JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this rule to set aside an order for the prosecution of the Petitioner under sec. 476, Cr. P. C. It appears that the Petitioner was cited as a witness on behalf of the Defendants in a suit for rent, and he produced what purported to be a receipt in proof of the allegation of the Defendants that the rent had been paid. The Court of first instance held that the document in question was not genuine and overruled the plea of payment. This decree was made on the 16th September 1909. On the 16th December following the Plaintiff applied for sanction to prosecute the Petitioner. This application however was not granted by the Munsif as an appeal had been preferred against his decision in the suit. There can be no doubt that the Munsif acted properly in declining to grant sanction at that stage. The decision of the Munsif, however, was affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge on the 19th May 1910. Thereupon, on the 6th August following the Plaintiffs renewed their application for section to prosecute the Petitioner. Meanwhile the officer who had tried the original suit had been transferred and the matter was taken up by his successor. The Petitioner was called upon to show cause why his prosecution should not be directed. He appeared on the 17th September 1910 and asked for time to enable him to produce evidence. The case was adjourned repeatedly from time to time to enable the Petitioner to produce his witnesses. Finally on the 7th January 1911 as no witness was forthcoming the case was heard and the order in question made. The propriety of this order has now been assailed on the ground that as it was made by a Judge who had not heard the evidence at the original trial, it ought not to have been made without an independent investigation by him. At one stage of the argument it was suggested, though somewhat faintly- upon the authority of the case of In re Krishna Gobinda Dutt 9 C. W. N. 859 (1905) Begu Singh v. Emperor I. L. R. 34 Cal. 551: s. c. 11 C. W. N. 569 (1907) and Kartik Ram Bhakat v. Emperor I.L. R. 35 Cal. 114(1907) that it was not competent to the Court under any circumstances to make an order without an independent investigation. 551: s. c. 11 C. W. N. 569 (1907) and Kartik Ram Bhakat v. Emperor I.L. R. 35 Cal. 114(1907) that it was not competent to the Court under any circumstances to make an order without an independent investigation. In view of the decision of this Court in the case of Shaikh Bahadur v. Shaikh Eradutulla 14 C. W. N. 799 (1910), the cases relied upon cannot, however, be treated as binding authority for the proposition enunciated. But the learned Vakil for the Petitioner contends that there are passages in the order of reference to the Full Bench in the case last-mentioned which lend some support to his contention. We have not been able to discover any passage which lends any support to the argument of the learned Vakil for the Petitioner. All that was pointed out in that case was that if an offence has been committed not in Court but outside the Court, as in the case of obstruction to execution of a judicial process, an investigation may be necessary to enable the Court to ascertain facts justifying an order under sec. 476, Cr. P. C. It may be observed that the very phraseology of sec. 476 shows that a preliminary enquiry is not obligatory on the Court. The section provides that the Court after making any such preliminary enquiry as may be necessary may send the case for enquiry or trial to the nearest Magistrate. It is clear, therefore, as pointed out by this Court in the case of Chowdhuri Mahomed Izharul Huq v. Queen-Empress I, L. R. 20 Cal. 349 (1892) and Bapiram Surma v. Gouri Nath Dutt I. L. R. 20 Cal. 474 (189S) and by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in Inre Jivabhai Khusal 7 Bom. L. R. 84 (1904) that in strict law, for proceedings under the section, neither a notice to show cause why a party should not be sent for trial, nor a preliminary enquiry is indispensable. What has to be borne in mind in each individual case is, whether in the interest of justice a preliminary investigation is necessary. It may be added that whether the person against whom an order under sec. What has to be borne in mind in each individual case is, whether in the interest of justice a preliminary investigation is necessary. It may be added that whether the person against whom an order under sec. 476 has been made without preliminary investigation has been prejudiced by reason of the omission to make such investigation is a matter which may be considered by this Court when the propriety of the order is called in question [see Chowdhuri Mahomed Izharul Huq v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 20 Cal, 349 (1892). 2. The real question therefore which arises in the case before us is whether the Petitioner has been prejudiced by reason of the omission of the Court below to hold a preliminary investigation. We are clearly of opinion that the Petitioner has not been prejudiced. Although he was a witness in the case it appears that he was the leading figure in that litigation. In fact he appeared in Court to support his brother who claimed to have purchased the tenancy in question and as such purchaser to have made payment of rent to the landlord. The question in controversy was fairly simple, namely, whether the receipt produced was genuine or not, the Court of first instance as also the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that the document in question was not genuine. It was therefore perfectly open to the Munsif before whom the application under sec. 476 was made to consider the evidence on the record, and after hearing the parties, if he was satisfied that an order was needed in the interest of justice under sec. 476, to make the appropriate order. There can be no question that the power to direct prosecution is conferred on the Court and not on the individual officer who fills the judicial office at a particular time. No doubt when the application is made before the officer who has heard the evidence at the original trial, he is in a position of advantage, but we are unable to lay down that in no case can his successor make an order under sec. 476, Cr. P. C, without an independent investigation. The result, therefore, is that the order of the Court below is affirmed and this rule discharged.