Judgement Appeal from an order of the High Court (February 12, 1908) directing the rehearing of an appeal from a decree of the District Judge of Poona (October 22, 1904). It appeared that on July 29, 1907, Russell C. J. and Batty J., who heard the appeal, differed in opinion, the former being in favour of the respondent that he had proved the limited character of the appellants occupation, the latter holding that the respondent had failed to establish his title to the land in suit. Russell C. J., his colleague having left Bombay, referred the case to a third judge by an order of the same date as the judgments. This order was set aside by the High Court on February 12, 1908, and a rehearing was directed; and on July 4, 1908, an Order in Council granted to the appellants leave to appeal therefrom, " the said Order being treated as if it had been a final decree on the merits, and the effect of the judgments of July 29, 1907, being treated as neutral, each party being considered as having one judgment in their favour," and liberty " being reserved to the parties on the hearing of this appeal to raise such questions of fact and law as they may be advised." The suit was brought in the District Court of Poona to eject the appellants from a plot of ground then known as No. 9, Arsenal Road, and formerly known as No. 23, Staff Lines, situate within the limits of Poona Cantonment. The respondent claimed (inter alia) that the plot of ground was held on military or cantonment tenure, under which the holder had no right of ownership, but merely a right of occupancy, and that the same was resumable at the pleasure of Government, compensation being given for any buildings standing thereon at the time of resumption. The sum of Rs.500 was offered to the appellants as compensation for the buildings erected thereon. They denied that the land was held on such tenure as alleged by the respondent, or that he had any right to resume it, and claimed that they held full and proprietary rights therein. They also alleged that they and their predecessors in title had been in adverse possession to the respondent for more than sixty years, and contended that the suit was time-barred. They also alleged that they and their predecessors in title had been in adverse possession to the respondent for more than sixty years, and contended that the suit was time-barred. By Bombay Regulation I. of 1819, s. 4, it is provided that " On receipt of this regulation the limits of the cantonments, including the military bazar attached thereto, at which any division or corps of the army or any considerable detachment not being less than half a battalion may be quartered, shall be fixed by the commanding officer in concert with the criminal judge or zilla magistrate. The commanding officer at each of those stations will accordingly submit to Government, through the usual channel, as soon as circumstances may conveniently admit, a report framed in concert with the criminal judge or zilla magistrate within whose jurisdiction the cantonments may be situated upon the local limits of the cantonments, forwarding at the same time any separate remarks which the criminal judge or zilla magistrate may wish to make on the subject for the final orders of the Governor in Council." By Bombay Regulation III. of 1826, s. 21, it is provided that " First At military stations situated within the territories subordinate to the Presidency of Bombay, the limits of cantonments or bazars shall, when directed by the Governor in Council, be marked by the local magistrate and commanding officer in conjunction subject to approval by the Governor in Council, in which limits private property is not to be included. Second The above-mentioned officers shall report the limits with a plan thereof to the Governor in Council; and when they have been approved a plan shall be kept by the magistrate and another by the commanding officer." Bombay Regulation XXII. of 1827, s. 21, is in similar terms. Second The above-mentioned officers shall report the limits with a plan thereof to the Governor in Council; and when they have been approved a plan shall be kept by the magistrate and another by the commanding officer." Bombay Regulation XXII. of 1827, s. 21, is in similar terms. By Aitchisons Cantonment Code, 1836, article 222, it is provided that "It is to be understood permission to occupy ground within the limits of a cantonment confers no proprietary right on the occupant." By Jamesons Code of Cantonment, 1850, rule 12, it is provided that " Permission to occupy ground in a military cantonment confers no proprietary right on the occupant; it continues the property of the State, and resumable at the pleasure of Government; but in all practicable cases one months notice of resumption will be given and the value of all buildings which may have been erected thereon, as estimated by a committee, will be paid to the owner." Rule 139 is in the same terms as rule 12. By rule 145, " Owners of houses within cantonments, not being resident military officers, are required to have their names registered in the major of brigade or station staff officers office, together with the bona fide value of their buildings, monthly rent, and the names of their occupants." By the Cantonments and Quarters Regulations, 1856, rule 14, it is provided that " Permission to occupy ground in a military cantonment confers no proprietary right; it continues the property of the State and resumable at the pleasure of Government; but in all practicable cases one months notice of resumption will be given, and the value of all buildings which may have been erected thereon, as estimated by a committee, will be paid to the owner; allotments of ground cannot, therefore, be sold to any one." By rule 22, " Houses in cantonments may be sold or let by house owners to officers or others without restriction beyond the permission of the local commanding officer." By rule 31, " Owners of houses within cantonment not being resident military officers are required to have their names registered in the major of brigade or station staff officers office, with the names of their occupants, and are at the same time to record if it be their desire to sell or rent, and they are not to be allowed to change the record but by permission of the brigadier of the station on showing sufficient grounds." The delimitation of the Poona Cantonment began in 1820, the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay being requested by the Government to cause the limits of all cantonments to be fixed under s. 4 of Regulation I. of 1819. It was finally settled and published in the Government General Order dated March 31, 1827; the respondents explanation of the delay being that the Collector required time in order to make sure that no private land was included therein. On September 29, 1827, the Collector issued a proclamation prohibiting without paying compensation the cultivation of any lands within the limits fixed by the Order of March 31 of that year. The plot of ground in suit was admittedly within the Poona Cantonment and was so shewn on the plans thereof dated 1828, 1830, and 1856. The title thereto, on which the appellants relied, rested on a document, Exhibit No. 71, executed by Mr. The plot of ground in suit was admittedly within the Poona Cantonment and was so shewn on the plans thereof dated 1828, 1830, and 1856. The title thereto, on which the appellants relied, rested on a document, Exhibit No. 71, executed by Mr. Beyts on August 27, 1864, in favour of Dorabji Pestonji, a Government contractor and owner of bungalows in Poona Cantonment, by which Mr. Beyts " handed over" to his purchaser "all claim I have to the houses outhouses and premises generally marked No. 23 Staff Lines, Poona Cantonment." This document was countersigned "Sanctioned Poona 27th August, 1864," by F. C. Heath, Brigadier-General Commanding Poona Brigade. The District Judge, after recording a mass of documentary evidence, dismissed the suit, holding that the respondent had failed to establish his title to the particular plot of ground in suit, and that there was nothing on the record to shew that the appellants or their predecessors in title had ever admitted that the plot was not their private property. He also held that the suit was barred by limitation. On a remand for findings on certain issues prescribed by the High Court, the District Court found as follows— Exhibit 71 evidences the sale of the house 23 Staff Lines (now No. 9, Arsenal Road) to Mr. Dorabji with the sanction of the military authorities and conferred permission on Mr. Dorabji to occupy the land in suit subject to cantonment regulations; the use of the word "sanctioned" therein implies that the occupation of the defendants and their predecessors in title was a permissive occupation; he defendants are not in a position to rebut the prima facie presumption arising on the face of the said exhibit; the word " sanction" as used in Exhibit 71 and as understood generally in 1864 meant the permission accorded by the military authorities to the sale of the bungalow and outhouses on the land in dispute. Russell C.J. held that, having regard to Exhibit 71 and other evidence in the case, the onus of proving ownership was shifted from the plaintiff to the defendants, and that they were bound to prove that the house and site in question had been the private property of their predecessor in title and had not been taken up by Government, which they had wholly failed to do, and that, as the possession of Beyts and his predecessors in title could not be said ever to have been adverse to Government, the suit was not barred by limitation. Batty J. (in a judgment pronounced on his behalf by his colleague) held that the evidence failed to establish the acquisition by Government of the land in question so as to give them a right to claim ejectment, and that the defendants predecessors in title could not be held to have admitted the title of Government by obtaining the indorsement of the word " sanctioned " on Exhibit 71 in the absence of evidence to shew that such action was universally recognized as tantamount to an admission of the title of Government. The material passages in Batty J.s judgment of dissent are as follows " The plaintiff has adduced no evidence whatever on remand to shew that the word sanctioned was in general acceptation understood to amount to an admission that cantonment conditions applied. The only evidence put in for plaintiff on remand is Exhibit 382 (being a General Order of the Commander-in-Chief dated July 81, 1856) containing regulations requiring the permission of military authorities to the transfer of cantonment grants. The existence of such a rule only shews that applications for sanction might have been made and granted in compliance therewith. But it does not prove that every party to a transfer knew that an application for sanction could only be made for the purposes of that rule and in reference to land held on cantonment tenure. It is quite consistent with the existence of that rule, that private dealing with land within cantonment limits might have followed the practice known to be common on transfer of land within those limits, without any intention of admitting title. " Application of sanction could only be made for the purposes of that rule and in reference to land held on cantonment tenure. " Application of sanction could only be made for the purposes of that rule and in reference to land held on cantonment tenure. If the practice of obtaining sanction to transfer in cantonment limits was known to be the common practice, it is quite conceivable that such practice might be followed either in ignorance of its origin or ex major cautela by persons who had no intention of admitting thereby the title of Government to the land transferred. And what plaintiff had to prove was that everybody who followed that practice knew that he was thereby making such admission. The plaintiff has made no attempt to prove this. The defendant on the other hand refers the Court to the instances on the record in which sanction was sought and obtained for documents which purport on the face of them to transfer an absolute proprietary right in the land. It is impossible to hold that the general public in accepting the indorsement of the word sanctioned on documents recog nized that indorsement as a disclaimer of the proprietary rights asserted in those documents." The judgment concluded " Then it has been suggested that as the old regulations directed that no private property should be included in cantonments, it should be presumed that the land in question was not private property on the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. But that maxim applies only to the manner of performance, and the presumption it allows is that acts or duties proved to have been done were done with due formality. It would not justify the inference that the act or duty (in this case that of excluding private property) had been performed. "It has also been urged that as the intention of Government to acquire all land within these limits is proved, a presumption arises that Government actually did so. Intentions may be inferred from acts, but there is no rule that acts should be presumed from intentions. I am unable therefore after full consideration to hold that Government have disclosed any ground on which a private litigant could successfully claim ejectment. Intentions may be inferred from acts, but there is no rule that acts should be presumed from intentions. I am unable therefore after full consideration to hold that Government have disclosed any ground on which a private litigant could successfully claim ejectment. No doubt they have much land within cantonment limits, but it is not impossible or improbable that private property which pre-existed also survived delimitation, and I do not think reprehensible recklessness in" failing to preserve due record of the respective rights and interests of the State and of private owners can be admitted as a ground for requiring from the present plaintiff less cogent evidence than would be demanded from any other plaintiff suing in ejectment. If further evidence were available to throw more light on the matter, I should welcome the opportunity of further inquiry into a question which is certainly left in a very unsatisfactory condition. But in the evidence as far as it goes, I cannot find grounds which in my opinion would be required in an ordinary suit for the ejectment of a person in possession of immovable property with colour of title extending at least over half a century." De Gruyther, K.C., and OGorman, for the appellants, contended that for the reasons stated by Batty J. in his judgment the decree of the District Judge dismissing the respondents action was right and ought to be affirmed. The respondent had wholly failed to discharge the onus of proving in ejectment that he had a clear title to the plot of ground in suit, or the right to resume possession on payment of Rs.500 in compensation. In any event the compensation payable was far in excess of the amount tendered. The basis of the title alleged was that all cantonment property belonged to the Government and that no private property had ever been included within a cantonment area. The evidence did not support this basis of title. It shewed that private property had been so included; it also shewed that < the appellants predecessors in title were owners in possession of ^ the property in suit before the delimitation of the cantonment area, and no evidence had been given to the effect that compensation had been paid for it. The respondent suggested that there was a presumption to that effect, which was insufficient support to an alleged title to eject. The respondent suggested that there was a presumption to that effect, which was insufficient support to an alleged title to eject. In Bombay Regulation I. of 1819 there were no provisions as to inquiry into private rights or as to the existing tenure of lands within the area fixed. There was no proof that any practical steps had been taken to exclude private property from the delimited area or to compensate the owners if it were included. The Regulation of 1826 no doubt excluded private property, but it was to be inferred from that provision that down to that date it had been included. The legislation subsequent to 1827 led to the same inference, that private lands had been included see Bombay Act III. of 1867, s. 2; Indian Act XIII. of 1889, s. 26; Cantonment Code, 1899, rules 76, 89, and 268, which shew that no presumption in favour of the respondent as alleged by him was recognized by the Legislature. The respondent had failed to shew that cantonment tenure by the Government necessarily excluded private rights in lands within the area, or that the holders of such land had no other rights than occupancy rights existing only so long as the military authorities approved. Even if the right to resume was proved the appellants should be compensated on the basis of its being private property. The appellants were entitled to all presumptions arising from the long undisputed possession enjoyed by themselves and their predecessors, and the respondent was bound to give the clearest evidence of a paramount title. Cohen, K.C., Dunne, and Konstam, for the respondent, contended that the judgment of Russell C.J. was right. The evidence shewed that the land in suit was within the limits of the cantonment of Poona and had always been so since they were first fixed in 1827; that all land included therein was and always had been the property of the Government; and that the land in suit was first enclosed and built on after it had been included as part of the Government land in the cantonment. The military authorities had given permission to that effect subject to the condition that the land remained the property of the Government. The rights possessed by the appellants were accordingly rights of occupancy and not of property. The military authorities had given permission to that effect subject to the condition that the land remained the property of the Government. The rights possessed by the appellants were accordingly rights of occupancy and not of property. They were liable to resumption on payment of compensation, and as the amount of compensation had been agreed upon in this case no question arose as to the principle on which it should be assessed. They referred to Bombay Regulations I. of 1819, s. 4, and HI. of 1826, s. 21 (repealed by I. of 1827, which did not come into force until September 1, 1827). The two regulations cited were in force before the cantonment limits in question were fixed in 1827. Then came Regulation XXII. of 1827, s. 21, and Bombay Act III. of 1867, ss. 7 and 9. See also Aitchisons Cantonment Code, 1836, art. 222; Jamesons Cantonment Code, 1850, rules 12, 129, 139, 145; and Cantonments and Quarters Regulations, 1856, rules 14, 22, 31, It was contended that the evidence as to administrative acts by the Government under this legislation and the presumptions arising therefrom led to the conclusion that its substantive provisions to the effect that private property was prohibited within the cantonment area were caried out. From 1827 downwards the Government had consistently asserted that that area was subject to military tenure. The rules from 1835 to 1856 explicitly laid down that only an occupancy right was permissible within that area. The Court under those circumstances should presume that the official acts required to give effect to the legislation were duly performed. See Evidence Act I. of 1872, s. 114 ; Taylor on Evidence, 10th ed., s. 147, p. 148; Ameer Ali and Woodroffe on Evidence, 4th ed., p. 68; Jones v. Williams (( 1837) 2 M. & W. 326.); Arnould on Marine Insurance, 8th ed., s. 725, p. 885, where the onus probandi as to unseaworthiness is thrown on the underwriter. The appellants had failed to prove any title to the land in suit. Exhibit 71 does not purport to convey it, but only the buildings thereon, and the surrounding circumstances disprove an intention to acquire proprietary right paramount to that of the Government. Nor have they proved any such possession adverse to the respondent or his predecessors as would give them a title by prescription. See Maharajah Koowur Baboo Nitrasur Singh v. Nund Lall Singh. Nor have they proved any such possession adverse to the respondent or his predecessors as would give them a title by prescription. See Maharajah Koowur Baboo Nitrasur Singh v. Nund Lall Singh. (( 1860) 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 199, 220) Indian Evidence Act, s. 116, was also referred to as shewing that the appellants were estopped by their conduct and , admissions from disputing the respondents title. De Gruyther, K.C., in reply.] The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBSON. In form this is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the High Court of. Bombay, dated February 12, 1908, which directed the rehearing of an appeal from a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Poona, dated October 22, 1904, in favour of the appellants, but by an Order of His late Majesty in Council it is in effect an appeal on the merits of the suit from a judgment of the High Court dated July 29, 1907. The action was brought by the respondent to eject the appellants from premises known as No. 9, Arsenal Road (formerly known as 23, Staff Lines), within the limits of the Poona Cantonment. It was claimed on behalf of the Government of Bombay that the land belonged to them and was only held by the appellants on military or cantonment tenure, which entitled the Government to resume it at their pleasure, subject to compensation for buildings which the tenants might have erected thereon. The appellants, on the other hand, claimed the land as their private property, and while admitting that they were subject to military jurisdiction in the shape of properly authorized cantonment regulations, and to the Government right of appropriation, contended that they were entitled to compensation on a basis of private ownership, and not as mere licensees. The title of the appellants began with a document dated August 27, 1864, whereby one I. C. V. Beyts, a purser in the Indian Navy, certified that for the consideration therein mentioned he " handed over to Dorabjee Pestonjee, Esq., all claim he had to the house, outhouses, and premises, generally marked 23, Staff Lines, Poona Cantonment." This document is indorsed as " sanctioned " by the Brigadier-General Commanding. Its wording appears on the whole to be more consistent with the contention of the Government that the interest of the tenant was that of a licensee of the land with a right to the buildings than with the private ownership in fee alleged by the . appellants. The appellants, however, assert that the prede cessors in title of Beyts were in fact owners of the land at the time the cantonment was established, and that nothing had since happened to vest the title in the Government. In support of this they produce a map of the cantonment dated February 8, 1828, though possibly made in 1826, in which they shew a house standing on the premises they identify with No. 9, Arsenal Road. They can say nothing as to the tenure on which that land was then held, nor by whom it had been granted, and can only ask the Court to infer that the plot was one of the private properties which they say existed there before the cantonment was formed. But, if that inference be not sustainable, then they contend that they are in actual possession of the land, and that the onus is on the respondent of rebutting the presumption of ownership in fee attaching to the possession of land whether in a cantonment or elsewhere. The Poona Cantonment dates from the year 1817, and was formed after the defeat of the Peishwa at the battle of Kirkee. In exercise of the right of conquest the military authorities at that time marked off a considerable area of land, about five square miles (which was cultivated or capable of cultivation only to a very slight extent), for the occupation and convenience of the troops. They soon set about to frame regulations for the appropriation and control of this area. Up to 1834 the Presidency of Bombay was governed by regulations made by the Governor in Council, and the first regulations affecting this cantonment appear to be those issued in 1819. By Bombay Regulation I. of 1819, s. 4, it is provided that the limits of the cantonments at which any corps or considerable detachment may be quartered shall be fixed by the commanding officer in concert with the zillah magistrate or criminal judge, and directing those authorities to report thereon to the Governor in Council. By Bombay Regulation I. of 1819, s. 4, it is provided that the limits of the cantonments at which any corps or considerable detachment may be quartered shall be fixed by the commanding officer in concert with the zillah magistrate or criminal judge, and directing those authorities to report thereon to the Governor in Council. On September 14, 1820, the Governor in Council directs the Commander-in-Chief to issue instructions carrying into immediate effect the provisions of Regulation I. of 1819. The precise delimitation of the Poona Cantonment was accordingly then commenced, and the correspondence during the years immediately ensuing (particularly a letter dated September 24, 1822, from the Collector to the Commissioner) shews that the T military authorities were making arrangements and agreements with the owners of the lands belonging to Poona such as would indemnify them for the loss they sustained by being deprived of their rights of occupancy. On May 4, 1823, the Commissioner, Mr. Chaplin, writes to the Collector to inform him that the whole of the land which had been sketched out as necessary for the cantonment by the military authorities must be given up, and asking for a report on any arrangements that might in consequence be requisite for indemnifying the present holders of the land. It seems reasonably clear, therefore, that from the first the military authorities were conscious, as they would scarcely help being, of the inconvenience and risk of having absolute owners of land within the cantonment, and of the necessity for propitiating them by proper settlements and compensation. Even if the appellant established that his house was built at or before the time the cantonment was formed, there is still, under the circumstances of the case, a strong probability that he was duly compensated along with other proprietors for the change in his position as owner to that of licensee. This probability is rendered stronger as the history of the cantonment proceeds. Bombay Regulation III. of 1826, s. 21, provides that the limits of cantonments shall be subject to the approval therein mentioned, and adds " in which limits private property is not to be included." Bombay Regulation XXII. of 1827, s. 21, is to the same effect. This probability is rendered stronger as the history of the cantonment proceeds. Bombay Regulation III. of 1826, s. 21, provides that the limits of cantonments shall be subject to the approval therein mentioned, and adds " in which limits private property is not to be included." Bombay Regulation XXII. of 1827, s. 21, is to the same effect. On September 29, 1827, a Government proclamation was issued for the information of the Poona district, notifying that the cantonment boundaries were fixed, prohibiting cultivation within that area, and warning all persons that the produce of such cultivation would be subject to appropriation without compensation. It is unnecessary to go in detail through the numerous succeeding regulations which shew how strictly the military authorities asserted their proprietary rights. They are summarized in Aitchisons Cantonment Code of 1836, and in Jamesons Cantonment Code of 1850, and they make it clear that, though permission to occupy ground was frequently given, especially for the building of officers houses or bungalows, such permission carried with it no sort of proprietary right, and the buildings were liable to expropriation at a price to be fixed by the authorities. The permission of the commanding officer was necessary even for the sale or letting of this house thus built. In this state of things it is impossible to say that mere possession or occupation of the bungalow on this site affords any presumption whatever that the possessor or his predecessors in title were owners in fee. The presumption is all the other way, and that adverse presumption is strengthened when the history of the site comes to be examined. It has been traced to the year 1843, when it was occupied by an army surgeon. It afterwards came into the hands of a contractor, Nundram Sundarji, and in 1860 he is found petitioning the Commander-in-Chief against a proposal by the military authorities to remove his bungalow along with others for various reasons, which illustrated the limited and precarious character of his tenure. Again, in 1882, Adarji Dorabji applied for permission to build a fowl shed on the site, and duly obtained the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. These circumstances tend to shew that the appellants prede cessors in title did not regard the property as differing in its tenure and terms from other property in the cantonment. Again, in 1882, Adarji Dorabji applied for permission to build a fowl shed on the site, and duly obtained the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. These circumstances tend to shew that the appellants prede cessors in title did not regard the property as differing in its tenure and terms from other property in the cantonment. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appellants are mere licensees, and that the land in question has been lawfully resumed by the Government, and they will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.