JUDGMENT 1. The sole question for consideration in this Rule is, whether the appeal preferred to the District Judge was properly dismissed as barred by limitation. The suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance on the 30th June 1910. The Plaintiff, with a view to prefer an appeal, applied on the 2nd July 1910 for copies of the judgment and decree. He filed 20 folios for the purpose and also Court-fees as prescribed by the rules. The copy of the judgment was ready on the 8th July, but the Plaintiff did not take delivery of it till 5 days later. It appears that at the time when the copy of the judgment was ready for delivery, the decree had not even been signed by the Judge; as a matter of fact, the record shows that the decree was signed on the 11th July. On the 13th July the copy of the judgment was delivered to the Plaintiff, and apparently pursuant to an order made on the 8th July when the decree was not yet in existence, one unused folio as also Court-fees of the value of Rs. 18 were returned to him. It is stated on behalf of the Plaintiff that he was informed at the time that the decree had not been prepared. Consequently, on the 15th July 1910, he made a fresh application for copy of the decree. This copy was ready on the 20th July, but the Plaintiff did not take delivery till the 5th August. The appeal was filed on the 17th August and dismissed two days later on the ground that it was barred by limitation. In our opinion, the order of dismissal cannot be supported. It is clear upon the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of Beni Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi ILR 13 Cal. 104 (1886) that the Plaintiff is entitled to a deduction of the time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree. Consequently time does not run against him from any date earlier than the nth July 1910. It cannot also be disputed that under sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, the Plaintiff is entitled to a deduction of the time taken up not only in obtaining a copy of the decree but also in obtaining a copy of the judgment. Consequently time does not run against him from any date earlier than the nth July 1910. It cannot also be disputed that under sec. 12 of the Limitation Act, the Plaintiff is entitled to a deduction of the time taken up not only in obtaining a copy of the decree but also in obtaining a copy of the judgment. This, however, is of no assistance to the Plaintiff, because the time taken up in obtaining the copy of the judgment in this particular case falls wholly within the time which the Plaintiff is entitled to deduct under the decision of the Full Bench in Bent Madhub v. Matungini ILR 13 Cal. 104 (1886). He cannot obviously be allowed to have deduction of the same period twice over. The question, therefore, arises whether taking time to run against the Plaintiff from the nth July 1910, when the decree was signed, the appeal was in time. Now as has been already stated, the Plaintiff made an application for copy of the judgment as also of the decree on the 2nd July 1910. At that time the decree was not in existence and, consequently, the Plaintiff could file the folio only upon an approximate estimate of what would be actually required. When the copy of the judgment was made ready, the folios unused ought not to have been returned as the application for copy of the decree was still pending and the Plaintiff should not have been obliged to make a fresh application for copy of the decree on the 15th July 1910. We may, under these circumstances, treat the application for copy of the decree made on the 2nd July 1910 as a pending application on the 11th July when the decree was signed. Consequently the Plaintiff is entitled to a deduction of time between the 11th July and the 20th July when the copy of the decree was made ready. If the Plaintiff is allowed a deduction of this period, there is no question that the appeal must be deemed as filed in time. It is obvious that the rules framed by this Court for dealing with applications for copies (see General Rules and Circular Orders, Vol. I, pp. 111 to 117) have not been strictly carried out in the case before us, and that is the reason why the Plaintiff has been placed in this difficulty. It is obvious that the rules framed by this Court for dealing with applications for copies (see General Rules and Circular Orders, Vol. I, pp. 111 to 117) have not been strictly carried out in the case before us, and that is the reason why the Plaintiff has been placed in this difficulty. The view we take is supported by the decision in Kali Sankar Bajpai v. Baikanta Nath Sen 7 C.W.N. 109 (1902) and Dulali Bewa v. Sarada Kinkar Palit 8 C.W.N. 55 (1898). In any event, as pointed out in those cases, even if it was necessary for us to apply the provisions of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908, ample grounds have been established by the Plaintiff in that behalf. We hold, therefore, that the appeal was in time and ought not to have been dismissed. 2. We may add that a preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Vakil for the Opposite Party that the Plaintiff has sought the assistance of this Court in a manner not authorised by law. There can be no room for controversy that the decision of the District Judge that the appeal was barred by limitation, was a decree within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure; the Plaintiff should, therefore, have appealed to this Court and not invited us to interfere by way of revision. It is open to us, however, to treat this application as a memorandum of appeal, as was done by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mahomed Wehidnddin v. Hakiman ILR 25 Cal. 757 (1898). But the Plaintiff must pay the additional Court-fee which he would have been obliged to pay on a memorandum of appeal. The result is that the order of the Court below is discharged and the case remitted to the District Judge in order that the appeal may be registered and heard on the merits. This order will take effect only upon payment by the Plaintiff of Rs. 15-4 as Court-fees within two weeks from this date. If the Court-fees are not so paid, the rule will stand discharged with costs. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs. If the Court-fees are paid and the case remitted, there will be no order for costs in this Court.