JUDGMENT : TUDBALL, J. 1. The facts of this case are as follows :—The defendants-appellants are heirs of the original mortgagor, Jahan Bibi, who owned shares in three properties—(i) Mauza Tari, (2) mauza Gangharar Tari, (3) Arazi Bagh Tari. 2. In 1882, (17th April) she mortgaged property No. 1 to Sheoamber Pande, the debt being repayable in nine years, i.e., on 17th April, 1891. 3. In (1883, 14th August) she mortgaged to Sheoamber the same property No. 1 for a second debt, repayable in three years' time, i.e., on 14th August, 1886. On 30th April, 1885, she mortgaged the same property (No. 1) to the predecessors-in-title of the present plaintiffs. The debt was repayable in nine years, i.e., on 30th April, 1894. 4. Two suits were brought by the mortgagee on the basis of the two bonds of 1882 and 1883. Being unable to resist them or to pay off the debts, the mortgagor came to terms and gave the mortgagee a fresh mortgage of properties Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in lieu of the debt due on the bonds of 1882 and 1883, plus the costs incurred in the suits. This mortgage is dated 31st August, 1888. The debt was repayable in twelve years' time, i.e., in 1900. 5. On 22nd July, 1903, a suit for sale was brought by the present plaintiffs on their deed of 1885. They impleaded Baldeo Pande (heir of Sheoamber Pande) as a puisne mortgagee. 6. The latter defended the suit and pleaded that he was a prior mortgagee in that the consideration for his mortgage of 1888, was the debt due on the two mortgages of 1882 and 1883, i.e., he held up the two mortgages of those years as a shield and urged that the plaintiffs could not put the property to sale without first redeeming them. As the law was then understood and applied in these provinces, the property which a mortgagee could put to sale was held to be the actual property itself and a puisne mortgagee could not put it to sale, without first redeeming prior mortgage, in which case he could recover the sum total of his own debt and those due on prior mortgages, by sale of the property. Accordingly the plaintiffs amended their plaint and expressed their willingness to redeem Baldeo Pande. 7. Accordingly the plaintiffs amended their plaint and expressed their willingness to redeem Baldeo Pande. 7. It is quite clear that the mortgages which they had to redeem were the two prior mortgages of 1882 and 1883 which were held up as a shield. 8. The court calculated the amounts due to the plaintiffs and Baldeo Pande, and granted a decree, ordering the mortgagors to pay what was due to the plaintiffs within a fixed time; in default the decree ordered sale of the mortgaged property, conditional on the plaintiffs paying the amount due to Baldeo Pande, in which case they might add this amount to that of their own debt and put the property to sale to recover the total sum of the two amounts. The mortgagors failed to pay. The plaintiffs paid off Baldeo Pande, and there was thus a sum of Rs. 11,257-15-3 due to them. 9. They put the mortgaged property, mauza Tari, to sale and recovered Rs. 9,200. The sale took place on 20th November 1907; the decree was passed on 4th May, 1904, and the order absolute on 26th August, 1905. The plaintiffs have now, on 12th February, 1909, brought a fresh suit to recover Rs. 2,200, the balance due to them on the decree of 4th May, 1904, after the sale of the mortgaged property. This they seek to recover by sale of the properties Nos. II and III which were mortgaged together with property I to Sheoamber Pande, under the mortgage of 1888. In para. 3 of their plaint they pleaded that they had acquired the rights of the prior mortgagees in respect to properties Nos. 2 and 3, “which had been hypothecated in the prior document owned by Baldeo Pande.” 10. The first court granted them a decree for sale. 11. On appeal the lower court held that no fresh suit would lie, but treating the plaint as an application for a decree over under Order 34, ‘Rule 6, held that the money was recoverable otherwise than out of the property sold, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for the amount. It then proceeded to uphold the lower court's decree (which was a decree for sale) and dismissed the appeal. The mortgagors have now come here in second appeal. It is quite clear that no fresh suit can lie. It then proceeded to uphold the lower court's decree (which was a decree for sale) and dismissed the appeal. The mortgagors have now come here in second appeal. It is quite clear that no fresh suit can lie. At the utmost, after the mortgaged property had been sold, the plaintiffs could get a decree under Order 34, Rule 6, if all the necessary conditions existed. 12. Their first suit, after the amendment of their plaint, became a suit wherein a puisne mortgagee sought to redeem a prior mortgagee and to recover the total amount due on both mortgages by sale of the property. In such a suit, a puisne mortgagee is entitled to and must ask for, a sale of all properties which are liable under the mortgages concerned. The decree in such a suit orders the sale of the mortgaged property or so much of it as may suffice to satisfy the decree. After obtaining the decree the mortgagee may put the various items of property to sale one by one in execution of his decree until the latter is satisfied. If after all the properties have been sold, a balance remains due to him and the money is legally recoverable otherwise than out of the property sold, he may apply for and obtain a simple money decree under Order 34, Rule 6. 13. If he fails to ask for and obtain a decree for sale of any portion of the property liable to sale under the mortgages, he cannot bring a fresh suit for sale to recover the balance left over after sale of the property mentioned in the decree. That balance is money for which he has already obtained a decree ordering payment. Order 2, Rules 1 and 2 forbid this. He cannot be allowed to vex the defendants twice for the same cause. 14. In the next place it is equally clear that the plaintiffs are not entitled to an order for sale of properties Nos. 2 and 3. These properties were not hypothecated in the two prior mortgages of 1882 and 1888. It was on these two mortgages, that Baldeo Pande took his stand and which he held up as a shield. The mortgage of 1888 was a subsequent mortgage, and it was only because this mortgage satisfied the two prior ones, that Baldeo Pande was able to fall back upon these latter. 15. It was on these two mortgages, that Baldeo Pande took his stand and which he held up as a shield. The mortgage of 1888 was a subsequent mortgage, and it was only because this mortgage satisfied the two prior ones, that Baldeo Pande was able to fall back upon these latter. 15. Thus the plaintiffs redeemed, not the mortgage of 1888, (a subsequent one) but the mortgages of 1882 and 1883, and they acquired rights under those mortgages. The property hypothecated therein did not include the properties which they now seek to bring to sale and therefore they are not entitled to put them to sale. 16. There remains the question as to whether, treating this suit as an application in execution under section 47(2), Civil Procedure Code the plaintiffs are entitled to a simple money decree. The first suit was brought on 22nd July, 1903. The debts due on the mortgages of 1882 and 1883 were payable in 1891 and 1886. In 1888 there was an acknowledgment in the bond of that year. The personal remedy under those bonds expired therefore in 1897 and 1894. 17. The debt due on the bond of 1885 was payable on 30th April, 1894. The personal remedy thereon expired in 1900. 18. It was only on the bond of 1888 that the personal remedy had not expired when the suit was brought in 1903. The debt due under that bond was payable in 1900. 19. But the plaintiffs have no rights under this bond. Their rights arise out of the bonds of 1882, 1883, and 1885, and the personal remedy thereunder is, so far as the record goes, barred by time. They are therefore not entitled to a personal decree; and in any event they are not entitled as a matter of course to such a decree when they bring a suit for sale in the manner in which they have done in the present case and; failed. In this view the suit must fail. We allow the appeal and dismiss the suit in toto with costs in all courts.