JUDGMENT 1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against an order of this Court made in reversal of an order of the Court below allowing the Petitioner to sue in forma pauperis [Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Haris Chandra Acharjee Rule No. 3587 of 1910]. The application has been opposed on behalf of the Opposite Party on the ground that the order, against which leave to appeal is sought, is not a final order passed on appeal within the meaning of cl. (a) of sec. 109 of the Code of 1908. Two questions, therefore, arise for consideration, namely, first, whether the order may be treated as passed on appeal within the meaning of cl. (a); and, secondly, whether it is a final order within the meaning of the same clause. In so far as the first of these questions is concerned, it must be answered in favour of the Petitioner. As was pointed out by this Court in the case of Secretary of Stale v. British India Steam Navigation Company 15 C. W. N. 848 : s. c. 13 C. L. J. 90 (1911), an order passed by the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, under sec. 115 of the CPC of 1908, or its power of superintendence, under sec. 15 of the High Courts Act of 1861, is an order made or passed on appeal within the meaning of sec. 109 of the Code and sec. 39 of the Letters Patent. To determine, whether an order may be deemed to have been passed on appeal we have to bear in mind the two essential elements of appellate jurisdiction, namely, first, that there must exist the relation of superior and inferior Court; and, secondly, that there must exist the power, on the part of the superior tribunal, to review, affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the inferior tribunal. In the case before us, both these elements are found to co-exist. The Court below held that the Petitioner was entitled to sue in forma pauperis. This Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, has reversed that order. Consequently, the order made by this Court must be deemed to have been passed on appeal within the meaning of cl. (a) of sec. 109 of the Code. 2. The Court below held that the Petitioner was entitled to sue in forma pauperis. This Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, has reversed that order. Consequently, the order made by this Court must be deemed to have been passed on appeal within the meaning of cl. (a) of sec. 109 of the Code. 2. In so far as the second question is concerned, as pointed out by this Court in the case of Saratmani Debi v. Bata Krishna Banerjee 10 C. L. J. 336 (1909), it is obvious that whether a particular order is a final order for the purpose of grant of leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, must depend upon its nature and contents and its relation to the proceedings in which it has been made. The term " final order " denotes an order which finally decides any matter directly at issue in the case in respect of the rights of the parties; if the order decides in effect finally the cardinal point in the suit, if it decides an issue which goes to the foundation of the suit and therefore is an order which could never while the decision stands, be questioned again in the suit, it is final within the meaning of the section, notwithstanding that there may subordinate enquiries to be made. Whether the character of finality can be rightly claimed in respect of an order, must be determined with reference to the precise relation in which it stands to the proceeding before the Court. It may be conceded generally that a final order is one which determines the rights of the parties in the suit or proceeding or a distinct and definite branch of it; but an order may be final, though it does not determine the rights of the partes, if even without such determination it terminates the particular suit or proceeding. An interlocutory order, on the other hand, is generally one which does not dispose of the suit or proceeding, but reserve some further question or direction for future determination. Tested in the light of these principles, what is the position of the Petitioner in the case before us ? He presented a plaint in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and asked for leave to proceed with his suit in formd pauperis, that is, without payment of Court-fees upon the plaint. Tested in the light of these principles, what is the position of the Petitioner in the case before us ? He presented a plaint in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and asked for leave to proceed with his suit in formd pauperis, that is, without payment of Court-fees upon the plaint. The application was granted under r. 7 of Or. 33 of the Code. The Defendant then applied to this Court to reverse that order, on the ground that the Court had not taken into consideration all the elements mentioned in r. 5 of Or. 33. This contention prevailed, and the result was that the application to sue in forma pauperis was refused. It is not possible, in our opinion, to lay down an inflexible rule whether under such circumstances the order can be treated as a final order because involving a decision on a matter directly at issue in the case in respect of the rights of the parties. For instance, if the application is refused on the ground that the applicant is not a pauper, it cannot be maintained that the refusal of the application involves a decision on the merits of the case [Secretary of State v. Jillo I. L. R. 21 All. 133 (1898)]: but if an application is refused on the ground that the allegations of the Petitioner do not show a cause of action at all, the order, it may be justly contended, involves a decision on a matter directly at issue in the case in respect of the rights of the parties. Now, in the case before us, the order of this Court is based on the ground that the plaint, as it now stands, does not disclose any cause of action against the Defendant. Consequently, we must hold that the order is a final order within the meaning of sec. 109 of the Code. 3. We must add, however, that we are not prepared to accept the contention of the learned Vakil for the Appellant that whenever an application for leave to sue in formd pauperis has been refused, the order is a final order within the meaning of sec. 109 of the Code. The case of Kumamanda v. Sreenath P. C. App. No. 60 of 1908 (unreported) upon which reliance was placed does not support any such comprehensive proposition. 109 of the Code. The case of Kumamanda v. Sreenath P. C. App. No. 60 of 1908 (unreported) upon which reliance was placed does not support any such comprehensive proposition. In that case, the Plaintiff had instituted a suit for recovery of possession of endowed property known as Bhotbagan and Amdanga Maths. In the original Court, the Plaintiff was granted leave to sue in formd pauperis. The suit was heard on the merits and dismissed on the 11th November 1907. On the 20th December following, he applied for leave to appeal to this Court in forma pauperis. Leave was granted on the 21st December 1907, but a condition was attached to the order to the effect that the Appellant must furnish security for costs within two months. The Appellant then applied for review of this order on the authority of the cases of Nusserooddeen v. Ujjul Biswas 17 W. R. 68 (1871) and Hafizan v. Abdul Karim (7). This application was refused on the 27th February 1908. The Petitioner was unable to furnish security as directed, and the appeal was dismissed on the 27th July 1908. On the 25th May 1908, the Petitioner applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The learned Judges who dealt with this application, in view of the decision in Hafizan v. Abdul Karim 12 C. W. N. 163 (1907), directed the Appellant to apply for reconsideration of the previous orders. Upon application so made, however, the Court, on the 1st June 1909, recalled the previous order and dismissed the application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Thereupon leave was granted ex parte, on the 6th April and 8th June 1909, to the Appellant to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the orders adverse to him. No question was raised or decided as to whether the order was a final order, and the case is obviously distinguishable. Besides, the case raised an important question of practice, namely, whether a person permitted to appeal as a pauper, could be called upon to furnish security for costs, and the form of the order, made on the 6th April 1909, shows that it was possibly treated as one under cl. (c) of sec. 109. Besides, the case raised an important question of practice, namely, whether a person permitted to appeal as a pauper, could be called upon to furnish security for costs, and the form of the order, made on the 6th April 1909, shows that it was possibly treated as one under cl. (c) of sec. 109. The case, therefore, cannot be regarded as an authority for the broad proposition put forward on behalf of the Appellant that whenever an application for leave to sue or to appeal in forma pauperis has been refused the order is final within the meaning of cl. (a) of sec. 109. In the case before us, it is not necessary to lay down any such comprehensive proposition. As already explained, we must hold that in view of the ground upon which the application for leave to sue in forma pauperies was rejected by this Court, namely, that the allegations of the Petitioner in his plaint do not disclose a cause of action against the Defendant, the order must be treated as a final order. There is no controversy that the value of the subject-matter of the suit which the Plaintiff sought to institute, was upwards of Rs. 10,000 and as the decision of this Court has reversed that of the Court below, the Petitioner is entitled to a certificate under sec. 110. Leave will accordingly be granted. We do not decide what security may be required from the Appellant or what payments he may have to make for preparation of the paper-book [In re Jowad Ali 8 W. R. 48 (1863); see also Thompson v. Calcutta Tramways Co. I. L R. 21 Cal. 528 (1896), Munni Ram v. Sheo Charan 4 M. I. A. 104 (136); 7 W, R. 29 P. C.], because the Petitioner does not ask for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council in forma pauperis.