JUDGMENT Karamat Husain, J. - One Ibrahim Ali and his wife Salim-un-nissa, both governed by the Shia law, under an agreement registered on the 25th of April, 1881, referred their dispute relating to dower and the mode of its payment to arbitrators. The arbitrators, Mazhar Ali and Barkat Ahmad, under an award registered on the 29th of September, 1881, transferred the absolute ownership of Ibrahim Ali's property in presenti to Salim-un-nissa, reserved possession of it to Ibrahim Ali for his life, gave him control over its income, and provided that if Musammat Salim-un-nissa died before Ibrahim Ali, his possession over the entire property should continue for his life; that no lawful heir would have any right to sue for the property and its profits; that if Ibrahim Ali died before Salim-un-nissa, the first party (Salim-un-nissa) should be owner of the Villages and their mesne profits, and that the heirs of Ibrahim Ali could not interfere. 2. Mutation of names was effected in favour of Salim-un-nissa, and she, on the 26th of May, 1883, executed a general power of attorney in favour of her husband for the management of the property which she got under the award. She sold some, mortgaged some, and leased some of it. 3. Salim-un-nissa died on the 5th of April, 1907, and the defendants 1, 2 and 3 got their names entered in respect of one-half of the property covered by the award, and the name of Ibrahim Ali in respect of the other half. Ibrahim Ali died on the 10th of June, 1907, and the plaintiff, who is one of his heirs, brought an action for her share, alleging that the property covered by the award was Ibrahim Ali's; that he did not intend to vest its ownership in his life in Salim-un-nissa; that the award had not the effect of transferring the property to Salim-un-nissa, and that it was not valid under the Shia law. 4. The defence was that the husband did intend to transfer in presenti the ownership of the property to his wife, that the award did transfer it, and that it was lawful under the Shia law and effect was given to it. 5. The court of first instance dismissed the suit. 4. The defence was that the husband did intend to transfer in presenti the ownership of the property to his wife, that the award did transfer it, and that it was lawful under the Shia law and effect was given to it. 5. The court of first instance dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court reversed the decree, holding in substance as follows:--An award under the English law transfers no property and therefore the award in question was not sufficient to have effect of conveying the property to the wife. 6. As the arbitrators reserved the possession of the property to the husband for his life, they did not transfer its ownership to her, 7. Mutation of names conferred no proprietary title on Salim-un-nissa. Ibrahim Ali admitted the claim for dower and stated that he did not wish to give up possession of his zamindari during his life-time, and the arbitrators carried out his wishes giving the matter a legal aspect just to satisfy Salim-un-nissa, who was to be the owner of the property in case she survived Ibrahim Ali. The agreement and award constitute a device by Ibrahim Ali to prevent his wife and her heirs from suing him for donor debt. Ibrahim Ali was not in his full senses when he signed the application for mutation of names after the death of his wife. 8. In second appeal it is contended that the award is' genuine; that it has been acted upon; that it transferred absolute ownership in presenti to Salim-un-nissa, and that according to the Shia law the agreement made between the husband and wife by the award is lawful. On behalf of the respondents it was at first argued that the arrangement made by the award could not be made under the Shia School of Muhammadan law, but afterwards it was rightly conceded by the learned vakil for the respondents that it could be made. I am not disposed to hold that the award was governed by Muhammadan law, but it is unnecessary to discuss it now. 9. I am not disposed to hold that the award was governed by Muhammadan law, but it is unnecessary to discuss it now. 9. Next it was contended by the learned vakil for the respondents that the agreement, dated the 25th of April, 1881, and the award, dated the 17th of June, 1881, were fictitious, and that Ibrahim Ali had no intention to pass the ownership of the property in his life-time to his wife, and that the whole thing was done to defeat the rights of the heirs of Ibrahim Ali in his estate. 10. I have no doubt that Ibrahim did intend to transfer the absolute ownership of his property to his wife in praesenti and that effect was given to the award. The finding of the lower appellate court that the arbitrators carried out the wishes of Ibrahim Ali and the contention of the respondents that the agreement and the award were designed to defeat the rights of the heirs of Ibrahim Ali completely negative the idea that the arrangement in the award was a mere paper transaction and that (sic) effect was given to it. 11. Ownership and possession are two distinct juristic conceptions and in every transfer of ownership from one person to another by the act of the party a transfer of possession is not necessary. 12. The fact that possession was reserved for the husband does in no way show that the ownership of the property did not pass to the wife. The award was sufficient to transfer ownership to Salim-un-nissa; see Ram Bakhsh v. Mughlani Khanam (1908) ILR 26 All., 266. Mutation alone creates no title, but in the case before us the award made the wife absolute owner of the property; and mutation showed that effect was given to the award. 13. For the above reasons I would set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance with costs. Chamier, J. I concur. 14. By the Court--The appeal is decreed with costs. The decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree of the court of first instance restored.