JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was brought by the plaintiff-respondent to enforce a mortgage executed on the 3rd of August, 1897, by the first defendant Sunder. The appellant, Sri Chand, is the purchaser of the mortgaged property in execution of a money decree. One of the pleas raised by him in defence was that the stipulation as to the rate of interest was “hard and improper.” The bond secures a sum of Rs. 50 to be repaid with compound interest at the rate of 2 per cent, per mensem with half yearly rests. 2. The court of first instance held that this stipulation was neither hard nor unconscionable, and decreed the plaintiff's claim. 3. On appeal the learned Judge, alter deferring to the fact that the mortgagor was a youth of nineteen, that the value of the mortgaged property was Rs. 4,000 and more than sufficient to secure the money borrowed, and that the rate of interest was high, expressed the opinion that “such a bargain might be considered to be a hard and unconscionable one.” He, however, held that Sri Chand, the purchaser, could not plead that the stipulation was a hard and unconscionable bargain and was bound to pay the principal amount and compound interest at the rate agreed upon. 4. We do not agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge as to Sri Chand's rights to contest the validity of the stipulation as to interest. But holding the view that we do on the other question raised in the case, we do not deem it necessary to decide this point. We are of opinion that the court of first instance was right in holding that the stipulation, as to interest was not hard and unconscionable. 5. The latest pronouncement on the point of their Lordships of the Privy Council was made in Dhanipal Das v. Maneshar Baksh Singh, [1906] I.L.R., 28 All., 570. In that case their Lordships held that the court “could not give relief from a transaction or contract merely on the ground that it was a hard bargain, except perhaps when the extortion is so great as to be of itself evidence of fraud, which is not this case. In that case their Lordships held that the court “could not give relief from a transaction or contract merely on the ground that it was a hard bargain, except perhaps when the extortion is so great as to be of itself evidence of fraud, which is not this case. In other cases there must be some other equity arising from the position of the parties or the particular circumstances of the case.” In the case before us there is no evidence of any circumstance which would justify the court in holding that the stipulation as to interest was procured in an unfair manner. As was observed by one of the learned Judges who decided the case of Meghraj v. Har Gayan, [1910] 7 A.L.J.R., 655. “In all cases of this kind the court must look to the facts and circumstances of the case, and unless in a case there is unfair dealing the court must enforce the contract made by the parties.” In the case before us there is no suggestion of undue influence or unfair dealing. The only plea raised on the question of interest was, as we have pointed out above, that the stipulation as to interest was hard and improper. The mere fact that the rate of interest was high, which it undoubtedly is in this case, is not sufficient to justify us in holding that the bargain was an unconscionable one and parties who entered into it should be relieved from the liability incurred by them. In this view we are of opinion that the decree of the learned Judge of the court below is right, and this appeal must fail. We accordingly dismiss it with costs. We extend the time for payment of the mortgage money for a period of four months from this date.