JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Defendants in an action in ejectment. The Plaintiffs-Respondents commenced this action for recovery of 14 parcels of land, of which they claimed to be the tenants under the Defendants-Appellants as zemindars. The Defendants conceded that the Plaintiffs were their tenants, but denied their tenancy in respect of the lands in dispute. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. Upon appeal, the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in part in respect of the plots to which the tenancy right of the Plaintiffs had been established. The Defendants have now appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the only substantial question of law which has been argued is that the claim is barred by limitation inasmuch as the Plaintiffs were occupancy raiyats, and, according to their own case, had been dispossessed more than two years before the commencement of the suit. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have contended that they were tenure-holders, and no question of limitation arose as they had brought the suit within twelve years from the date of dispossession. The learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below has found that the Defendants had failed to prove that the Plaintiffs were occupancy raiyats, and that consequently the special rule of two years limitation could not be applied to the claim. The present appeal was heard by a Division Bench on the 26th April 1909, and on that occasion an order was made under Or. XLI, r. 25 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to enable the lower Court to determine the true character of the tenancy. The Subordinate Judge has now returned the finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that they were tenure-holders as asserted by them. The position, therefore, in substance is that the origin of the tenancy is unknown, and neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants have been able to establish their allegation as to the true character of the tenancy. 2. It is worthy of remark that the provision in cl. (7) of sec. 20 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is of no assistance to the parties. 2. It is worthy of remark that the provision in cl. (7) of sec. 20 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is of no assistance to the parties. That clause provides that if in any proceeding under the Act, it is proved or admitted that a person holds any land as a raiyat, it shall, as between him and the landlord under whom he holds the land, be presumed, until the contrary is proved or admitted, that he has for twelve years continuously held that land or some part of it as a raiyat. In the first place this suit for ejectment cannot be properly deemed a proceeding under the Bengal Tenancy Act: in the second place it is neither proved nor admitted that the Plaintiffs hold as raiyats, and consequently no presumption can arise that they are occupancy raiyats. Nor is the presumption laid down in cl. (5) of sec. 5 of the Bengal Tenancy Act of any use in the solution of the question raised before us. That clause provides that where the area held by a tenant exceeds 100 standard bighas, the tenant shall be presumed to be a tenure-holder until the contrary is shown. Here the area held by the tenant does not exceed 100 bighas. Consequently, the statutory presumption is entirely inapplicable. It may be observed here that the clause to which reference has been made does not embody a presumption that where the area held by a tenant is less than 100 bighas, the tenant is to be presumed to be a raiyat until the contrary is shown. The presumption created by the Legislature is purely unilateral, and its scope and applicability cannot be extended beyond its legitimate limits. 3. The position, therefore, is that the Plaintiffs have been proved to be the tenants of the disputed lands under the Defendants as their landlords who have unlawfully dispossessed them. No information is available as to the origin of the tenancy, and nothing is known about the purposes for which the tenancy was created. The question arises, under these circumstances, whether the general rule of limitation embodied in Art. 142 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act is to be applied, or whether the special rule of limitation laid down in Art. 3 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act is to be taken to govern the matter. The question arises, under these circumstances, whether the general rule of limitation embodied in Art. 142 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act is to be applied, or whether the special rule of limitation laid down in Art. 3 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act is to be taken to govern the matter. The learned Counsel for the Defendants-Appellants has contended that as cl. (1) of sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, quite as much as sec. 4 of the Limitation Act, makes it obligatory upon the Court to dismiss a suit instituted after the time prescribed for the purpose, and as sec. 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, casts the duty upon the Plaintiffs to specify the point of time when the cause of action arose, the burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff to establish the true character of the tenancy and the applicability of the rule of limitation upon which they place reliance. In answer to this contention, it has been argued by the learned Vakil for the Plaintiffs-Respondents, that the onus is upon the Defendants to prove the special circumstances which would abridge the ordinary period of limitation applicable to cases of this description. In our opinion, the contention of the Respondent is well-founded and must prevail. 4. Art.142 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act provides that a suit for possession of immoveable property, when the Plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession, must be instituted within twelve years from the date of the dispossession or discontinuance. There is no room for controversy that the present suit is one for possession of immoveable property within the meaning of the rule thus laid down. Prima facie, therefore, this is the rule applicable to the matter now before us. The Defendants, however, contend that the period which would otherwise be available to the Plaintiffs has been abridged, because the Plaintiffs are occupancy raiyats, and that they are bound to sue within two years from their dispossession as laid down in Art. 3 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. That article provides that a suit to recover possession of land claimed by the Plaintiff as an occupancy raiyat must be instituted within two years from the date of dispossession. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. That article provides that a suit to recover possession of land claimed by the Plaintiff as an occupancy raiyat must be instituted within two years from the date of dispossession. As the Defendants rely upon the special rule, the burden is obviously upon them to establish the circumstances requisite to make the rule applicable. The Plaintiffs do not claim to recover possession of the land as occupancy raiyats. It may be conceded that if it was established that the Plaintiffs were, as a matter of fact, occupancy raiyats, the mere circumstance that, in their plaint, they claimed the disputed land not as occupancy raiyats but as tenure-holders, would not exclude the operation of Art. 3 of Sch. III because it is a well-settled principle that parties cannot be allowed to evade the just application of statutory provisions on allegations untrue in fact : if the contrary view were taken, an unscrupulous litigant might evade the bar of limitation created by Art. 3 of Sch. III, by an unfounded assertion which would not stand scrutiny. We shall, therefore, assume that Art. 3 would be applicable if it was proved that the Plaintiffs were in reality occupancy raiyats. But they have not been proved to be such : neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants are able to prove the true character of the tenancy. Under such circumstances, as the special rule embodied in Art. 3 of Sch. III is not shown to be applicable, we must fall back upon the general rule embodied in Art. 142 of the Limitation Act, which, it cannot be disputed, is by its very terms, applicable to the case. The position that in circumstances like these the burden of proof is upon the party who asserts that the case has been taken out of the general rule and is governed by the special rule, is supported by the principle which underlies the decisions in Mohan Singh v. Conder ILR 7 Bom. 478 (1883), Danmull v. B.I.S.N. Co. ILR 12 Cal. 477 (1886) and Mangun Jha v. Dulhin ILR 25 Cal. 692 (1898). The burden of proof is rightly thrown on the party who claims the protection of the shorter period, because he would fail in his contention if no evidence at all were given on this question on either side (secs. 102 and 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872). 477 (1886) and Mangun Jha v. Dulhin ILR 25 Cal. 692 (1898). The burden of proof is rightly thrown on the party who claims the protection of the shorter period, because he would fail in his contention if no evidence at all were given on this question on either side (secs. 102 and 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872). The wider clause is, by the very generality of its terms, comprehensive enough to govern the matter, and if its operation is sought to be excluded on the ground that the case is covered by a special clause, the party who takes up this position must prove the existence of the special fact which operates as a bar to the suit, except perhaps when the facts are specially within the knowledge of the Plaintiff (sec. 106, Indian Evidence Act, 1872). To put the matter in another way, if there is a conflict between two periods of limitation, one of which, the longer, is applicable to all circumstances, and the other, the shorter, to special circumstances only, the longer term given by the statute to bring the suit ought to be applied, unless there is clear proof of the special circumstance which would make the shorter term applicable [Crum v. Johnson [1902] 92 N.W. 1954]. 5. The view we take is obviously just and may be defended on first principles if we remember for a moment the object of statute of limitation. We are not now concerned with the conflicting opinions as to the policy which underlies statutes of limitation, whether they are to be strictly interpreted because they encourage unconscientious defences [Lord Mansfield, C.J., in Quantock v. England 5 Burr. 2628 ; 2 W. Bl. 702 (1770)], or whether they are to be construed liberally because they are statutes of repose, Dallas, C.J., in Tolson v. Kaye 3 Br. and Bi. 223 (1822), or statutes of peace [Baron Bramwell in Hunter v. Gibbons 26 L.J. Ex. 5 (1856)]. It is sufficient for our present purpose to hold with Lord St. 2628 ; 2 W. Bl. 702 (1770)], or whether they are to be construed liberally because they are statutes of repose, Dallas, C.J., in Tolson v. Kaye 3 Br. and Bi. 223 (1822), or statutes of peace [Baron Bramwell in Hunter v. Gibbons 26 L.J. Ex. 5 (1856)]. It is sufficient for our present purpose to hold with Lord St. Leonards [Trustees of Dundee Harbour v. Dougall 1 Maoqueen H.L. 321 (1852)], that " all statutes of limitation have for their object the prevention of the rearing up of claims at great distances of time when evidences are lost, and in all well-regulated countries, the quieting of possession is held an important point of policy" [Luchmee Buxsh v. Runjeet Ram 20 W.R. 375 (1873), White v. Paruther 1 Knapp. P.C. 179 at 227 (1829)]. The principle is lucidly explained by Sir Thomas Plumer M.R. in Cholmondeley v. Clinton 2 Jack and W. 140 (1820):"The public have a great interest in having a known limit fixed by law to litigation for the quiet of the community, and that there may be a certain fixed period, after which the possessor may know that his title and right cannot be called in question." In the case before us, the possessor knew that after the expiry of twelve years from his entry, his right could not be called in question. If it was his case that his right ought not to be allowed to be called in question after the expiry of a shorter period, namely, after the lapse of two years from the commencement of his possession, it was for him to prove the special circumstances which alone would support a claim for such special protection. The burden, therefore, would be clearly upon him to establish the facts which would justify a reliance on his part upon the special period of limitation. This he has failed to do. Consequently, in our opinion, the Subordinate Judge has rightly applied the general rule of limitation. The result is that the decree made by the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.