JUDGMENT : CHAMIER, J. 1. These appeals arise out of a suit brought by Mubarak Husain, the respondent in F.A. No. 11 for of a mortgage alleged to have been made by one Amir Abbas in favour of Ram Prasad whom Mubarak Husain now claims to represent. 2. The rights of Amir Abbas in the property were put up for sale in execution of a money decree and were purchased by Fakhr-ud-din on December 20th, 1902. The latter entered into possession and while in possession redeemed the mortgage held by Ram Prasad. Meanwhile Amir Abbas by private treaty sold all his interest in the property to two persons Tulsi Ram and Ram Gopal, who applied to the Collector to set aside the auction-sale. 3. The Collector did so but on appeal the Commissioner reversed his order and confirmed the sale. Tulsi Ram and Ram Gopal then brought a suit in the Civil Court to have the sale set aside. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on April 19th, 1905, but his decision was reversed by the District Judge who set aside the sale on September, 22nd, 1905. A further appeal to the High Court was dismissed. It was after the dismissal of the suit by the Subordinate Judge and before that decision was reversed by the District Judge that Fakhr-ud-din redeemed Ram Prasad's mortgage. The plaintiff in the present suit is one of the heirs of Fakhruddin the other heirs have been impleaded as defendant. The plaintiff's case is that Fakhr-ud-din having paid off Ram Prasad's mortgage at a time when he was in possession of the mortgage property and believed himself to be entitled to the property, he stood in the shoes of Ram Prasad and was entitled to sue upon that mortgage. The defence of Tulsi Ram and the heirs of Ram Gopal was and is that Amir Abbas was a minor at the date of the alleged mortgage, of which, they say, they have no knowledge, that the full consideration stated in the deed did not pass to the mortgagor and that the plaintiff cannot sue upon the mortgage. The court below found that Amir Abbas was of full age at the date of the mortgage and that the deed was duly executed by him, but that only Rs. 75 passed to him as consideration. The court below found that Amir Abbas was of full age at the date of the mortgage and that the deed was duly executed by him, but that only Rs. 75 passed to him as consideration. The court held also that Fakhr-ud-din by paying off the mortgage, in the circumstances stated above, had acquired the rights of the mortgagee and consequently his heirs representing him were entitled to bring the present suit. 4. Both sides have appealed. On the question of fact I have no hesitation in confirming the decisions of the court below. There can be no doubt whatever, that Amir Abbas executed the mortgage-deed in suit. There is a conflict of evidence as to his age at the date of the mortgage, but I have no doubt that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is true. It is supported by an application dated June 20th 1894 made by Amir Abbas in which he stated that he had come of age and prayed that his guardian might be removed. The Judge to whom it was made observed that he looked about 18 or 19, and according to this Amir Abbas must have been born about 1875 or 1876. He came of age in 1896 or 1897 and was in all probability more than 21 years of age at the date of the mortgage. The evidence adduced prior to the passing of the consideration stated in the deed, is extremely feeble. It was intended to prove that the consideration was made up of a sum of Rs. 75 paid in cash at the execution of the deed, Rs. 74 paid a few days before the execution, Rs. 120 paid to a relation of the mortgagee on account of a pair of bullocks purchased by Amir Abbas, Rs. 76 paid to the mortgagee's son-in-law on account of a bond and some cloths and Rs. 30 on account of a tonga purchased from the mortgagee. Amir Abbas denies having received any of these sums except the sum of Rs. 75 paid at the execution of the deed. I think with the court below that his evidence is true and I do not believe that the other items had any real existence. 5. There remains the question whether Fakhr-ud-din by paying off the mortgage, when he was in possession of the property, was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. 75 paid at the execution of the deed. I think with the court below that his evidence is true and I do not believe that the other items had any real existence. 5. There remains the question whether Fakhr-ud-din by paying off the mortgage, when he was in possession of the property, was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. Counsel for the plaintiff relies upon the decisions in Syamalrayudu v. Subbarayudu, [1897] I.L.R. 21 Mad., 143, Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu, [1908] I.L.R., 31 Mad., 439, Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh, [1907] I.L.R., 36 Cal., 193, Brocklesby v. Temperance Building Society, [1895] L.R. A.C. 173, Thurstan v. Notingham Permanent Benefit Building Society, [1902] L.R. 1 Chan. 1 affirmed by the House of Lords L.R., 19 A.C., 6, and the very recent case of Butler v. Rice, [1910] L.R. 2 Ch., 277. 6. Pandit Sundat Lal, on behalf of the defendants, Tulsi Ram and the heirs of Ram Gopal, sought to distinguish these cases, (except the third) from the case before us, on the ground that in all of them (except the third) the persons who paid off the mortgage had at the time an interest both in fact and in law, in a part at all events, of the property affected by the mortgage, whereas in the present case though Fakhr-ud-din was in possession, he had no interest in any part of the property, and the learned Pandit urged that according to the law as stated in the third case Fakhr-ud-din was not subrogated to the right of the mortgagee. It may no doubt be said of some of the cases cited that the persons found to be entiled to be subrogated to the right of another, had both in law and in fact an interest in part of the property in question at the time when he paid or advanced the money; but this cannot be said of the Building Society in the fifth case or of the plaintiff in the last case and there is no substance in the ground of distinction suggested by Pandit Sunder Lal, for in none of the cases was the right of subrogation limited to that part of the property, in which the possessor claiming the right was ultimately found to have an interest both in fact and in law. 7. 7. In the present case Fakhr-ud-din was supported by the decision of a competent court in this belief that his purchase at auction would hold good. In that belief he paid off Ram Prasad, mortgagee. He was in possession of the property and he paid off the mortgage to protect the interest which he believed himself to possess in the property. His right to be subrogated to the position of Ram Prasad or against the subsequent purchasers of the property seems to me to be very clear. This case is in many respects a much stronger case than any of those mentioned above. 8. I would dismiss both appeals with costs. KARAMAT HUSAIN, J. - I agree. 9. Order of the court is that both appeals are dismissed with costs.