JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in these rules to set aside orders by which the Court below has dismissed applications under sec. 73 of the CPC of 1908. The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them for the disposal of the questions of law raised before us, lie in a narrow compass. The Roys held a decree against the Mukerjees and a Receiver appointed by this Court in respect of the properties of one member of that family, by name Chandra Kant Mukerjee. The Roys took out execution of the decree, and the properties of the judgment-debtors were sold on the 20th June 1910. One-fourth of the purchase-money was paid on that date as required by the Code. The balance was deposited on the 1st and the 2nd July following. Meanwhile, the Maharaja of Burdwan, now Petitioner before us who held several decrees for rent against the Mukerjees and the Receiver already mentioned, had taken steps to enforce his rights thereunder. Two of those decrees had been obtained by him in the Burdwan Court, while the other two were decrees of the very Court at Hughly in which the Roys had taken out execution. The applications of the Maharaja for execution were presented to the Hughly Court before the sale held at the instance of the Roys, but in the case of the two decrees passed by the Burdwan Court, the necessary certificates were not transmitted to the Hughly Court till after the sale had taken place. It is clear, however, upon an examination of the record that the applications of the Maharaja were completed in every respect before the 1st July 1910, that is, before the whole of the purchase-money had been deposited by the auction-purchaser. Objections were then taken by the Roys to the applications of the Maharaja for rateable distribution under sec. 73 of the Code, substantially on the grounds, namely, first, that as his applications had not been perfected before the sale held at their instance they could not be entertained under sec. Objections were then taken by the Roys to the applications of the Maharaja for rateable distribution under sec. 73 of the Code, substantially on the grounds, namely, first, that as his applications had not been perfected before the sale held at their instance they could not be entertained under sec. 73; secondly, that as leave was not obtained to proceed against the Receiver before the applications were presented, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain them; and, thirdly, that as the judgment-debtors under the decrees held by the Maharaja were not in all respects identical with the judgment-debtors under the decree held by the Roys, the applications could not be entertained under sec. 73. The Subordinate Judge has given effect to the first two contentions and has not considered it necessary to examine the third. The result has been that the applications of the Maharaja under sec. 73 have been refused. In our opinion, there is no room for serious controversy that the orders cannot be supported. 2. In so far as the first ground is concerned, it is clear that as the applications were perfected before the entire purchase-money was deposited on the 1st and 2nd July 1910, sec. 73 was applicable. That section provides that where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made applications to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of monies passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realisation, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons. The condition essential to attract the operation of sec. 73 is that the application to the Court for execution of the decrees should be made before the receipt of the assets which have to be rateably distributed. It cannot be reasonably suggested that such assets are received on the date of sale, for on that date, only one-fourth of the purchase-money is deposited, and the balance may be deposited at any time within 15 days. Till the whole of the purchase-money has been deposited, it cannot be held that the assets are held by the Court and admit of rateable distribution. If the purchaser fails to deposit the balance of the purchase-money, the one-fourth amount deposited by him may be forfeited, and in that event a fresh sale would be necessitated. Till the whole of the purchase-money has been deposited, it cannot be held that the assets are held by the Court and admit of rateable distribution. If the purchaser fails to deposit the balance of the purchase-money, the one-fourth amount deposited by him may be forfeited, and in that event a fresh sale would be necessitated. Consequently we must hold that till the whole of the purchase-money has been deposited by the purchaser, it is open to the decree-holders to apply for execution. This view is in accord with that taken in the cases of Hafez Mahomed v. Damodar Pramanik I. L. R. l8 Cal. 242 (1891), Ramanathan v. Subramania I. L. R. 26 Mad 179 (1902) and Arunachellam v. Haji Sheek I. L. R. 34 Mad. 25 (1910), where the provisions of the Code of 1882, which were by no means so explicit as those of sec. 73 of the Code of 1908, were construed. The first ground, therefore, upon which the Subordinate Judge refused to entertain the applications under sec. 73 cannot be supported. 3. In so far as the second reason for the dismissal of the applications is concerned, it is, in our opinion, equally unsustainable. As already explained, leave was obtained to proceed against the Receiver after the applications for execution had been presented and before the Court was called upon to make rateable distribution of the assets. The Subordinate Judge, under these circumstances, held upon the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of Pramatha Nath v. Khetra Nath I. L. R. 32 Cal. 270: s. c. 9 C. W. N. 247 (1904), that the applications could not be entertained, and that the subsequent grant of leave to the execution creditor to proceed against the Receiver could not validate the applications presented before such leave could be obtained. 270: s. c. 9 C. W. N. 247 (1904), that the applications could not be entertained, and that the subsequent grant of leave to the execution creditor to proceed against the Receiver could not validate the applications presented before such leave could be obtained. The case mentioned, however, has been dissented from in Banku Behari v. Harendra Nath 15 C. W. N. 54 (1910), in which it was ruled that where a suit has been instituted against a Receiver without leave previously obtained from the Court which appointed him, it is open to the Court to stay proceedings for a reasonable time so as to enable the Plaintiff to apply for leave to proceed with the suit, because the consent of the Court which appointed the Receiver is not a condition precedent to the institution of an action against the Receiver. The same principle clearly governs cases of applications for execution of decrees. In our opinion, it was the duty of the Court below, after leave had been obtained from the Court which had appointed the Receiver, to proceed with the application previously presented. The second ground, therefore, upon which the order of the Subordinate Judge is based cannot be supported. 4. In so far as the third ground urged in the Court below is concerned, it has been suggested that the case should be remanded for further investigation. But it is not necessary, in our opinion, to adopt such a course, because the facts as they appear on the record are beyond controversy, and plainly indicate that the case falls with the principle recognised by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gonesh Das v. Shiva I. L. R. 30 Cal. 583 (1903), which accord with the view taken in the cases of Gatti Lal v. Bin Bahadur I. L. R. 27 All. 158 (1904), Ramanathan v. Subramania I. L. R. 26 Mad. 179 (1902) and Chhota Lal v. Nabibhai I. L. R. 29 Bom 528 (1905). The judgment-debtors against whom the Maharaja of Burdwan has obtained decrees are all judgment-debtors under the decree held by the Roys. Consequently there is no bar to rateable distributions under sec. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. 179 (1902) and Chhota Lal v. Nabibhai I. L. R. 29 Bom 528 (1905). The judgment-debtors against whom the Maharaja of Burdwan has obtained decrees are all judgment-debtors under the decree held by the Roys. Consequently there is no bar to rateable distributions under sec. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. We may add that it was faintly argued that it was not competent to this Court to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction in these cases; but the suggestion cannot be seriously entertained. The Subordinate Judge refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him, by reason of an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of sec. 73 of the Code. It may be conceded, as ruled by the Judicial Committee, in Amir Hassan v. Sheo Baksh L. R. 11 I. A. 237 : s. c. I. L. R. 11 CAL. 6 (1884) and Mahammad v. Abdul L. R. 16 I. A. 104 : s. c. I. L. R. 16 Cal. 749 (1889), that it is not open to this Court to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction merely because the decision of the Court below is erroneous in law. On the other hand, it cannot be seriously disputed that the authority to interfere in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction is not taken away merely because the Court below has assumed or failed to exercise jurisdiction upon an erroneous construction of a statutory provision. The test to be applied in the case before us is, whether the Court below has refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law; it is immaterial that such refusal is based upon a misapprehension of the true effect of statutory provisions on the subject [Vishumbhar v. Vasudev I. L. R. 16 Bom. 708 (1892), Ross v. Petambar I. L. R. 25 All. 509 (1903)]. 6. The result, therefore, is that these rules are made absolute and the orders of the Court below discharged. The cases will be remitted to the Subordinate Judge in order that he may deal with them on the merits under sec. 73 of the Code of 1908. The Petitioner is entitled to his costs in this Court. We assess the hearing fee in each case at two gold mohurs.