JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs claimed that a platform and a cesspool should be removed. The plaintiffs alleged that the platform and the cesspool had been wrongfully put up and constructed, of their land. They also pleaded that by an agreement, dated the 2.4th February, 1906, the defendants had agreed that the chabutra and the cesspool should be removed within fifteen days from the date of the agreement. The defendants pleaded that if the platform was on any part of the plaintiffs land, the plaintiffs had lost the right to have it removed by adverse possession. They further pleaded that the agreement was entered into under the following circumstances, namely, that a criminal case had been brought, which was a false case, in order to bring pressure to bear on the defendants and that the plaintiffs by means of undue influence caused certain particulars contrary to the facts and mutual agreement to be entered therein. The court of first instance held the agreement to be void because it was made in consideration of the withdrawal of a criminal proceeding, and that the platform and the cesspool were more than twelve years old. It therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. The lower appellate court did not try the issue as to the agreement being valid or invalid, but held that the chabutra and cesspool were more than twelve years old and confirmed the decree of the court of first instance. The plaintiffs now appeal to this Court. It has to be admitted by the respondents that if the agreement was a valid agreement, the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed. The appellants, on the other hand, must admit that if the agreement was void, the finding of the courts below, which is a finding of fact, cannot be touched in second appeal. 2. The only question really for decision then is the validity or invalidity of the agreement of the 24th February, 1906. It is admitted that it was executed. 3. The respondents are unable to point to any evidence to support the allegation that any matters were fraudulently put into this agreement, contrary to the intention of the parties when they executed it, by the plaintiffs or anyone on their behalf. It is admitted that it was executed. 3. The respondents are unable to point to any evidence to support the allegation that any matters were fraudulently put into this agreement, contrary to the intention of the parties when they executed it, by the plaintiffs or anyone on their behalf. I offered to give time to look into the record to see how the evidence stood on this matter, and it is admitted that there is no evidence in support of any such allegation. The facts connected with the agreement appear to some extent at least to be undisputed and the undisputed facts are as follows. One Asbraf Khan, who was the karinda of the plaintiffs, brought criminal proceedings under sections 341 and 352, Penal Code, 1860, against some of the defendants. Section 341 is the offence of wrongful restraint and is punishable with simple imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one month or with fine, which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both. It is an offence which is compoundable without the leave of the court. The offence mentioned in section 352, Penal Code, 1860, is the offence commonly called simple assault, punishable with imprisonment, either rigorous or simple, not exceeding three months, or with fine not exceeding five hundred rupees, or with both. It also is a compoundable offence without the leave of the court. These criminal proceedings were pending at the time the agreement of the 24th February, 1906, was entered into. Now reading the plaint in the present suit in conjunction with the written statement, it is perfectly clear that the platform in question as it stood at the date of the agreement and at the time of the criminal proceedings either actually encroached on certain land which on partition had been allotted to the plaintiffs or their ancestors or, if it did not actually so encroach, the plaintiffs were honestly contending that there was such encroachment. The first paragraph of the written statement-commences by admitting that plot No. 93 was land which had been allotted to the plaintiffs’ ancestors on partition; but the defendants contended that if any part of it was occupied by their platform, the plaintiffs had lost that part by adverse possession. The cesspool also was complained of. Now let us see what was the nature of the agreement, which was entered into between the parties. The cesspool also was complained of. Now let us see what was the nature of the agreement, which was entered into between the parties. It provided that the defendants should demolish the platform but only to the extent of one and half yards and that they should do so within fifteen days. The cesspool was also to be removed; but the agreement provided for its re-erection elsewhere, proper precaution being taken to make it safe. The agreement then goes on to provide that if the defendants do not comply with the terms, the plaintiffs are to be at liberty to institute a suit for the removal of the platform and the cesspool. It contains one more term, namely, that in the criminal proceedings to which I have already referred, a compromise should be filed. Now, on the face of this agreement, there is nothing unreasonable or unfair. No proceedings have ever been instituted to set it aside on the ground of fraud or duress and the plaintiffs took the steps of having it compulsorily registered. The compromise in the criminal proceedings was duly filed; The defendants, however contend that the agreement is void, having regard to the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, as the courts below have found that it was entered into in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal proceedings. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act provides that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless, among other things, the court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. It is said that the consideration for the present agreement was opposed to public policy on the general principle that its effect was to stifle a prosecution. Reliance is placed on a passage in the case of Sriranga Chariar v. Ramasami Ayyangar, [1894] I.L.R., 18 Mad., 189, 191. The learned Judge there says There is also no doubt of the law that a consideration that proceeds upon the withdrawal of criminal proceedings that have been instituted is illegal as being opposed to public policy, as it is held to be the stifling of a prosecution. And even if this illegal consideration is only part of the consideration it renders the whole agreement void, because there is not good and sufficient consideration.” With great respect to the learned Judge I think that proposition in India at least is too wide. And even if this illegal consideration is only part of the consideration it renders the whole agreement void, because there is not good and sufficient consideration.” With great respect to the learned Judge I think that proposition in India at least is too wide. What a court has to do is to see in each case if it regards the consideration as being opposed to public policy. In the present case I have no doubt that the compromising of the criminal proceedings did in fact enter into the Consideration of the parties on each side when they executed the agreement. The law, however, in this country allows parties to compromise and compound certain offences. I fail altogether to see how a court can regard the compounding of an offence, which the law permits to be compounded, as being opposed to public policy. See also the exception to Section 214, I.P.C. In the present case the offences with which the defendants were charged were of a trivial and private nature, and in all probability were directly connected with the very matters in dispute, which the parties settled by the agreement of the 24th February, 1906. In my opinion the court of first instance was wrong in holding that the agreement was void and that the lower appellate court was in error in not deciding the question. The agreement in my opinion was a valid agreement and ought to have been given effect to. This view was taken in the case of Amir Khan and Amir Jan, [1898] 3 C.W.N., 5. See also the judgment in S.A. No. 536 of 1910, decided by a learned Judge of this Court on the 22nd February, 1911. The defendants nowhere alleged that they complied with the terms of the agreement and the agreement provides that if the defendants did not within fifteen days mentioned in the agreement partially demolish the platform and alter the position of the cesspool, the plaintiffs will be at liberty to institute a suit to have the platform demolished and the cesspool removed. This being so, the plaintiff's claim ought to have been decreed. I allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of both the courts below and decree the plaintiffs’ claim with costs.