Judgement Appeal from an order of the High Court (February 23, 1905) rejecting the appellants application for revision of an order of the Subordinate Judge of Moradabad (June 11, 1904), whereby he amended decrees of his Court under ss. 88 and 89 of Act IV. of 1882 so as to bring them into accord with the judgment of January 30, 1901, on which they were founded. It appeared that in a mortgage suit brought by the appellant and two other persons on two mortgage bonds a judgment and decree had been made by the Subordinate Judge under s. 88 of Act IV. of 1882 on January 30, 1901, that a decree absolute had been made by him on October 5, 1901, under s. 89, and that an appeal from the judgment and decree of January 30, 1901, had been dismissed with costs by the High Court on December 1, 1902. The variance complained of was that whereas the judgment of January 30, 1901, gave to the mortgagee decree-holder for reasons stated by the judge and approved in appeal by the High Court a lump sum of Rs.20,415.7.6 for interest on the principal loan of Rs.40,000, the decree gave him a further lump sum of Rs.7000 for interest pendente lite and future interest at the rate of eight annas per cent, per mensem to the date of repayment. The total amount ordered to be paid within six months by the judgment of January 30, 1901, including costs, was Rs.63,257.14. The decree of that date ordered payment within six months of Rs.70,257.14, with future interest as aforesaid ; and also included a direction inconsistent therewith but in the terms of the judgment that the decree was for Rs.60,415.7.6 and costs, and in default for sale of the mortgaged property "in satisfaction of the said sum." The judgment found that the rate of interest was exorbitant and usurious though not penal, that the amounts of the bonds mainly consisted of fabulous and fancy prices of articles sold, and that compound interest was charged thereon at Rs.3.2.0 per cent, per mensem with three-monthly rests. It concluded "I would allow interest at 1 per cent, per mensem with three-monthly rests on the amount of the bond. In other words I allow for interest Rs.20,415." The decree under s. 88 of Act IV. It concluded "I would allow interest at 1 per cent, per mensem with three-monthly rests on the amount of the bond. In other words I allow for interest Rs.20,415." The decree under s. 88 of Act IV. of 1882 founded on this judgment was as follows, the passages subsequently struck out being given in italics — " It is decreed and hereby declared that on the 30th day of July, 1901, the sum of (Rs.7 0,2 57.14.0) Rs.63,257.14.0 will be payable to the plaintiff, viz., Rs.60,415.7.6 for principal and interest on the mortgage, dated the 11th day of May, 1894, and 13th December, 1894, and Rs.2,842.6.6 for his costs of this suit {and Rs.7000 for interest pendente lite from 5th March, 1898, to 3rd January, 1901), and it is hereby ordered that upon the defendant paying to the plaintiff or into Court on the 30th day of July, 1901, aforesaid, the said sum (with future interest at 8 annas per cent, per mensem to the date of repayment) the plaintiff shall deliver up to the defendant, or to such person as he appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the property specified below and shall transfer the property to the defendant free from all incumbrances created by the plaintiff, or any person claiming under him or by those under whom he claims. " But if such payment be not made as aforesaid on or before the aforesaid 30th day of July, 1901, then it is ordered that the said property, or a sufficient part thereof, be sold. And that the proceeds of the sale (after defraying thereout the expenses of the sale) be paid into Court and applied in payment of the sum found due to the plaintiff, and that the balance, if any, be paid to the defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same. It is ordered that the claim of the plaintiffs for Rs.40,000, principal, and Rs.20,415.7.6, interest, in all Rs.60,415.7.6, be decreed, and that if the decretal money is not paid within six months from this date, the villages aforesaid and detailed below be sold at auction in satisfaction of the said sum. The parties do get their costs in proportion to their success." The decree of the High Court on December 1, 1902, dismissed appeals of both plaintiffs and defendant from the decree under s. 88 and confirmed the same. The parties do get their costs in proportion to their success." The decree of the High Court on December 1, 1902, dismissed appeals of both plaintiffs and defendant from the decree under s. 88 and confirmed the same. Pending appeals to the High Court, the decree-holders pro ceeded with the execution of their decree. On August 6, 1901, they asked for an order absolute under s. 89. It was opposed by the respondent on the ground of pending appeals, but the appellants contended that unless the Appellate Court ordered a stay of execution it could not be stayed. Accordingly the appellants obtained a decree absolute under s. 89 on October 5, 1901, which decree was on or before November 30 in the same year transferred to the Collector of Bijnor for execution. On April 22, 1902, the appellants co-decree-holders sold their third share of the said decree to one Lachman Das, and two days later the appellant sold a considerable share (about one-third) of his remaining two-thirds therein to the same Lachman Das, whose name was on May 10, 1902, brought on the record by the said Subordinate Judge of Moradabad as one of the decree-holders. On February 9, 1904, the respondent, who had paid into Court the full amount decreed, petitioned the Subordinate Judge for an amendment of the decrees under ss. 88 and 89 by striking out so much of them as awarded future interest on the amount decreed. The Subordinate Judge on June 11, 1904, granted the petition, the effect being to reduce the amount recoverable under the decrees by a sum of over Rs.19,000. Two applications to revise this order were made to the High Court, one by Lachman Das, the other by the appellant Brij Narain. The first was granted, and the amending order was set aside so far as it affected the interests of Lachman Das, the High Court holding that as the decree which the Subordinate Judge had amended had been previously affirmed on appeal by the High Court he had no jurisdiction to do so. On the appellants application the High Court said "Looking to all the circumstances of the case, we do not think that this is a case in which we ought to exercise our discretionary power in revision. On the appellants application the High Court said "Looking to all the circumstances of the case, we do not think that this is a case in which we ought to exercise our discretionary power in revision. We reject the application, but make no order as to costs," De Gruyther, K.C., and Ross, for the appellant decree-holder Brij Narain, submitted that the order of amendment made by the Subordinate Judge having been held by the order in favour of Lachman Das to have been made without jurisdiction, it should have been set aside as a whole and not in part only. It should have been declared inoperative against all persons whom it purported to affect. It related to a joint and several decree in favour of all the decree-holders, and the High Court was in error in ordering in effect that it should stand as against Lachman Das but at the same time could be set aside as regards the appellant and his interests under the decree. Reference was made to the Civil Procedure Code, ss. 206, 209. The respondent did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. The story out of which the points involved in this appeal arise is rather intricate. On March 5, 1898, the appellant and two persons named Kishori Lal and Sri Earn instituted a suit against the predecessor in title of the respondent before the Subordinate Judge of Moradabad for the recovery of more than a lakh of rupees with future interest by sale of property mortgaged under two documents dated respectively May 11 and December 13, 1894. On May 6, 1898, the claim was decreed by the First Court, but on appeal to the High Court at Allahabad that Court took the view that the learned judge had placed undue pressure upon the defendant, who had asked for a postponement, on the ground of illness, to go on with the case, and accordingly set aside the decree which he had made and remanded the case for determination according to law. On January 30, 1901, the case came again before the Sub ordinate Judge of Moradabad and resulted in a decree for Rs.70,257.14.0, with future interest. On January 30, 1901, the case came again before the Sub ordinate Judge of Moradabad and resulted in a decree for Rs.70,257.14.0, with future interest. Meanwhile Kishori Lal and Sri Earn had sold the whole of their interest in the decree to one Lachman Das, to whom the present appellant also transferred a part of his interest as a decree-holder, and the name of Lachman Das was added to the record. From this decree both parties appealed to the High Court, The High Court dismissed the defendants appeal, and with a slight modification affirmed the decree of the First Court on the cross-appeal. On October 5, 1901, on the application of the original decree-holders, the First Court made an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged property under ss. 89 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act for the amount decreed, together with future interest. Thereafter the present appellant applied to the First Court for execution of the said decree, and after certain intermediate proceedings, which it is not necessary to refer to in detail, the judgment debtor on November 21, 1903, deposited the entire amount due under the decree, with future interest. On February 9, 1904, the present respondent, the judgment debtor, applied to the First Court to amend the said decree by striking out so much of it as awarded future interest on the amount decreed. In March, 1904, petitions objecting to the application of the judgment debtor on various grounds were filed on behalf of the present appellant and Lachman Das. With reference to the allegations of the parties, the Subordinate Judge framed the following issues for trial— "1. Whether the judgment debtors application for amendment of decrees is barred by limitation ? "2. Whether the said application is barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code ? "3. Whether the decrees of this Court under ss. 88 and 89 of Act IV. of 1882 can be amended by this Court as requested by the judgment debtor ? "4. Whether the judgment debtor has a right to apply for amendment of the said decrees ? " On June 11, 1904, the Subordinate Judge made an order granting the application of the judgment debtor. He found the four issues in his favour, and amended the two decrees of the Court made under ss. "4. Whether the judgment debtor has a right to apply for amendment of the said decrees ? " On June 11, 1904, the Subordinate Judge made an order granting the application of the judgment debtor. He found the four issues in his favour, and amended the two decrees of the Court made under ss. 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act by striking out of them the provision for future interest, the effect of such amendment or modification being to reduce the amount payable under the decrees by a sum of over Rs. 19,000. Two applications were therefore presented to the High Court by the present appellant and the said Lachman Das for revision of the order of the Subordinate Judge dated June 11, 1904. They were heard by a Divisional Court, constituted by two learned judges of the High Court, who on February 23, 1905, delivered separate judgments disposing of the two applications for revision in the following manner — With regard to the application 24 of 1904, they observed that the order revision of which was asked for was an order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Moradabad amending a decree of his Court. Previous to the order of amendment the decree had been affirmed on appeal by the High Court. The Subordinate Judge therefore had no jurisdiction to amend. The learned judges therefore allowed the application and set aside the order amending the decree, but only so far as it affected the interests of the applicant Lachman Das. With regard to the application for revision 32 of 1904 of Brij Narain the learned judges delivered the following judgment " Looking to all the circumstances of the case, we do not think that this is a case in which we ought to exercise our discretionary power in revision. We reject the application, but make no order as to costs." Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the High Court made on the said application 32 of 1904, the present appellant applied for leave to appeal therefrom to His Majesty in Council. His application was heard by the Hon. the Chief Justice and the Hon. Sir W. R. Burkitt. We reject the application, but make no order as to costs." Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the High Court made on the said application 32 of 1904, the present appellant applied for leave to appeal therefrom to His Majesty in Council. His application was heard by the Hon. the Chief Justice and the Hon. Sir W. R. Burkitt. When granting the application their Lordships, after referring to the facts of the case, made the following observations —" A Bench of this Court on the application by Lachman Das allowed the first application, holding that the Subordinate Judge had no power to modify his decree after it had been confirmed by the High Court, and set aside the order complained of. In the other application No. 32 of Brij Narain, the Bench made an order rejecting it, holding that, under all the circumstances of the case, this was not a case in which they should exercise their discretionary power in revision. The consequence is that there are now two joint decree-holders, as to one of whom the decree contains a provision for future interest the value of which is Rs. 19,000 odd, whilst as to the other this provision does not exist. The provision of the decree therefore seems to be apparently inconsistent, as out of two joint decree-holders one can execute the decree plus future interest, whilst the other cannot. Under these circumstances we think this is a case which we should certify to be fit for appeal." Their Lordships have not had the advantage of hearing the case argued for the respondent, but they think the High Court have themselves said enough to make it clear that if the decree of the First Court was made without jurisdiction as altering a decree after it had been affirmed on appeal in the case of Lachman Das, so also the alteration in Brij Narains case was equally ineffectual and ought not to have been allowed to stand. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed. The respondent will pay the costs.