JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order by which the Court below has dismissed an application for an enquiry into the validity of an order alleged to have been made by consent of parties on the 12th May 1910. The Petitioner before us held a decree against the Opposite Party judgment-debtors. In execution of that decree the properties of the judgment-debtors- were sold on the 7th May 1910 and purchased by the decree-holder himself. Before the sale the judgment-debtors had taken exception to the execution on the ground that the decree had been satisfied. That objection had been overruled and the sale directed to be held. The judgment-debtors had preferred an appeal against that order and attempted to obtain a stay of proceedings during the pendency of the appeal. Their attempt was in fructuous and the sale took place as stated. The appeal then came to the heard in due course and it transpired that the execution-sale had been set aside on the 12th May 1910 upon the strength of a petition of compromise to which the decree-holder was alleged to be a consenting party. The appeal was dismissed, but the learned District Judge directed an enquiry into the circumstances under which the sale had been set aside. Thereupon, the decree-holder on the 22nd August 1910 applied to the original Court for an enquiry into the validity of the order which purported to have been made by consent and on the strength whereof the sale had been set aside. The Court summarily dismissed the application on the ground that it had been made more than 90 days after the order of the 12th May 1910. This order we are how invited to revise. The learned Vakil for the judgment-debtors has not discussed the merits of the case or dealt with the allegation made on behalf of the decree-holder. But he has contended that the decree-holder has erroneously made an application for review, whereas he should either have made an application under r. 13 of or. 9 of the Code of 1908 or brought a suit to set aside the consent order. 3. In support of the first branch of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Bholai Naskar v. Alach Naskar 3 C. L. J. 158 (1897) and Kunjo Behari Ghosh v. Durga Moni Dasi 3 C. L. J. 160 (1906). 9 of the Code of 1908 or brought a suit to set aside the consent order. 3. In support of the first branch of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Bholai Naskar v. Alach Naskar 3 C. L. J. 158 (1897) and Kunjo Behari Ghosh v. Durga Moni Dasi 3 C. L. J. 160 (1906). These cases, no doubt, lay down the proposition that although a decree purports on the face of it to have been made by consent, if it is subsequently alleged by one of the parties that he was not present at the time when the consent order was made and that as a matter of fact what appears to be a consent decree was in essence an ex parte decree, it is open to him to pursue the remedy provided by sec. 108, CPC of 1882. But these cases do not affirm the proposition that this is the sole remedy open to a person placed in that position. In our opinion, it is open to a person so affected to make an application under r.1 of or. 47 of the Code and to invite the Court to reconsider its previous decision in the light of the facts subsequently discovered. 4. As regards the second branch of the argument of the learned Vakil for the judgment-debtors, namely, that a suit should be brought to set aside the consent order, we need only state that it is not obligatory upon the decree-holder to adopt that course. No doubt, it was pointed out by this Court in the case of Gulab Koer v. Badshah Bahadur 10 C. L. J. 420: s. c. 13 C. W. N. 1197 (1909) that when a consent decree has been obtained by fraud, the appropriate method to set it aside is to institute a suit in that behalf. That principle, in our opinion, does not govern the circumstances of the present case. Here, in the course of execution proceedings, it is asserted, an order has been obtained from the Court on the allegation that both parties had assented thereto. It is now asserted by one of the parties that he never consented to the order in question and that what purports to be a petition on his behalf was as a matter of fact never approved by him. It is now asserted by one of the parties that he never consented to the order in question and that what purports to be a petition on his behalf was as a matter of fact never approved by him. If these allegations are established, it is, in our opinion, open to the Court to review the order and re-call it. The result is that this Rule is made absolute and the order of the 23rd August 1910 discharged. The case will be remanded in order that the Munsif may take up the application of the decree-holder, and upon evidence to be produced by both parties determine whether the order of the 12th May 1910 was or was not made by consent. If it was not made by consent of the decree-holder, it must be discharged and such other proceedings taken as may be found necessary in the circumstances of the case. The Petitioner is entitled to the costs of this Rule. We assess the hearing-fee at two gold mohurs.