JUDGMENT Jenkins, C.J. - The suit out of which this second appeal arises was one brought for khas possession of certain land. It was dismissed by the Additional Munsif, and on appeal this decree was reversed by the Subordinate Judge who directed that the Plaintiffs be put in khas possession of the land claimed on establishment of title to the same. From this decree the present appeal is preferred and the only point argued before us was whether the Court of Appeal had erred in holding that the Plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the suit for khas possession against the Defendants on the ground of forfeiture by reason of denial of the tenancy in a previous rent suit. Though these are the terms in which the contention is framed in the grounds of appeal it is not a precise statement of the real reason of the decision in the lower Appellate Court. That Court relied on what was done in a previous suit brought by the present Plaintiffs against the present Defendants for rent. In that suit, the Defendants pleaded that there was not the relationship of landlord and tenant alleged by the Plaintiffs: and, not merely did they deny that relationship but they succeeded in persuading the Court to hold that there was no such relationship, and in obtaining from the Court an adjudication to that effect. The issue of this relationship was directly raised in the former suit and it was negatived. The real ground, therefore, on which the Plaintiffs base their claim in this suit is not that there was any forfeiture of any tenancy but that the Court could not try in this suit the matter which in the former suit had been directly and substantially in issue between the parties, and decided by the Court, that is to say, the relationship of landlord and tenant. The argument that to give effect to the Plaintiffs' contention would be to disregard the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act was based principally on the decisions in Debiruddi v. Abdur Rahim I. L. R. 7 Cal. 196 (1888). Dhora Kairi v. Ram Jewan I. L. R 20 Cal. 101 (1890). and Sremutty Mallika Dassi v. Makham Lal Chowdhry 9 C. W. N. 928 (1905). In the first and third of these cases, there was no decision on the point to which the argument relates,-merely an expression of opinion. 196 (1888). Dhora Kairi v. Ram Jewan I. L. R 20 Cal. 101 (1890). and Sremutty Mallika Dassi v. Makham Lal Chowdhry 9 C. W. N. 928 (1905). In the first and third of these cases, there was no decision on the point to which the argument relates,-merely an expression of opinion. In Dhora's case I. L. R. 20 Cal. 101 (1890), however, there was an actual decision, and it is claimed on the strength of these expressions of opinions and this decision that it is not open to us to uphold the decree of the lower Appellate Court, notwithstanding a line of decisions which go to support what was determined by the Subordinate Judge in this case. The last of these decisions is that of Sheikh Miadhar v. Rajani Kanta 14 C. W. N. 339 (1909). where all the relevant cases are cited. What was said in Sremutty Mallika Dassi v. Makham Lal Chowdhry 9 C. W. N. 928 (1905). was based on what was said is decided in Debiruddi's case I. L. R. 17 Cal. 196 (1888) and Dhora's case I. L. R. 20 Cal. 101 (1890). But turning to those cases, it becomes apparent from the facts that in neither of them could the plea of res judicata arise; for in Debiruddi's case I. L. R. 17 Cal. 196 (1888) the denial of the relationship was negatived, while in Dhora's case I. L. R. 20 Cal. 101 (1890). the suit was between different parties. Therefore, I venture to think that so far as this case can be rested on the plea of res judicata those cases do not touch the matter. The law of res judicata is summed up in the CPC of 1882 which was applicable to this suit at its institution and sec. 13 contain an express prohibition to the effect that no Court shall try any issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties. I have been unable to ascertain on what ground we can disregard that plain statutory prohibition. 13 contain an express prohibition to the effect that no Court shall try any issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties. I have been unable to ascertain on what ground we can disregard that plain statutory prohibition. There is no conflict between this provision of the Code and anything contained in the Bengal Tenancy Act: as I have already indicated, the question is not whether a denial has worked forfeiture but whether the Court having negatived, in a former suit, the relationship of landlord and tenant at the instance of the Defendants, it is now open to the Defendants to argue that that relationship should be established in his favour and that he should by virtue thereof be given the benefit of the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In my opinion this case is governed by the prohibition against the second trial of one issue. The plea of res judicata must prevail and I think that on this ground the decree of the lower Appellate Court should be confirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs. Chatterjee, J. I agree.