Judgement Consolidated Appeals from three decrees of the High Court (April 23, 1907) which reversed three decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly (May 20, 1905). The suits were brought by the respondents to eject the appellants from three mouzahs named Malhpur, Khai Khera, and Chandana. They were brought on the same date, Sep tember 15, 1904, and on the same title, namely, that of reversionary heirs to one Daulat Singh claiming to eject the appellants as derivative purchasers under an alleged alienation in 1860 by Daulats daughters, which it was contended enured only till the death of the survivor of them in the year 1899. The entire estate, which was a very large one, of which the three mouzahs formed a part, had been from 1843 the joint estate of Ratan Singh and his son the said Daulat Singh as members of a joint Hindu family. In 1845 Ratan Singh became a Mahomedan and thereupon, according to the contention of the plaints, forfeited all his rights in the estate, which it was alleged devolved on his son Daulat Singh, who became thenceforth the absolute and exclusive owner of the entire estate. Daulat Singh died on January 8, 1851, predeceasing his father Ratan Singh, who died in September of the same year. Daulat Singh left a widow and two daughters named Chhattar Singh and Mewa Singh. His father Ratan Singh left a widow and a daughters son named Khairati Lal. Ratan Singh retained possession of the entire estate till his death to the exclusion of his son. It then passed to his widow, whose name was recorded under an order dated March 12, 1852, but later on in the same year the Court of Wards took possession. While the Court of Wards was in possession the two widows died, Daulats widow in 1857, and Ratans in 1858 and thereupon the dispute as to title which had arisen between them was continued between the daughters of Daulat on the one side and Khairati Lal the daughters son and sole heir of Ratan on the other. The dispute between the widows did not result in litigation in the Civil Courts. On their death the parties were referred to the Civil Courts for a decision, but agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration. The dispute between the widows did not result in litigation in the Civil Courts. On their death the parties were referred to the Civil Courts for a decision, but agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration. On July 21, 1860, they signed an agreement for division of the disputed property, under which they respectively obtained possession of their agreed shares. The agreement was signed by the two daughters of Daulat Singh and by Khairati Lal and declared — " There were disputes and disagreements amongst us, the executants, about the property owned and possessed by us, namely, the ancestral and acquired movable and immovable property the estate of Raja Ratan Singh, deceased, under the Court of Wards, situate in the districts of Rai Bareilly Pilibhir, Shahjahanpur and Badaun, &c, in Oudh. We the executants have now without any undue influence or coercion while in sound health, in full possession of our senses and of our own free will and accord declared the property to consist of one rupee and have agreed to a partition made in this way by Mr. John Inglis the Collector of Bareilly. We have fixed a 7 ½ anna share for Rai Khairati Lal, a 4 ¼ anna share for Rani Chhatar Kunwar and a 4 ¼ anna share for Rani Mewa Kunwar. We will partition the whole of the property among ourselves in this manner by arbitration. We will not repudiate the aforesaid partition in any way. If we bring any claim contrary to the partition it will be considered false by the Civil and Revenue Courts. These few lines have been executed as a deed of agreement that it may serve as evidence and be of use in time of need." Dated July 21, 1860, Saturday. The plaints alleged that the effect of this agreement was that the daughters of Daulat Singh as " life tenants " " without any lawful necessity, and contrary to law gave away a 7 anna 6 pie share to one Khairati Lal who had no right whatever," and that the plaintiffs as reversionary heirs of Daulat Singh became entitled on the death of the survivor to absolute possession. The three mouzahs, the subject of the three suits, were included in the share which on partition under the said agreement was allotted to Khairati, the predecessor in title of the appellants. The three mouzahs, the subject of the three suits, were included in the share which on partition under the said agreement was allotted to Khairati, the predecessor in title of the appellants. The appellants contended that no legally enforceable right to Ratans estate devolved on Daulat in 1845, and that as Ratan Singh remained in proprietary possession of the entire estate till his death, being succeeded by his widow, while neither Daulat Singh nor any of his heirs obtained possession of any part thereof until the transaction of 1860, any right which might have devolved on Daulat Singh in 1845 became extinct by reason of twelve years having elapsed ; that the transaction of 1860 was a compromise of conflicting claims to an estate in the possession of the Court of Wards; and that Daulat Singhs daughters " were under the Hindu law competent to enter into the compromise, and the plaintiffs are also bound by it." The main question decided was as to the validity and effect of the said compromise, in reference to which the Courts below differed. The Subordinate Judge held that though impugned by the respondents as an alienation in excess of the daughters powers it did not amount to a gift of a 7 J anna share to Khairati. " It was not a gift. The plaintiffs have been gainers by the compromise, in that they got by it 8J anna share, whereas they would in all probability get no more than 8 anna share only, if the matter were decided by a Law Court. I have stated above that the case would be decided under s. 9 of Regulation VII. of 1832. The fact is perfectly plain that the plaintiffs cannot get any part of Ratan Singhs 8 anna share unless the rule of forfeiture by loss of caste is enforced under Hindu law, and by the Bengal Regulation VII. of 1832 the Law Courts are prohibited to enforce that rule." He further held that it " is a family arrangement and is binding on the plaintiffs." He considered that it " conformed to the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, Laid down for the guidance of the Courts by s. 9 of the Bengal Regulation VII. of 1832 the Law Courts are prohibited to enforce that rule." He further held that it " is a family arrangement and is binding on the plaintiffs." He considered that it " conformed to the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, Laid down for the guidance of the Courts by s. 9 of the Bengal Regulation VII. of 1832." He added that " Daulat Singhs daughters even as Hindu women andholding no more than what is known as Hindu womans estate in the property they inherited from Daulat Singh would be perfectly justified to part away with so much of that property as was necessary to protect the rest of it." The High Court on the other hand held (see I. L. R. 29 Allah. 487, 492) that the compromise “undoubtedly amounts to an alienation. The circumstances under which the compromise came into existence will be found on page 558,1. L. R. 25, Allahabad. There can be no doubt that it was a just and wise compromise, each party having a good fighting title, and was perhaps the best arrangement which could have been made. Had the parties on both sides been male heirs, it unquestionably would have bound them and their successors and reversioners. But, unfortunately, one party were female heirs with a limited interest. Does their act bind their reversioners? We regret to be obliged to hold that in our opinion the reversioners are not bound by it." With regard to the title antecedent to the compromise the High Court also referred to their judgment in I. L. R. 25 Allah. 546, which held (see p. 571) that Regulation VII. of 1832 " did not abrogate the Hindu law as to the consequences of apostasy, but merely Laid down for the guidance of the judge a rule under which he might refuse to enforce those consequences. But it does not purport to affect the substantive law. The Hindu law remained unaltered in this respect and we hold that under it Daulat became on his fathers conversion sole owner of the property which up to that time had belonged jointly to him and his father." Their judgment under appeal (see 29 Allah., p. 491) added that as regards Act XXI. The Hindu law remained unaltered in this respect and we hold that under it Daulat became on his fathers conversion sole owner of the property which up to that time had belonged jointly to him and his father." Their judgment under appeal (see 29 Allah., p. 491) added that as regards Act XXI. of 1850 " we consider it sufficient to say that as in our opinion Daulat Singh in 1845 had become sole and absolute owner of the whole of the estate, which up to then had been the joint estate of himself and of his father, and as the Act just mentioned was not passed till 1850, some five years after Ratan Singhs conversion, it had no effect." The authorities relied upon by the High Court as obliging them to hold that the reversioners were not bound by the compromise appear in the following passage — " In the case of Imrit Kunwar v. Roop Narain Singh (( 1880) 6 C. L R. 76, 81.) their Lordships of the Privy Council lay down in clear and unequivocal language that it is clear that the daughters could not be bound by a compromise made by the widow under any circumstances. " That case no doubt was one in which the widow when entering into the compromise had made good terms for herself, disregarding the daughters (her reversioners) interests But the language used by their Lordships is general and not confined to the facts of the case before them. It uses the words under any circumstances thus laying down a general rule that a widow cannot bind her reversioner under any circumstances by a compromise. We take it to be undisputable that the law Laid down in respect of a widow applies equally to daughters who, like her, are merely limited owners holding the estate for life. " In the case of Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koeri (( 1882) 10 C. L. R. 337.) a widow sued two brothers of her deceased husband (who had got themselves recorded as owners in succession to him) for confirmation of her possession as her husbands heir. She succeeded in the first Court but this decision was reversed on appeal. " In the case of Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koeri (( 1882) 10 C. L. R. 337.) a widow sued two brothers of her deceased husband (who had got themselves recorded as owners in succession to him) for confirmation of her possession as her husbands heir. She succeeded in the first Court but this decision was reversed on appeal. She then filed a special appeal to the Sadar Court, and while the appeal was pending there she entered into an ikrarnama or compromise with the respondents by which they divided the property, each side taking a share. In a subsequent suit by the reversioners after the widows death, calling in question the validity of the compromise, it was held by the Calcutta High Court, citing the case of Imrit Kunwar v. Roop Narain Singh (6 C. L. R. 76, 81.), that the ikrarnama could not be regarded as affecting the rights of those who claim to be entitled as reversioners on the expiration of the widows life interest. The case of Jeram Lalji v. Veerbai (( 1903) 5 Bomb. L. R. 885.) was one practically to enforce a decree passed on an award, one of the parties to the submission to the arbitration having been a widow. In that case the learned judge held that there is a distinction between a bare compromise out of Court and an award by arbitrators followed by a consent decree thereon. But I think that in the absence of authority to the contrary it would be unsafe to treat anything short of a decree in a suit contested to the end as coming within the ruling of the Shiva Ganga Case. This case shews that even a decree passed on an arbitration award may not be binding on reversioners. " Among the reported cases cited in the case just mentioned was that of Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran (( 1886) I. L. R. 8 Allah. 365.), in which Mr. Justice Mahmud held that the rule in the Shiva Ganga Case was limited to decrees fairly obtained against the widow in contested and bona fide litigation, and would not apply to the compromise made in that case, which could hardly be regarded as standing on a higher footing than an alienation which the widow might have made. Justice Mahmud held that the rule in the Shiva Ganga Case was limited to decrees fairly obtained against the widow in contested and bona fide litigation, and would not apply to the compromise made in that case, which could hardly be regarded as standing on a higher footing than an alienation which the widow might have made. A similar rule was applied in Ram Sari v. Ram Dei (( 1906) I. L. R. 29 Allah. 239.), where it was held that a decree passed against a widow on an award in a case where there had been no trial in Court and which was based on agreement between the parties is not binding on the reversioners. In that case it was also held that an act done by the widow by which she purported to convey to third parties, out of the property inherited from her husband, an absolute estate amounted to an alienation. "On a review of the authorities, we hold that a compromise made by a widow is not binding on the reversioners even though it has been followed by a decree of Court, nor is a decree on an arbitration award, one of the parties to the submission having been a widow, and that the reversioners can be bound only by decree made after full contest in a bona fide litigation. Mr. J. C. Ghose in his book on the Principles of Hindu Law, 2nd ed., p. 267, writes .— It has been held that a decree against a widow to bind the reversioners must have been passed after full contest, and a compromise decree or a decree on an arbitration award can have no higher footing than an alienation by the widow. But it was contended that the compromise might be defended as a family settlement of doubtful claims. That contention is, we think, not sound. This subject is discussed in the leading case of Stapilton v. Stapilton. ((1739) 1 White & Tudor, 230.) In that case, dealing with what a Court of justice has to do in dealing with a compromise, we find the words always supposing that it (i.e., the compromise) is within the power of each party if honestly done, indicating the qualification which each party to the compromise must possess. ((1739) 1 White & Tudor, 230.) In that case, dealing with what a Court of justice has to do in dealing with a compromise, we find the words always supposing that it (i.e., the compromise) is within the power of each party if honestly done, indicating the qualification which each party to the compromise must possess. The two sisters being only limited owners, we think it was not within their power to enter into such a compromise so as to bind their reversioners. “Finally, we would add that there is no pretence for suggesting, nor has any such suggestion been made, that the compromise of July, 1860, was justifiable by any necessity recognized by Hindu law." Cowell, for the appellants, contended that on the conversion of Ratan Singh in 1845 the only legal consequence enforceable in a Court of law was that the joint relationship to his son in food worship and estate was terminated. Thenceforth they were separate, and the conversion operated as a severance of the joint title see Abraham v. Abraham. (( 1863) 9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 199.) Accordingly an 8 anna share vested separately in father and son, and the sons title to his share is not in dispute in this suit, for the compromise which is its foundation recognized his title to more than 8 annas. With regard to the fathers title it was contended that the High Court had erroneously held that it was forfeited by his conversion and immediately vested in the son. Reference was made to Regulation VII. of 1832, s. 9, and Act XXL of 1850, the effect of which was that the respondents could not in this suit assert any title to Ratan Singhs estate on behalf of his son unless the Court enforced the rule of forfeiture prescribed by the Hindu law, and the Court was imperatively prohibited from doing so. On the construction and effect of those enactments reference was made to Bhagwant Singh v. Kallu. (( 1888) I. L. R. 11 Allah. 100.) The title of the respondents was based upon the forfeiture, ^ but the effect of the compromise of 1860 had to be considered. On the construction and effect of those enactments reference was made to Bhagwant Singh v. Kallu. (( 1888) I. L. R. 11 Allah. 100.) The title of the respondents was based upon the forfeiture, ^ but the effect of the compromise of 1860 had to be considered. By their plaints they claimed that Daulat Singhs daughters were entitled as representing their father to the whole estate as life tenants, and that Khairati Lal, from whom the appellants derived title, traced its inception to an alienation which had been made without legal necessity and did not enure beyond the lifetime of the surviving daughter. It was contended that the compromise was not in effect and did not purport to be an alienation, but rather a mode of acquisition under which the parties thereto for the first time obtained possession and a title by consent in lieu of a disputed title without possession. It cured the imperfection of existing title asserted by the parties see Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 166.); Karimuddin v. Gobind Krishna Narain (( 1909) L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 138.); Lalla Oudh Behari Lall v. Mewa Koonwer (( 1868) 3 Agra H. C. 82, 84.); Ranee Mewa Koonwer v. Lalla Oudh Beharee Lall. (( 1867) 2 Agra H. C. 311, 320.) Assuming it to be an alienation it was intra vires the daugh ters under the circumstances. They were more than life tenants and represented the estate with all the powers of managers, and Khairati Lal at the time was the only reversioner see the Shivaganga Case (( 1863) 9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 539, 604.); Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (( 1856) 6 Moo. Ind. Ap. 393.); Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., s. 346, p. 454; ss. 347, 624, pp. 840, 852, 854. There was a concurrent finding that the compromise was the best and wisest arrangement which could be made. The cases relied on by the High Court related to compromises made in breach of duty to the holders of the reversionary interest and did not apply to the present case. Reference was made to Lekraj Roy v. Mahtab Chand. (( 1871) 14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 393.) Further it was contended that Khairati had a good title by prescription, and that a suit to eject his alienees was barred by limitation. Reference was made to Lekraj Roy v. Mahtab Chand. (( 1871) 14 Moo. Ind. Ap. 393.) Further it was contended that Khairati had a good title by prescription, and that a suit to eject his alienees was barred by limitation. The evidence shewed that possession in 1860 was made over to the parties in full proprietary right see s. 28 of Act XV. of 1877. As regards limitation it ran against Daulat Singh from 1845 see Act XIV. of 1859, s. 12, and Act IX. of 1861, s. 2. If it ran from the date on which possession was given by the Court of Wards (December 15, 1860), it was barred before Act IX. of 1871, which does not apply to suits before April 1, 1873, came into force see s. 1 of that Act and s. 2 of Act XV. of 1877. The later Acts which give an independent cause of actio to reversioners did not revive suits already barred see Huri Nath Chatterji v. Mothoormohun Goswami. (L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 183.) De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the respondents, contended that on Ratan Singhs conversion to Mahomedanism he forfeited his share in the property jointly held by himself and his son. The whole estate vested in the son immediately thereupon, succeeding thereto as to a father who was in the eye of Hindu law civiliter mortuus. Neither the Bengal Regulation of 1832 nor the Act of 1850 was applicable. The Hindu law of forfeiture was not abrogated thereby, it was only rendered unenforceable by the Courts. Moreover Act XXI. of 1850 was not retrospective, and a statute does not affect vested rights, such as accrued in 1845 to Daulat Singh, without express words see Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 866, s. 643, and p. 805, s. 593 ; and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd ed., pp. 295, 299, and 302. With regard to the compromise of 1860 it was not binding on the respondents. On its true construction it amounted to an alienation by the daughters in, favour of Khairati, and there was no evidence of any justifying necessity. Consequently the alienation was inoperative to pass title beyond the life of the surviving daughter. Nor does the case of the appellants stand on any better footing if the transaction is regarded as a compromise of doubtful but good fighting claims. Consequently the alienation was inoperative to pass title beyond the life of the surviving daughter. Nor does the case of the appellants stand on any better footing if the transaction is regarded as a compromise of doubtful but good fighting claims. The power to compromise is not more extensive than the power to alienate. The Shivaganga Case (9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 539.) shews that a compromise by a Hindu female can only bind her reversioners when it is made the basis of a decree fairly obtained in a contested and bona fide litigation. This compromise was made to avoid litigation, and however wise and prudent it may be considered, it was not within the powers of the Hindu daughters to conclude except so far as their own interests were concerned. The cases cited by the High Court, Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran (I. L R. 8 Allah. 365, 370.) Imrit Kunwar v. Hoop Narain Singh (6 C. L. R. 76, 81.), Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Karri (( 1882) 10 C. L. R. 337.), and Indro Koer v. Abdul Bwrkat (( 1870) 14 S. W. R. 146.), were relied upon. As to the nature of the compromise in this case and how it came to be made, see the judgment of the High Court in Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum.(( 1903) I. L. R. 25 Allah. 546, 548.) Obviously the principle Laid down in the Shivaganga Case (9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 539.) did not apply to it, and unless the compromise was binding the appellants had no title and were liable to ejectment from 1899, the date of the death of the surviving daughter. It was further contended that Khairati had not gained a title by prescription. The possession of the Court of Wards was the possession of the true owner, that is, of Daulat Singh or his widow or his daughters see Kasan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan (( 1882) L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 99.); Secretary of State for India v. Krishnawoni Gupta. (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 104.) As regards limitation reversioners had a separate cause of action under the Acts of 1871 and 1877, and limitation only ran in this case from the death of Mewa Kunwar in 1899 see art. 141 of Act XV. of 1877 and Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parvatibhai. (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 104.) As regards limitation reversioners had a separate cause of action under the Acts of 1871 and 1877, and limitation only ran in this case from the death of Mewa Kunwar in 1899 see art. 141 of Act XV. of 1877 and Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parvatibhai. (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 71.) Cowell, in reply, referred to the evidence as to the possession of the Court of Wards which accounted to the parties to the compromise for rents and profits of their allotted shares during the whole time of its possession. Reference was also made to Lala Oudh Beharee Lall v. Mewa Kunwar (3 Agra H. C. R. 84.) and Bholamosee v. Abdoollah Khan cited therein. (( 1852) S. D. A. Bengal, 1103.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Mr. Ameer All These appeals, which have been consolidated by an order dated November 1, 1910, arise out of three actions in ejectment, brought by the plaintiffs in the Court of the Sub ordinate Judge of Bareilly, who dismissed the suits by one judgment on May 20, 1905. His decision, however, was reversed on appeal by the High Court of Allahabad, which decreed the plaintiffs claims, on April 23, 1907. The defendants have appealed to His Majesty in Council, and the point for determination is the same in each case. The plaintiffs claim as next reversioners to their grandfather (mothers father) Eaja Daulat Singh to recover possession of certain properties held by the defendants, on the allegation that the deed of compromise under which the latter purport to derive title is not binding on them. The defendants, on the other hand, are transferees from one Raja Khairati Lal, a grandson by a daughter of Raja Ratan Singh, the father of Daulat Singh, and a party to the compromise in question. The history of Ratan Singhs family and the circumstances which led to the compromise have been twice before this Board and will be found summarized in the earlier of the two cases. (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 157 ; L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 138.) It is unnecessary, therefore, to enter into them at any length. The history of Ratan Singhs family and the circumstances which led to the compromise have been twice before this Board and will be found summarized in the earlier of the two cases. (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 157 ; L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 138.) It is unnecessary, therefore, to enter into them at any length. For the purposes of the present appeals it is sufficient to state that Raja Ratan Singh, who appears to have held a high position in the Court of the then King of Oudh, owned considerable property within British territories, part of which is in suit, and that he and his son Daulat were members of a joint Hindu family and thus entitled in joint tenancy each to a moiety of the properties. It may be taken now as established beyond dispute that in 1845 Ratan Singh abandoned Hinduism and adopted the Mahomedan faith. But although his renunciation of the Hindu religion involved, under the Hindu law, the forfeiture of civil rights to the extent of depriving him of his share in the joint estate, Daulat advanced no claim based on such forfeiture, and father and son remained joint until the latters death in January, 1851. Daulat left him surviving a widow named Sen Kunwar, and two daughters, Chhattar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar. On the death of Ratan Singh some months later (September, 1851) the entire property which had stood all along in his name in the Collectors register was recorded in the name of his widow, Rani Raj Kunwar. Disputes then arose between the heirs of Daulat on the one side and Raj Kunwar on the other. Eventually, and in consequence of these disputes, the Court of Wards took over, in 1852, possession of the entire estate, making Raj Kunwar, who is stated to have been a person of weak intellect, an allowance of Rs.500 a month. The rights of Daulats heirs do not appear to have been admitted to any part of the property, as no allowance was made to them, and, in fact, it is alleged, they were referred to the Civil Courts for the establishment of their rights. Matters remained in this condition for several years. Sen Kunwar died in 1857, and Raj Kunwar, Ratans widow, the following year. In 1860, under the advice of Mr. Matters remained in this condition for several years. Sen Kunwar died in 1857, and Raj Kunwar, Ratans widow, the following year. In 1860, under the advice of Mr. John Inglis, a well-known district officer, then Collector of Bareilly, the daughters of Daulat and the grandson of Ratan, Khairati Lal, entered into the compromise which the plaintiffs now seek to set aside so far as it affects them. By this compromise Daulat Singhs daughters, Chhattar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar, obtained between them an 8 ½ anna share, taking the entire estate as 16 annas; whilst Khairati Lal received a 7 ½ anna share. Partition was effected in terms of the compromise, and the parties obtained possession of the respective shares allotted to them. Chhattar Kunwar died in 1866. There was litigation between Chhattars husband and Mewa Kunwar as to the right to Chhattars share, which was ultimately decided in Mewa Kunwars favour, who thus obtained possession of the entire 8% anna share received by the two sisters in 1860. Mewa Kunwar died in 1899, and the share held by her has devolved on the plaintiffs, her sons. Their case is that on the abandonment of Hinduism by Ratan Singh he forfeited his half share in the joint property which vested in Daulat Singh, that they as his heirs are entitled to the entire 16 annas, and that they are not bound by the compromise of 1860, as Chhattar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar, being mere life tenants, had no authority, in the absence of legal necessity, to alienate the 7 ½ anna share in favour of Khairati Lal. The defendants, who are transferees either from Khairati Lal or his heirs, contend inter alia that the compromise entered into by the two ladies was not an alienation; that it was a family arrangement for the settlement of disputes under which they obtained more than they were legally entitled to; that in view of the British legislation (to which the defendants refer) the forfeiture, on which the plaintiffs reply, could not be enforced, and that, therefore, there was no divestment of the right of Ratan in respect of his half share, and that even if any such right, as the plaintiffs allege, devolved on Daulat in consequence of Ratans conversion in 1845, it became "extinguished" on the lapse of twelve years from the date of such devolution. The Subordinate Judge in a well-considered judgment upheld the defendants pleas and dismissed the suits. The learned judges of the High Court, on appeal by the plaintiffs, arrived at a different conclusion. They were of opinion that on the conversion of Ratan Singh, Daulat became "sole and absolute owner of the whole estate," inasmuch as Regulation VII. of 1832 "did not abrogate the Hindu law as to the consequences of apostasy," and Act XXI. of 1850 was not enacted until some five years after his adoption of the Mahomedan faith. With regard to the compromise of 1860, although they considered it to be "just and wise " and "perhaps the best arrangement that could be made," they felt pressed by authority to hold in effect that it amounted to an alienation which the ladies, in the absence of legal necessity, were not competent to make, and that consequently it was not binding on the plaintiffs. In this view of the question they reversed, as already stated, the decision of the Subordinate Judge, and decreed the plaintiffs claims in all three suits. The learned judges did not deal with the question of limitation raised by the defendants. Their Lordships regret they are unable to concur in the judgment of the High Court. In 1845, when Ratan Singh abandoned Hinduism and adopted the Mahomedan faith, the rule Laid down in s. 9, Regulation VII. of 1832, for decision in civil suits where the parties ranged against each other belonged to different persuasions, was in force in the Bengal Presidency. It declared in express terms that in such cases, "When one party shall be of the Hindoo and the other of the Mahommedan persuasion, or where one or other of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the Mahommedan or Hindoo persuasions, the laws of those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to which, but for the operation of such laws, they would have been entitled." Act XXI. of 1850 extended the principle of s. 9, Regulation VII. of 1832, of the Bengal Code throughout the territories subject to the government of the East India Company. of 1850 extended the principle of s. 9, Regulation VII. of 1832, of the Bengal Code throughout the territories subject to the government of the East India Company. After reciting the provisions of s. 9, and stating that it would be beneficial to extend its principle to the rest of British India, it enacted that—" So much of any law or usage now in force within the territories subject to the government of the East India Company, as inflicts on any person forfeiture of rights or property, or may be held in any way to impair or affect any right of inheritance, by reason of his or her renouncing, or having been excluded from the communion of any religion, or being deprived of caste, shall cease to be enforced as law in the Courts of the East India Company, and in the Courts established by Royal Charter within the said territories. The intention in both enactments is perfectly clear; by declaring that the Hindu or Mahomedan law shall not be permitted to deprive any party not belonging to either of those persuasions of a right to property, or that any law or usage which inflicts forfeiture of rights or property by reason of any person renouncing his or her religion, shall not be enforced, the Legislature virtually set aside the provisions of the Hindu law which penalizes renunciation of religion or exclusion from caste. The effect of the legislation of 1832 and 1850 was that on Ratan Singhs abandonment of Hinduism Daulat Singh did not acquire any enforceable right to his fathers share in the joint family property which he could either assert himself or transmit to his heirs for enforcement in a British Court of justice. In the view their Lordships take of this branch of the case it is not necessary to discuss the question of limitation raised by the defendants. But it may be observed that whatever right Daulat acquired under the Hindu law to the share of his father came into existence in 1845 on the conversion of the latter to the Mahomedan religion. No suit could be brought, even if the enactments referred to above had permitted it, to enforce the right after the lapse of twelve years " from the time the cause of action arose " (s. 12, Act XIV. of 1859). Nothing in art. 142 of Act IX. No suit could be brought, even if the enactments referred to above had permitted it, to enforce the right after the lapse of twelve years " from the time the cause of action arose " (s. 12, Act XIV. of 1859). Nothing in art. 142 of Act IX. of 1871 or of art. 141 of Act XV. of 1877 could lead to the revival of a right that had already become barred. In this connection their Lordships would refer to the judgment of this Committee in the case of Hurrinath Chatterji v. Mohunt Mothoor Mohun Goswami (L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 183.), where it was pointed out that " the intention of the law of limitation is, not to give a right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right." Such was the relative position of the parties in 1860, when the compromise was entered into. The heirs of Daulat had no existing enforceable right to the share of Ratan Singh, and the entire property was recorded in the name of his widow. Under these circumstances the parties, under the advice of the district officer, instead of engaging in a long litigation, arrived at a mutual settlement of their claims. The real nature of the compromise is well expressed in a judgment of the High Court of the North West Provinces in 1868 in the suit of Mewa Kunwar against her sister Chhattar Kunwars husband. The learned judges say as follows "The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes, each one relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in dispute other than that falling to his share, and recognizing the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this light, rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other, that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement, and we think that it is the duty of the Courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement." (3 Agra H. C. R. at p. 84.) Their Lordships have no hesitation in adopting that view. The true test to apply to a transaction which is challenged by the reversioners as an alienation not binding on them is, whether the alienee derives title from the holder of the limited interest or life tenant. In the present case Khairati Lal acquired no right from the daughters of Daulat, for " the compromise," to use their Lordships language in Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar (L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. at p. 166.), " is based on the assumption that there was an antecedent title of some kind in the parties, and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is." In their Lordships judgment the decisions on the authority of which the learned judges of the High Court have held the compromise not to bind the plaintiffs are not applicable to the present case. On the whole their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment and decrees of the High Court of Allahabad should be reversed and those of the Subordinate Judge restored, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondents will pay the costs of this appeal and of the appeal in the High Court.