manifestly controlled by sec. I and the words of that section and of the preamble clearly show that the Act is intended to apply to those contracts only between employer and workmen, where the latter has received from the former " an advance of money on account of any work which he shall have contracted to perform." 3. In this case the work performed by the workmen used to be paid for at a certain rate without any deduction from the money he had received in advance. 4. It is quite clear that the advance was made not on account of any work contracted to be performed but as a loan, and that repayable not when the borrower chose to pay, but when the employer chose to realize. See Ram Prasad v. Ditgopal I. L. R. 3 All. 744 (1881). We therefore think that the contract which would extend the provisions of this highly penal statute to cases for which it was never intended cannot be enforced. For these reasons we make the rule absolute and set aside the conviction and sentence and direct that the accused be acquitted and discharged from his bail.