JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. 1. This is an application for the revision of a decree of the Munsif of Farukhabad, exercising the powers of Judge of a Court of Small Causes, by which he dismissed a suit brought by the plaintiff-applicant, for contribution under the following circumstances :—One Mehdi Ali Khan held a decree for money against the parties to the suit, and in execution of that decree caused the property of the parties to be attached and sold. After the sale the plaintiff made an application under section 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, to have the sale set aside and he made the deposits required by the section. The sale was thereupon set aside and the decree was discharged and the parties remained in possession of their property. The plaintiff contends that as he satisfied the decree for which he and the defendants were jointly liable, he is entitled to be reimbursed for the portion of the decretal amount for which the defendants were liable and which he has paid for them. He included in his claim not only the amount of the decree but also the 5 per cent, deposit made under section 310A and also the costs of the application under that section. 2. The court below held, following the ruling of the Madras High Court in Yagambal Bayee Ammani Ammal v. Naina Pillai Markayar, [1909] I.L.R., 33 Mad., 15 that the payment made by the plaintiff was a voluntary payment and that the suit was therefore not maintainable. 3. It accordingly dismissed the suit. 4. It is urged that the court below was wrong in holding that the payment was voluntary. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the respondents that as the property was sold, the defendants must be taken to have satisfied the decree by reason of the sale of their property, that they did not desire that the sale should be set aside and that it was for his own benefit that the plaintiff made the application under section 310A and must, therefore, be deemed to have paid the amount of the decree gratuitously. 5. I am unable to agree with this contention. There can be no doubt that if after the attachment of the property and before its sale the plaintiff had discharged the amount of the decree, he could have claimed contribution from the defendants. 5. I am unable to agree with this contention. There can be no doubt that if after the attachment of the property and before its sale the plaintiff had discharged the amount of the decree, he could have claimed contribution from the defendants. On this point the rulings of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Fatima Khatoon Chowdhrain v. Mahomed Jan Chowdhry, [1868] 12 M.I.A., 65 and Duli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh, [1881] I.L.R., 7 Cal., 648 are conclusive. Does the fact of the amount of the decree having been paid after the sale make any difference? I am of opinion that it does not. The mere fact of the property of the parties being sold by auction was not sufficient to discharge the decree. The decree would have been satisfied if the sale had been confirmed and the amount of the decree had been paid to the decree-holder out of the sale proceeds, but if the sale was set aside before confirmation and the amount realized by the sale was paid back to the auction-purchaser, the decree was not satisfied. It was the payment made by the plaintiff which satisfied the decree, although the payment was made under section 310A. This circumstance does not seem to have been considered by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the case referred to above. As the liability for the discharge of the decree lay on the plaintiff as well as on the defendants, there was an obligation on the plaintiff to discharge the whole amount of the decree and he paid that amount not for his own benefit only but for the benefit of the defendants also. It is true, as held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lall Sahoo, [1875] L.R., 2 I.A., 131 that “it is not in every case in which a man has benefited by the money of another, that an obligation to repay that money arises. The question is not to be determined by nice considerations of what may be fair or proper according to the highest morality. To support such a suit, there must be an obligation, express or implied, to repay. The question is not to be determined by nice considerations of what may be fair or proper according to the highest morality. To support such a suit, there must be an obligation, express or implied, to repay. It is well settled that there is no such obligation in the case of a voluntary payment by A of B's debt.” In this case I am unable to hold that the payment was voluntary or gratuitous. It was a payment which the plaintiff was interested in making for the discharge of a decree for which both the parties were liable and a portion of which the defendants were bound to pay. Not only have the defendants been relieved of their liability under the decree but they have been able to retain their property of which they are admit tedly in possession. This, therefore, is a case which comes within the purview of section 69 of the Contract Act, and the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for the payment which he made for the defendants. He is, however, not entitled to claim any portion of the 5 per cent, deposit which he was required to make under section 310A, inasmuch as that deposit was made for his own benefit only. There was no obligation on the defendants to pay that amount as they did not want to have the sale of their property set aside. For the same reason the plaintiff is not entitled to a share of the costs of the application under section 310A. But as regards the amount of the decree, since the defendants were bound to pay it, the plaintiff is entitled to contribution. 6. The view taken by me is supported by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Suchan Ghoshal v. Balaram Mardana, [1910] I.L.R., 38 Cal., 1. The case before me is a stronger one than the case mentioned above. There the plaintiff was not a party to the suit in which the decree was passed but his property was sold. It was held by Jenkins, C.J. and Doss, J., that the plaintiff was entitled to sue the several defendants for contribution, each according to his share in the decretal debt only, but not in respect of the deposit of 5 per cent, of the purchase money. It was held by Jenkins, C.J. and Doss, J., that the plaintiff was entitled to sue the several defendants for contribution, each according to his share in the decretal debt only, but not in respect of the deposit of 5 per cent, of the purchase money. For the reasons stated above, I am unable, with great respect, to concur in the view taken by the Madras High Court in Yogambal Bayee Ammatti Animal v. Nania Pillai Markayar, [1909] I.L.R., 33 Mad., 15 on which the respondents rely. 7. The decree of the court below is in my judgment erroneous and must be set aside, I accordingly allow the application, reverse the decree of the court below and send back the case to that court with directions to reinstate it under its original number in the register, and determine the amount for which each defendant is liable, bearing in mind the observations made above. The applicant will get the costs of this application.