JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. 1. This is a suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 were the owners of certain zamindari property and that the sale of that property to the defendant, Umme Khatun, in execution of a decree in favour of the defendant, Bishambar Das, did not affect the rights of the plaintiffs. The property in dispute formerly belonged to Musammat Majid-un-nissa. Bishambar Das obtained a decree against her on the 28th of January, 1904; and on the following 6th of August the decree-holder attached the property in execution of his decree. Pending this attachment, namely, on the 21st of November, 1904, Majid-un-nissa purported to convey the property to Musammat Ummat-ul-Fatma, the mother of the plaintiffs. For some reason which is not explained, the application of the decree-holder for execution of his decree of the 28th of January, 1904, was dismissed on the 6th of January, 1905, but shortly afterwards, namely, in February, 1905, he made an application to the court for execution of his decree and asked for sale of the property which had been attached. The court granted the application, but by its order purported to re-attach the property and ordered a sale of it. Both the lower courts dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the transfer of the 21st of November; 1904, was made by Majid-un-nissa pending the attachment of the property under the decree held by Bishamber Das, and was therefore void under section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882. 2. This appeal has been preferred and the ground of appeal which has been pressed before us is, that the attachment of the property in 1904, came to an end on the dismissal of the application for execution and that the transfer of the property made by Majid-un-nissa before the subsequent attachment in favour of the plaintiff's ancestor was not affected by it. 3. The question is whether the original attachment of 1904 was ever discharged. The decree-holder, in applying for execution in 1905, did not ask for the attachment of the property but for the sale of it under the attachment of 1904. 3. The question is whether the original attachment of 1904 was ever discharged. The decree-holder, in applying for execution in 1905, did not ask for the attachment of the property but for the sale of it under the attachment of 1904. There is nothing on the record to show the circumstances under which the application for execution of the decree was dismissed, and there is nothing before us to lead us to suppose that the property was by order of the court or otherwise released from attachment. On the contrary it appears that when the order for sale was applied for in 1905, by the decree-holder, an office report was filed to the effect that the property attached had been sold on the 21st of March, 1904. Inconsequence of this report the Revenue Court rejected the decree-holder's application, but on appeal the learned District Judge held that the sale was made, while the original attachment continued, and therefore was clearly void, that the attachment of 1904 must be held to have been subsisting, not only at the date of the sale, but also when the subsequent application for execution was made. In The Bank of Upper India v. Sheo Prasad, [1897] I.L.R., 19 All., 482, Knox and Burkitt, JJ. held that where property is once attached in execution of a decree an order merely dismissing an application for execution, which order does not contain specific words withdrawing the attachment and which is not an order declaring the decree incapable of execution will not have the effect of raising the attachment, and if in appeal such order is set aside the decree-holder will be in the same position as he was before and entitled to the full benefit of the attachment. Reliance has been placed by the appellant's learned Counsel upon the ruling of their Lordships of the Privv Council in Puddomonee v. Roy Muthoora Nath Chaudhry, [1873] 12 B.L.R., 411 In that case their Lordships held that “generally where the party prosecuting the decree is compelled to take out execution, his title should be presumed to date from the second attachment. If in the case before us the decree-holder had been obliged to apply for a new attachment and had done so, the observation of their Lordships in the case above cited would have had weight, but their Lordships go on to say that no broad rule could be laid down upon the question. They observe “Their Lordships do not mean to lay down broadly that in all cases in which an execution is struck off the file, such consequences must follow.” In the present case all that we know is that the application for execution of the decree-holder was dismissed; that he renewed his application for sale of the property which had been attached; that a sale was ordered, while at the same time the attachment was confirmed, and that in appeal in execution the appellate court held that the original attachment subsisted. We are of opinion that the courts below rightly dismissed the suit. We dismiss the appeal with costs.