JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. 1. This suit relates to a small plot of land in the town or village of Basti. It forms part of an area of 172 bighas and odd, mortgaged by the then proprietor, on the 2nd of September, 1887, to Mr. Churcher, with possession. On November, 26th, 1963, Mr. Churcher gave a perpetual lease of the land in suit to the defendant-respondent, Sarnam Gharak. The present plaintiff redeemed Mr. Churcher's mortgage on 24th November, 1906. An attempt to eject Sarnam by a suit under the Agra Tenancy Act (Act XI of 1901) failed, on the ground that the Rent Courts declined to eject this defendant unless and until the plaintiff could obtain a decision of the Civil Court against the validity of the perpetual lease. In the present suit the plaintiff seeks either a decree for possession as against a trespasser with mesne profits, or in the alternative a declaration that the perpetual lease of the 26th November, 1903, is invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. 2. As a matter of general principle, it is not denied that a mortgagee in possession cannot give a lease for a period beyond the duration of his mortgage, and that a lease like the present would not be binding on the mortgagor, or on any person who had succeeded the original mortgagor as owner of the equity of redemption, when the latter has paid off the mortgagee. Nor is the present case really affected by the circumstance that on the 22nd of September, 1897, Mr. Churcher had purchased at an auction sale held in execution of a simple money decree the equity of redemption in the entire area of 72 bighas and odd which he held as mortgagee. This auction sale took place at a time when the proprietary rights of the original mortgagor in the entire village of Basti were subject to a decree for sale under a mortgage prior to that of Mr. Churcher, and they were in fact sold on the 21st of December, 1897, just three months after the equity of redemption in this area of 72 bighas was sold under the simple money decree. 3. The auction sale of the 22nd September, 1897, was a transfer pendente lite, and in fact passed no title to Mr. Churcher as auction purchaser. Nor did Mr. 3. The auction sale of the 22nd September, 1897, was a transfer pendente lite, and in fact passed no title to Mr. Churcher as auction purchaser. Nor did Mr. Churcher himself put forward any claim to be the lawful owner of the equity of redemption when the present plaintiff offered to pay off his mortgage in the year. The fact of this auction sale of the 22nd September, 1897, may, therefore, be put on one side and must not be allowed to confuse the point really in issue. 4. The point as it has been very fully and carefully argued before me turns on Mr. Churcher's position as a subsequent mortgagee. The mortgage of the proprietary rights in the entire village of Basti together, it is admitted, with a good deal of other property, was effected in favour of Babu Mathra Das and others, by a deed dated, the 30th March, 1883. A suit for sale on this mortgage was instituted on the 22nd June, 1889, and although Mr. Churcher had in the meantime acquired the status of a subsequent mortgagee in respect of a part of the property concerned, that is to say, in respect of the proprietary rights in a specified area of 72 bighas and odd, he was not impleaded as a party in the suit for sale brought on the mortgage of 1883. It cannot be denied that as a subsequent mortgagee, Mr. Churcher had a technical right to redeem the entire mortgage of the 30th March, 1883, and that he could not be deprived of that right merely because the holders of that mortgage failed to implead him in their suit for sale. This was the position when in the year 1906 the present plaintiff, who had in the meantime acquired the proprietary rights in the village of Basti from the auction purchaser at the sale held under the mortgage deed of 1883, offered to pay off Mr. Churcher's mortgage. It is not denied that Mr. Churcher accepted the offer, was paid his mortgage debt in full and definitely relinquished all rights or claims under his mortgage deed of 1887. He might have replied to the plaintiff's offer that he was himself still entitled to redeem the original mortgage of 1883. But it is obvious that he was under no obligation to do so. The suggestion for the defendant-respondent appears to be that Mr. He might have replied to the plaintiff's offer that he was himself still entitled to redeem the original mortgage of 1883. But it is obvious that he was under no obligation to do so. The suggestion for the defendant-respondent appears to be that Mr. Churcher, because he had in the meantime granted a perpetual lease of a small portion of the area mortgaged to him, was legally bound at all costs to protect the interests of his lessee by resisting the plaintiff's offer of redemption on any possible plea open to him. A suggestion is also thrown out that the defendant, Sarnam, as lessee of a portion of the area concerned, was himself a person interested in the property in question and might have maintained a suit for redemption of the mortgage of 1883. I find no force in either of these contentions. The defendant acquired his position as a lessee long after the Mortgage of 1883 had ceased to exist, and whatever rights Mr. Churcher personally might possess in respect of that mortgage by reason of his not having been made a party to the suit for sale brought on the same, I can see no ground for holding that Mr. Churcher had, so to speak, cons tructively passed on those rights to the defendant when he executed the lease in his favour. The defendant accepted a lease from a mortgagee in possession and must be presumed to have done so with full knowledge of the fact that his lessor's rights were liable to come to a termination whenever the owner of the equity of redemption found himself in a position to redeem. I am quite unable to read into section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act IV of 1882), any provision which would make it incumbent on a usufructuary mortgagee to oppose redemption in the manner suggested by the argument put forward on behalf of the respondent, in order to protect the interests of a person who had accepted a lease from him. For these reasons I am unable to accept the finding of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff is in any way bound by the terms of the lease granted to the defendant by Mr. Churcher, in so far as those terms purport to confer on the defendant a right of possession extending beyond the duration of the mortgage. 5. For these reasons I am unable to accept the finding of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff is in any way bound by the terms of the lease granted to the defendant by Mr. Churcher, in so far as those terms purport to confer on the defendant a right of possession extending beyond the duration of the mortgage. 5. Now remains the question of the nature of the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. In order to obtain a decree for ejectment the plaintiff must satisfy the court that the position of the defendant is that of a trespasser and not of a tenant. There can be no question that if the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, the ejectment of the defendant is a matter reserved to the jurisdiction of the Rent Courts. Now Mr. Churcher as mortgagee in possession, had a right to grant leases to tenants. I see no reason for treating the lease in favour of Sarnam as anything but an ordinary agricultural lease. The condition of perpetuity embodied in the lease granted by Mr. Churcher, was not binding on the plaintiff, and the latter has a right to effect the ejectment of the defendant by ordinary process of law if he finds it to his interests to do so. If this were a tenancy to which the Agra Tenancy Act did not apply at all, I should still see no reason for holding that the tenant became a trespasser from the date of the redemption of Mr. Churcher's mortgage. He would be entitled to continue in possession as tenant until he had received such notice as would be applicable to the particular kind of tenancy held by him. The present case is a much stronger one. There is a plea in the defendant's written statement that rent has actually been paid by him to the plaintiff since the redemption of the mortgage, and I do not find that this was denied on behalf of the plaintiff. Moreover, when bringing a suit for ejectment in the Rent Court, the plaintiff did undoubtedly treat Sarnam as his tenant, his position then being merely that Sarnam was an ordinary tenant from year to year and liable to ejectment as such under the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act. Moreover, when bringing a suit for ejectment in the Rent Court, the plaintiff did undoubtedly treat Sarnam as his tenant, his position then being merely that Sarnam was an ordinary tenant from year to year and liable to ejectment as such under the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act. I am not concerned with the propriety or otherwise of the position taken up by the Rent Courts in refusing themselves to adjudicate on the question whether or not the case held by Sarnam was binding on the plaintiff. But it is clear from the orders passed both by the Commissioner and by the Board of Revenue that the fact of the existence of a tenancy of some sort was not doubted by those courts and was in fact admitted before them. I do not see how it can be held that the defendant in the present case became a trespasser liable to ejectment and to a claim for mesne profits from the date of redemption of Mr. Churcher's mortgage, unless the court is prepared to hold that the same would be the case with any tenant of agricultural land to whom a usufructuary mortgagee had granted a lease during the period of his mortgage. In my opinion the correct view is that tenancies thus created by a mortgagee in possession are binding on the mortgagor after redemption of the mortgage, in so far that the relationship of landlord and tenant continues, and that if the mortgagor desires to bring the tenancy to a close, he must do so by a regular suit under the Tenancy Act. He may claim as in the present case, that he is not bound by the terms of the contract between the mortgagee and the tenant in so far as those terms purport to extend the duration of the tenancy beyond that of the mortgage. For these reasons I set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and give the plaintiff a decree for the second or alternative relief claimed, that is to say, for a declaration that the perpetual lease, dated the 26th November, 1903, executed by Mr. Churcher, in favour of the defendant is invalid as against the plaintiff and not binding on him. I see no reason why the plaintiff should not have his costs throughout, and I order accordingly.