JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit to redeem a mortgage. In the plaint it was alleged that the mortgage was made in 1849, but the plaintiff failed to show when as a matter of fact the mortgage was made. They, however, rely on an acknowledgment. The original mortgagor was one Bijai Singh. He had three sons, Lokhan, Gobardhan and Hulasi. Hulasi had two sons, Makunda and Jai Ram. Makunda had a son, Kalian, and Jai Ram had two sons, Mani Ram and Tula. Dhira Singh, plaintiff, has become the owner of any equity of redemption, which was left in Lokhan and Gobardhan. Chunni represents the equity of redemption of the descendants of Hulasi. The original mortgagees were Shahjit, Tulshi and Ghansham. Their transferees were Bharat, Padam and Bhanwar. In the khewat of 1875, Lokhan, Gobardhan and Hulasi were set forth as mortgagors and Bharat, Padam and Bhanwar were set out as mortgagees. The wajib-ul-arz is signed by Bharat and the wajib-ul-arz refers to the khewat. The court of first instance held that the entry in the khewat verified by the wajib-ul-aiz was a good acknowledgment against Bharat and, accordingly, it decreed redemption to the extent of one-third of the property. The plaintiffs appealed against this decree of the court of first instance in so far as it refused redemption of the entire property. The defendants appealed in so far as any part of the property had been ordered to be redeemed. The lower appellate court dealt with the two appeals in one judgment. It dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and decreed the defendants' appeal. The plaintiffs appealed to this court; but filed only one appeal, which was an appeal against allowing the defendants' appeal in the lower appellate court. A preliminary objection was raised in this court by the respondents. It was contended that the plaintiffs ought to have appealed against both decrees and that not having done so, the present appeal is barred on the principle of res judicata. The Full Bench decision in the case of Zaharia v. Debia, [1910] 7 A.L.J.R., 861 was relied on. The plaintiffs' appeal in the lower appellate court was No. 28 of 1910. The defendants' appeal in the same court was No. 32 of 1910. The Full Bench decision in the case of Zaharia v. Debia, [1910] 7 A.L.J.R., 861 was relied on. The plaintiffs' appeal in the lower appellate court was No. 28 of 1910. The defendants' appeal in the same court was No. 32 of 1910. The decree in the lower appellate court on the plaintiffs' appeal is simply to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal, that is to say, it dismisses the complaint of the plaintiffs that their suit was dismissed to the extent of two-thirds of the property. It seems to me that the decree of the lower appellate court, in appeal No. 28 is res judicata to this extent that it is no longer open to the plaintiffs to ask for the redemption of the property to the extent of two-thirds. If this Court were to now make a decree for two-thirds of the property, there would be two equally binding decrees, one contradicting the other. It is said that although there were two decrees, the judgment covered both. It seems to me that everything that was done by the lower appellate court has been appealed against, except the actual decree dismissing No. 28. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs' appeal in so far as they ask to redeem the property to the extent of one-third is not barred on the principle of res judicata. 2. The next question is the question of acknowledgment. 3. In the year 1875, the Limitation Act then in force was Act IX of 1861. Article 148 of Schedule II of that Act provides a period of sixty years within which a suit for redemption of a mortgage must be brought. The period from which time begins to run is set forth in the third column as being the date of the mortgage, unless where there has been made an acknowledgment of title of the mortgagor or of his right of redemption, before the expiration of the prescribed period, in writing, signed by the mortgagee or some person claiming under him, and in such case the time begins to run from the date of the acknowledgment. In the present case the mortgage was a joint mortgage and the wajib-ul-arz was only signed by one of them. Article 148 of Act IX of 1871 does not provide as do the later Acts for the signing of acknowledgment by an agent. In the present case the mortgage was a joint mortgage and the wajib-ul-arz was only signed by one of them. Article 148 of Act IX of 1871 does not provide as do the later Acts for the signing of acknowledgment by an agent. In the case of Hanuman Prasad v. Raghunandan Singh, [1904] 1 A.L.J.R. 355 it was held that an acknowledgment by one of two mortgagees could not enure to the benefit of the mortgagor as against the other. The learned Judge, who delivered the judgment of the court, quotes a number of authorities in support of the decision. The appellants contend that the entry in the khewat verified, as they allege, by the wajib-ul-arz is certainly a sufficient acknowledgment against Bharat, and that, therefore, they are entitled to redeem the property to the extent of one-third. The case of Daia Chand v. Sarfraz, [1875] ILR, I-All., 117 is cited. In that case, under what appears to be somewhat similar circumstances, the majority of the court held that there had been a sufficient acknowledgment. It seems to me that the question as to the sufficiency of the acknowledgment must depend to a great extent on the circumstances of each case, and it is a little hard to understand how the mere signing of a lengthy wajib-ul-arz which refers among many other things to the khewat can be considered an acknowledgment of the title of the mortgagor within the meaning of the Act. The wajib-ul-arz contains a lot of matters, and so does the khewat. If the khewat itself had been signed, it might fairly be said, perhaps, that it should be deemed an acknowledgment. However, for the purpose of my decision I shall assume that the case of Daia Chand v. Sarfraz, is a binding authority and that the entry in the khewat, such as it is, is a sufficient acknowledgment if it had been made by all the mortgagees. It remains to be considered whether on this assumption it ought to be held to be sufficient acknowledgment as against one-third of the property. It seems to me that the mortgage was a joint mortgage and could not be redeemed in part. It is said that the plaintiffs were ready when the suit was instituted to redeem the entire mortgage. This is no doubt correct. But there are two answers. It seems to me that the mortgage was a joint mortgage and could not be redeemed in part. It is said that the plaintiffs were ready when the suit was instituted to redeem the entire mortgage. This is no doubt correct. But there are two answers. First of all, that although they were ready to redeem the entire mortgage they could not do so, because there had not been sufficient acknowledgment as against all the mortgagees. In other words in the year 1875 an acknowledgment by one of several mortgagees in a joint mortgage was of no avail whatsoever. The second objection is that having neglected to appeal against the decree dismissing the suit to the extent of two-thirds, it is now impossible to redeem the entire mortgage. Under the circumstances it seems to me that the appeal must be dismissed. I therefore dismiss it with costs.