JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal in a suit brought by the Plaintiffs who are auction-purchasers of an entire estate known as the 4 annas share carved out of 12 annas of Perganah Dandra and which was sold under the provisions of Act XI of 1859. The Plaintiffs sought to recover khas possession of 21 plots of land on annulment of the encumbrances. The defence, in effect, was that the tenure was protected by the provisions to sec. 37 of the Act. The Subordinate Judge framed the necessary issues, among them the 4th issue, '' whether the Defendant's taluk is a mokurari istemrari taluk existing from before the Permanent Settlement. If so is it liable to be avoided ?" On a consideration of the evidence, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. 2. The Plaintiffs then went to the District Judge on appeal and succeeded in obtaining from him a decree with regard to some of the plots in suit but not with regard to plots Nos. 1 to 14 which, accordingly, are the subject-matter of the present second appeal. 3. The District Judge has accepted the judgment of the first Court on the 4th issue without recapitulating the reasons of the Subordinate Judge; but he has based his judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs, with regard to the plots decreed, upon the question whether all the lands in suit are included within the Defendant's taluk and to that question he has returned an affirmative answer with regard to the plots Nos. 1 to 14. 4. The argument in the lower Appellate Court was, first, that, for the purposes of proving the inclusion of these plots within the taluk of the Defendants, the chitta of 1844 was inadmissible in evidence, and, secondly, that the mudafat description, in respect of some of the plots, not appearing in the said chitta, it cannot be held that these plots, at any rate, form part and parcel of the Defendant's taluk, or, rather, of the parent taluks, Jadab Roy and Srinarayan Roy. 5. The District Judge has found the chitta of 1844 to be admissible in evidence, and held that the mere omission of the word '' Mudafat " (name of the previous owner) against the plots in question from the chitta of 1844 is immaterial in view of his express finding that these plots appertain to the Defendant's taluk. 6. 5. The District Judge has found the chitta of 1844 to be admissible in evidence, and held that the mere omission of the word '' Mudafat " (name of the previous owner) against the plots in question from the chitta of 1844 is immaterial in view of his express finding that these plots appertain to the Defendant's taluk. 6. In second appeal, the contentions advanced before us, are as follows :-First, that the Subordinate Judge, whose judgment has been incorporated by the District Judge into his own, does not find, that the Defendant's taluk existed from before the Permanent Settlement, so that the second exception to sec. 37 of Act XI of 1859 does not protect the tenure-and that the mere finding that, in the year 1844, some lands of the original taluks, Jadab Roy and Srinarayan Roy, descended into, and become part of, the Defendant's taluk, Ram Kinkar, does not sufficiently demonstrate that the Defendant's taluk is a creation anterior to the Permanent Settlement; secondly, that, though the Subordinate Judge comments upon the absence of satisfactory rebutting evidence on the part of the Plaintiff, he has not considered the various papers (some of which have been printed by the Appellant in the Appendix) as he should have done, and that these papers constitute rebutting evidence of a valuable kind; thirdly, (it has been somewhat faintly pressed) that the chitta of 1844 is not admissible inasmuch as it was not prepared for public purposes; and, fourthly, that even if the chitta is admissible, it can only be regarded as evidence in favour of the Defendants in respect of the lands expressly shown as mudafat lands, that is to say, lands which descended from the old taluks, Jadab Roy and Srinarayan Roy. 7. Although this is a second appeal, we have gone somewhat minutely into the documentary evidence, with a view to understanding the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, and we have considered whether it is necessary to send back the case to the lower Appellate Court for re-consideration and an expression of his own views by the District Judge. It appears to us, however, that the case has been properly tried and that the conclusions of fact bind us at the present stage. 8. The case may be taken to come under the first and second provisions to sec. 37 of Act XI of 1859. It appears to us, however, that the case has been properly tried and that the conclusions of fact bind us at the present stage. 8. The case may be taken to come under the first and second provisions to sec. 37 of Act XI of 1859. The 4th issue, it is true, contemplates the first proviso only, that is to say, the parties went to trial on the question whether the Defendant's taluk is a mokurari istemrari tenure existing from before the Permanent Settlement. To that issue, the Subordinate Judge returns an affirmative answer. He says " I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the present taluk has been carved out of taluks, Jadab and Srinarayan, which existed in 1199 with a ten-rupee jama each. The successive additions and subtractions do not take away the integrity of a taluk, if the steps can be traced. The identity is not lost; " and again, " my finding therefore is that taluk, Ram Kinkar, is one of those tenures which had their origin from before the Permanent Settlement." But the Subordinate Judge appears to have gone further, and he records another conclusion that" taluk, Ram Kinkar, falls within the second exception to sec. 37, Act XI of 1859, and as such cannot be avoided and annulled as an incumbrance." He has elaborated this part of the case on the dowls, returns and documents filed and, in fact, he has taken considerable trouble to show how the Plaintiff's 4-anna estate was originally created. It appears that, although a permanent jama was assessed upon the 16-anna Perganah, including the Plaintiff's 4-anna bahali hissa, an equitable adjustment of revenue was not made upon the latter estate until long after the Defendant's taluk came into existence. We regard the creation of the Defendant's taluk as having taken place in the year 1220 (Ex. F) although it existed from before the Permanent Settlement, if the history of the old taluks, Jadab Roy and Srinarayan Roy, he traced up to the year 1220 (1813) when portions of these taluks were transferred to Ram Kinkar, a member of the same" family, and held at proportionate jamas. The Subordinate Judge points out from Ex. (C) how the descent into the taluk, Ram Kinkar, was effected and finally perfected by Ex. F. It was unnecessary for the Subordinate Judge to go as far as he did. The Subordinate Judge points out from Ex. (C) how the descent into the taluk, Ram Kinkar, was effected and finally perfected by Ex. F. It was unnecessary for the Subordinate Judge to go as far as he did. But we entertain no doubt that his conclusions are based on a consideration of the evidence, which it was open to him to consider, and those conclusions, in either view of the case, effectually bind the Plaintiffs. They bring the taluk of the Defendants within either of the exceptions, first or second, to sec. 37. 9. With these general observations, which show how the case has been dealt with in the lower Courts, we proceed to record our views on the four contentions raised. 10. With regard to the first contention, it is the finding of the Subordinate Judge, and certainly a very clear one, that the taluk, Ram Kinkar, was derived and descended from two ancient taluks and, as such, must be deemed to have existed from before the Permanent Settlement. The test is whether the original obligation to pay a certain quota of the land revenue assessed was destroyed at any subsequent date. But it appears to us that when certain lands were transferred to taluk, Ram Kinkar, the continuity of the original obligation was not in any way impaired. These lands of the original taluks have been found by the lower Courts to appertain to the Defendant's taluk, and the taluk must be deemed to be protected from annulment because its recognition by the landlords involves a recognition of the former status of the taluk. 11. With regard to the second contention, although the Subordinate Judge has not discussed much of the evidence on the side of the Plaintiffs in rebuttal of the case for the Defendants, he has mentioned certain chittas of the year 1202. That appears to us sufficient for the purposes of this appeal. We are not deciding this case as a regular appeal but on the questions of law put forward. 12. The third contention, as we have said, is somewhat faintly pressed, and on the authorities, we entertain no doubt that the chitta of the year 1844, is admissible in evidence. The cases cited to us are not authorities to the contrary. We are not deciding this case as a regular appeal but on the questions of law put forward. 12. The third contention, as we have said, is somewhat faintly pressed, and on the authorities, we entertain no doubt that the chitta of the year 1844, is admissible in evidence. The cases cited to us are not authorities to the contrary. The chitta was prepared at that time, as appears from the evidence, for the purpose of distributing in equal manner the public revenue on the separate bahali hissa which was subsequently purchased by the Plaintiffs. The record thus prepared is a document of a public nature, and evidence of the state of affairs then existing. 13. The last contention, namely, that the mudafat lands are the only lands recorded as having been derived from the old taluks has in fact been disposed of by the observations we have already made. We are now concerned with plots Nos. 1 to 24, and, that being so, it is immaterial to enquire whether the other lands, not mudafat, were included in taluk, Ram Kinkar, in the year 1220 (1813) or not. It has been found by the Subordinate Judge that the jama of taluk, Ram Kinkar, was practically the same as the jama on the mudafat lands which were included in and transferred from taluks, Jadab Roy and Srinarayan Roy. That finding on the question of identity disposes of the case. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.