JUDGMENT 1. The substantial question of law which has been argued in these appeals relates to the right of the Plaintiffs-Appellants to set aside two consent decrees made in previous litigations between the parties to the present suits. The circumstances under which the Plaintiffs attacked these decrees are somewhat complicated hut in so far as it is necessary to state them, for our present purpose, they do not admit of any doubt or dispute. Lat Gopinagore constitutes a putni Taluk of which one half was owned by one Brindaban Chandra Bose, now represented by the Plaintiffs, and the other half by a family of Singhs, now represented by the Defendants. In 1873 the putni rents fell into arrears, whereupon the predecessors of the Defendants saved the property from sale, and under sec 13 of Reg. VIII of 1819 obtained possession thereof as mortgagees. In 1904 the Plaintiffs commenced an action against the Defendants for recovery of possession of their half share of the putni Taluk upon declaration that the mortgage lien had been satisfied from the usufruct and also for accounts and incidental reliefs. Shortly after, the Defendants commenced an action against the Plaintiffs for specific performance of a contract of sale alleged to have been made in their favour by the latter for transfer of their half share of the putni Taluk. These two suits came on for trial together, and the parties filed a petition of compromise on the 3rd March 1905, It is necessary to mention that one of the Plaintiffs by name Sarbesh Chandra Bose was a party lo the previous suits in his personal capacity and also as administrator to the estate of his deceased brother Sudhist Chandra Bose whose sole her was his infant widow. Consequently in the petition of compromise, to the terms of which we shall presently refer, Sarbesh Chandra acted in a double capacity, for himself and as administrator of the estate of his brother. The effect of the compromise was that the present Plaintiffs agreed to grant a durputni of their half share to the then Defendants in consideration of a bonus of Rs. 100 and a net annual rental of four hundred rupees payable in four equal instalments. The effect of the compromise was that the present Plaintiffs agreed to grant a durputni of their half share to the then Defendants in consideration of a bonus of Rs. 100 and a net annual rental of four hundred rupees payable in four equal instalments. There were covenants as to the payment of the head rent and cesses by the durputnidar to which no detailed reference is necessary for the purposes of the present litigations; but the petition further recited that the Plaintiffs would execute and register a regular durputni lease within five months and that before the execution of the lease Sarbesh Chandra as administrator to. the estate of his deceased brother, would obtain the necessary permission from the Original Side of the High Court where Letters of Administration had been granted. The parties apparently did not contemplate that such permission might be refused, and the petition merely provided that if either of them refused to execute the pattah and the corresponding kabuliyat, it would be executed by the Court on behalf of the defaulter. On the basis of this petition of compromise, consent decrees were drawn up in both the suits. The decree in the suit for possession by the Plaintiffs declared their title as putnidars and provided that the Defendants would become durputnidars under them or the bonus and annual rent specified; and the claim for account was dismissed. In the suit for specific performance of the contract of sale set up by the present Defendants a similar decree was drawn up, which set out in full the various terms to be embodied in the durputni pattah and haduliyat which, it was stated, were to be executed after Sarbesh Chandra had obtained the leave of the Court. The two suits were thus disposed of on the 3rd March 1905. The event, however, which had not been contemplated by the parties actually happened. Sarbesh Chandra applied to the Original Side of this Court on the 22ud July 1905, for permission to execute the durputni lease in respect of the share of his deceased brother, of which he had been appoint-ed administrator. The event, however, which had not been contemplated by the parties actually happened. Sarbesh Chandra applied to the Original Side of this Court on the 22ud July 1905, for permission to execute the durputni lease in respect of the share of his deceased brother, of which he had been appoint-ed administrator. On the 31st August 1905, this application was refused on the ground that, as found by the Official Referee, the net annual profit of the half share of the putni was over one thousand rupees and a lease of one-fourth of such half share for a proportionate rental of one hundred rupees was not beneficial to the infant. On the 2oth February 1906, the Plaintiffs commenced these actions to set aside the consent decrees. They at-tacked the compromise on which the decrees were based substantially on two grounds, namely, first, that the Defendants had obtained their consent to the settlement by fraud and misrepresentation, that they were in possession of the entire property for many years partly as owners of the putni and partly as mortgagees and that though they had collection papers which showed what the true income was, they represented to the Plaintiffs that the property was held by them at a loss and that its income was not sufficient for payment of the head rent, cesses, and collection charges; secondly, that as the settlement had been made on the assumption that the necessary permission from the High Court would be obtained as a matter of course, and as such leave had been refused, the settlement had become inoperative as to the share of Sudhist Chandra and further that as the contract was entire and undivisible, it must fail in its entirety. The Defendants denied the allegations of the Plaintiffs as to fraud and misrepresentation and contended that the consent decrees were not open to objection in fact or in law. In the Court of first instance, the Subordinate Judge found that the allegation of fraud and misrepresentation was amply supported by the evidence. On this ground he decreed the suits and set aside the consent decrees. Upon appeal the learned District Judge held that there was not one particle of evidence in proof of the case of misrepresentation. In the Court of first instance, the Subordinate Judge found that the allegation of fraud and misrepresentation was amply supported by the evidence. On this ground he decreed the suits and set aside the consent decrees. Upon appeal the learned District Judge held that there was not one particle of evidence in proof of the case of misrepresentation. He further held that the administrator was estopped from denying that he had no power to enter into the compromise and that at any rate as a transfer by an administrator is not void but merely voidable, it was needless to disturb the consent decrees. In this view of the matter, the District Judge allowed the appeals and dismissed the suits. The Plaintiffs have now appealed to this Court and on their behalf, the decision of the District Judge has been challenged on two grounds, namely, first, that upon the materials on the record, specially the road cess returns, the case of misrepresentation has been abundantly proved; secondly, that the consent decrees by which the administrator may be compelled to execute a durputni lease, although the High Court has found that such lease would not be beneficial to the infant concerned, ought not to be allowed to stand, specially as the parties obviously contemplated that the execution of the lease should be dependant upon the grant of permission by the High Court; and, further, that if the settlement fails as to a substantial part, it is so interwoven with the remainder that the entire compromise must be cancelled. In our opinion, it is needless to examine the first ground because the Appellants are clearly entitled to succeed on the second point. Sec. 90, sub-sec 3 of the Probate and Administration Act pro-vides that an administrator may not, without previous permission of the Court by which the Letters of Administration were granted, lease any property for the time being vested in him under sec. 4 for a term exceeding five years. Sub sec. 4 then provides that a disposal of property by an administrator in contravention of sub-sec. 3 is voidable at the instance of any other person interested in the property. In other words, as observed by the Judicial Committee in Nawab Akbari Begum v. Peara Saheb 1 C. L. J. 594 : S.C. 9 C.W.N. 938 (1905), sec. Sub sec. 4 then provides that a disposal of property by an administrator in contravention of sub-sec. 3 is voidable at the instance of any other person interested in the property. In other words, as observed by the Judicial Committee in Nawab Akbari Begum v. Peara Saheb 1 C. L. J. 594 : S.C. 9 C.W.N. 938 (1905), sec. go gives an administrator large but not unlimited powers of disposition and an alienation by him in excess of his powers without leave of the Court is voidable : Eastern Mortgage and Agency Coy. v. Rebati Kumar 3 C. L. J. 260 (1906). It is manifest, therefore, that if a permanent lease were granted in this case by the administrator without leave of the High Court, the beneficiary might maintain an action to cancel it. Such an agreement by the administrator under these circumstances is clearly in contravention of law, and if a suit were compromised on these terms by an administrator, acting admittedly in excess of his powers, it would obviously be competent to the Court to refuse to pass a decree in accordance therewith under sec. 375 of the Code of 1882, on the ground that the suit bad not been adjusted by a lawful agreement or compromise. Indeed, it has been maintained that if a consent decree is by inadvertence made on the basis of an agreement or compromise contrary to law, the Court of execution has power to refuse to execute the decree. Lakshmaneshwara v. Rangama ILR 26 Mad. 31 (1902). It is not necessary for our present purpose to consider whether the execution Court has power to question the validity of the decree; but this much is clear that if a consent decree has been made on the basis of an unlawful compromise a suit can be maintained to set aside such decree. Gulab Koer v. Badshah Bahadur 13 C.W.N. 1197 : S.C. 10 C. L. J. 420 (1909). In this case, it was pointed out, on the authority of Huddersfield v. Leiaster [1895] 2 Ch. Gulab Koer v. Badshah Bahadur 13 C.W.N. 1197 : S.C. 10 C. L. J. 420 (1909). In this case, it was pointed out, on the authority of Huddersfield v. Leiaster [1895] 2 Ch. 273, that although a consent decree might have been drawn up and completed, it might be set aside upon any ground which would justify the Court in setting aside the agreement entered into between the parties, because the consent decree is a mere creature of the agreement and if a greater validity were attributed to it because it had received judicial sanction, it would be to give the branch an existence which is independent of the tree. It is clear, therefore, that as a lease by an administrator in excess of his powers is voidable on the ground that it is in contravention of law, a consent decree based on an agreement in that behalf is equally open to attack. The position of the Appellants in the present case is moreover fortified by an additional circumstance. The terms of the agreement plainly indicate that both the parties contemplated that the grant of the lease by the administrator should be sanctioned by the High Court, and they treated the grant of such sanction as an essential preliminary requisite to the execution of the lease. As such sanction was refused on the ground that the contemplated lease was not beneficial to the infant concerned, the agreement as also the consent decree based thereon must be treated as open to successful attack in a suit properly framed for the purpose. There is another point of view, however, from which the ac-curacy and justness of this conclusion may be emphasised. If the agreement in question had not ripened into a decree, would any Court of Justice have enforced specific performance thereof ? The answer must clearly be in the negative. Sec. 21, cl. (e) of the Specific Relief Act provides that a contract made by trustees either in excess of their powers or in breach of their trust cannot be specifically enforced. In sec. 3 of the Act, a trustee is de-fined to include every person holding expressly or by implication or constructively a fiduciary character. Shrewsbury v. London 4 DeG. M. & G. 116; affirmed 6 H. L. C. 113 (1853). In sec. 3 of the Act, a trustee is de-fined to include every person holding expressly or by implication or constructively a fiduciary character. Shrewsbury v. London 4 DeG. M. & G. 116; affirmed 6 H. L. C. 113 (1853). This definition is obviously comprehensive enough to include the case of an administrator of the estate of an infant in relation thereto. Reference may, in this connection, be made to the case of Harnett v. Yeilding 2 Sch. & Lef. 553 (1805), where Lord Redesdale in delivering to compel specific performance of an agreement which would necessitate a breach of trust, namely, execution of a lease by a trustee in excess of his powers, observed as follows :--"The Plaintiff must also show that in seeking the performance, he does not call upon the other party to do an act which he is not lawfully competent to do, for if he does, a consequence is produced that quite passes by the object of the Court in exercising the jurisdiction, which is to do more complete justice." To the same effect are the decisions in Byrne v. Acton 1 Browne P. C. 186 (1721), Bellringer v. Blagrave 1 DeGex. & T. 63 (1847), Sneesby v. Thome 1 Jurist. N. S. 536 (1854); affirmed 7 DeG. M. & G. 399 (1855), Mortlock v. Buller 10 Ves. 292 (1804), Motee Doss v. Modhoo Soodun 1 W.R. 4 (1864), Narain v. Aukhoy 1 L.R. 12 Cal 152 (1885) Now in the case before us, if the consent decrees were allowed to stand and to be enforced at any time, what would the position of the administrator be ? If he executed the lease, as directed by the decree, he would act in defiance of the authority of the High Court which had refused to grant him permission on the ground that the intended transaction was injurious to the estate of the infant now under his charge. On the other hand, if he refused to execute the lease, he would be clearly guilty of contempt of the Court which made the decree. In the former contingency, he might be rendered liable under the administration bond given by him for faithful management of the estate. In the latter event, he might be punished in exercise of the disciplinary powers of the Court. In the former contingency, he might be rendered liable under the administration bond given by him for faithful management of the estate. In the latter event, he might be punished in exercise of the disciplinary powers of the Court. The principle, therefore, that a Court will not lend its aid to give effect to a contract which is illegal, whether it violates the common law or the statute law, either expressly or by implication, is eminently applicable to the case before us; for as observed by Chanceller Walworth in Pratt v. Adams Paige 615, it is a well-settled principle that no Court of Justice will lend its aid to enforce the performance of any contract or agreement which was intended by the parties thereto to contravene the provisions of a positive law or the performance of a contract which is contrary to public policy; and such a contract will not be enforced even with the consent of the parties, Bowler v. Scully 72 Pa, 456. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the decree in so far as it affects the estate of Sudhist Chandra Bose ought not to be allowed to stand. The next question which requires consideration is, whether the decree ought to be set aside in part only or in its entirety. The test to be applied is whether the reliefs granted are severable or not. Now in the case before us, as already stated, there were originally two suits which were compromised; one of these was for recovery of possession of a half share in the putni on the ground that the statutory lien created under the putni regulation had been satisfied out of the usufruct of the property and also for accounts and incidental reliefs; the other suit was for specific performance of an alleged contract of sale of the same share of the putni. When the parties consented to the creation of a durputni of the disputed share, it must be assumed to have been entered into in settlement of the dispute in both the suits. When the parties consented to the creation of a durputni of the disputed share, it must be assumed to have been entered into in settlement of the dispute in both the suits. If therefore the agreement was maintained as to the shares of the executants other than that vested in the administrator, it might terminate the suit for specific performance; but the other suit for recovery of possession and for account of the receipts by the mortgagee would have to be continued, so far as the estate of Sudhist Chandra is concern-ed. Under such circumstances, it appears to us that the consent decree ought to be set aside in its entirety and both the suits reopened and heard on the merits. It may be observed that there is authority for the proposition, Price v. Griffith 1 DeG. M. &G. 80 (1851), that where an agreement to grant a lease of an entire property cannot be enforced as to the whole, it will not necessary be enforced as to a share because, as Knight Bruce, L. J., puts it, a lease of an undivided moiety may be a very different thing from a lease of the whole. In the case before us it is fairly clear that the parties intended that the durputni lease, if any, should be in respect of one half of the property, so that the possession of the whole might vest in one of the parties and thus all disputes avoided in future. Under such circumstances, if the intended lease must fail as to a part the arrangement should stand cancelled in its entirety. No rule of universal application however can be laid down in cases of this description, Hexter v. Pearce [1900] 1 Ch. 341 (1899), but in the absence of mis-representation or misconduct the general rule is that where a person is jointly interested in an estate with another person and purports to deal with the entirety, specific performance will not be granted against him as to his share, Lumby v. Ravens (1895) 1 Q B. 685. The case of course will be different if nothing more than partial performance is possible by reason only of the default of the Defendant, because no man ought to be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. The case of course will be different if nothing more than partial performance is possible by reason only of the default of the Defendant, because no man ought to be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In the case before us, however, the parties acted with their eyes open, and the present Defendants were fully aware that the Plaintiff administrator could not execute a valid permanent lease without the sanction of the Court. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the decrees ought not to be maintained as to a part though no doubt, as observed by Lord Eldon in Morltock v. Buller 10 Ves. 292, 315 (1804), if the vendee chooses to take as much as he can have, ordinarily he has a right to that and to an abatement. The result, therefore, is that these appeals must be allowed, the decrees of the District Judge set aside, and those of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs in all the Courts. The effect of this decision will be that the two original suits which were compromised will stand revived and the parties will be at liberty to proceed with them.