JUDGMENT Chamier, J. - The following pedigree explains the position of the parties to this appeal and other persons to whom reference will be made:-- 2. After the death of Deoki Nandan, which occurred many years ago, Ram Charan, his sons Kali Prasad and Lachhmi Prasad, and his grandsons Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain constituted a joint family. In 1874, Kali Prasad brought suits against Kara Charan, Lachhmi Prasad and Sonkali for partition and possession of his share in the family property and obtained decrees which established his right to possession of a one-third share. In August, 1876, Kali Prasad made a will whereby he left his shares in the villages Katyalu, Bisauli, Kanura and Badhya, to his nephews, Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain. In January, 1878, Ram Charan executed a deed of gift whereby he transferred to the same two persons his ancestral and acquired shares in the four villages mentioned above and other property. All the males in the family have died. The dates on which they died are not material. It is only necessary to state that Jainti Prasad predeceased his brother Sarup Narain, and on Jainti's death mutation of names in respect of the shares standing in his name was made in favour of the respondent, Musammat Mundra. On the death of Sarup Narain, mutation of names in respect of the property standing in his name was made in favour of his son, Triloki Narain, and on the latter's death in favour of the appellant, Musammat Kishori. It may be mentioned hero that Musammat Sonkali was at one time recorded with Jainti and Sarup as one of the proprietors of shares in two villages called Misraulia and Gular Bahar, a fact which seems to have puzzled the lower appellate court. The explanation is to be found in the deed of gift executed by Ram Charan, whereby he gave his shares in certain jungle land to Musammat Sonkali for life and thereafter to his two grandsons. That land, as the lower appellate court has shown, is now known as Misraulia and Gular Bahar. With the exception of these two villages the whole of the property in the six villages with which we are concerned in the present case was for many years recorded in the names of Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain. 3. That land, as the lower appellate court has shown, is now known as Misraulia and Gular Bahar. With the exception of these two villages the whole of the property in the six villages with which we are concerned in the present case was for many years recorded in the names of Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain. 3. The respondent, Musammat Mundra, having made a lease of her recorded shares in two of the villages in favour of the respondent, Mahant Beni Bibikanandgir, and having in other ways shown that she intended to claim a widow's estate in the property recorded in her name, the appellant brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, claiming a declaration that she is the owner and in possession of the property recorded in Musammat Mundra's name, and that the lease is invalid. The appellant's case is that the brothers, Jainti and Sarup, held all the property recorded in their names as members of a joint family; that on the death of Jainti the whole passed to Sarup Narain, on the latter's death to Triloki Narain, and on his death to the appellant who has been in undisputed possession for many years. The respondent's case is that the decree of 1874 operated to sever the interests of Kali Prasad, Ram Charan and Lachhmi Prasad; that each took a one-third share, Lachhmi Prasad taking one-third for himself and his two sons; that Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain each took a separate interest under the will of their uncle, Kali Prasad, and under the deed of gift executed by their grandfather, with the result that the interest of Jainti, which is the property now in dispute, passed on his death to his widow, Musammat Mundra. 4. The first question is as to the effect of the decree of 1874. There is no doubt that the decree operated to sever the share of Kali Prasad from the shares of the rest of the family. The appellant referred to the decisions in Durga Dei Vs. Balmakund and Another, (1907) ILR (All) 93 and Balkishan Das v. Ram Narain Sahu (1903) I.L.R., 30 Calc., 738, and contended that as shares were not actually allotted by the decree to Ram Charan and Lachhmi Prasad, these two should be held to have remained joint in estate. The appellant referred to the decisions in Durga Dei Vs. Balmakund and Another, (1907) ILR (All) 93 and Balkishan Das v. Ram Narain Sahu (1903) I.L.R., 30 Calc., 738, and contended that as shares were not actually allotted by the decree to Ram Charan and Lachhmi Prasad, these two should be held to have remained joint in estate. The respondent referred to the case of (1903) ILR 30 231 (Privy Council) and contended that Ram Charan and Lachhmi Prasad should be regarded as having held separately after, the decree, because in order to determine the shares of Kali Prasad it was necessary to determine the shares of Ram Charan and Lachhmi Prasad, and because the evidence shows that they held their shares separately after the decree. They might, no doubt, have elected to remain in union, but the evidence shows that they did not. Ram Charan, as already stated, transferred his shares to his grandsons, and there is other evidence to support the view of the lower appellate court that Ram Charan held a separate share after the decree of 1874. 5. The second and most important question in this case is whether Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain took separate interests under the will and deed of gift, as contended by the respondents, or took the property as undivided coparceners, as contended by the appellant. The latter does not suggest that the two brothers took the property as joint tenants in the sense of the English law. Her learned advocate relied principally upon the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Garu Vs. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu, (1902) ILR (Mad) 678 . That case does not appear to me to have any real bearing on the question which we have to decide. There the question was whether the sons of a daughter who wore members of a joint family with their father and had succeeded to their maternal grandfather's estate on the death of their mother, took the property as undivided coparceners (i.e. jointly) or as tenants in common. It has been pointed out by the Madras High Court, see Karuppai Nachiar Vs. It has been pointed out by the Madras High Court, see Karuppai Nachiar Vs. Sankaranarayanan Chetty and Others that that decision cannot be regarded as laying down a rule that all property coming to two or more persons who happen to be members of a joint family is taken by them jointly, i.e. with the rights of coparceners in a joint 'family. Moreover, we have to deal here not with succession on ah intestacy, to which alone the ruling of the Privy Council can be applied, but to a case of property passing under a will and a deed of gift. The nature of the interests taken by the two brothers depends upon the language of the will and deed of gift, and, if the language is ambiguous, upon any presumption or rule of construction that may be applicable to such documents There is nothing either in the will or the deed of gift which gives any indication as to whether the testator or donor intended that the two brothers should hold as undivided coparceners or as tenants in common with separate interests. There are cases, e. g., 4 I.D (N.S.) 179a and Mankamna Kunwar v. Balkishan Das (1905) I.L.R., 28 All., 38, in which it has been held in accordance with a rule of English law that a gift or bequest to two persons without more creates a joint tenancy, but their Lordships of the Privy Council have disapproved of the application of this rule to the will of a Hindu and have observed that the principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of co-parcenary between the members of an undivided family; (1896) ILR 23 670 (Privy Council) As regard may be had to surrounding circumstances in order to ascertain the meaning of the testator in the one case and of the donor in the other, the learned advocate for the appellant has relied upon the fact that the brothers were at the time of the gift and will members of a joint family and has pointed out that this circumstance was relied upon by this Court in the case of Mankamna Kunwar v. Balkishan Das (1905) I.L.R., 28 All., 38 as a reason for holding that a joint tenancy had been created by a deed of gift. The respondent's learned vakil contended that the authority of the last mentioned case was much weakened by the erroneous application of a rule of English conveyancing to the construction of a deed of gift executed by a Hindu, and he referred to a later case of Gopi Vs. Jaldhara, 7 Ind. Cas. 697 in which, following a decision of the Privy Council; one of the same Judges declined to apply that rule to the construction of a will executed by a Hindu. The learned vakil referred also to the case of Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas (1902) I.L.R., 26 Bom., 445. There, property had been given to two brothers who were members of a joint Hindu family. One died leaving a widow, and it was held that she was entitled to half the property as heir of her husband. The facts of the present case are very much the same. It was suggested that, as this Court in the case of Mankamna Kunwar v. Balkishan Das (1904) I.L.R., 28 All., 33 relied upon the fact that the donees were living as undivided coparceners as a reason for holding that the donor intended that they should hold the property passing to them under the deed of gift, in the same manner we should give the same weight to a similar circumstance in the present case. That would not be a proper way of using a reported decision. One document cannot be construed by reference to decisions on other documents executed in different circumstances and containing different language. We must determine for ourselves what weight should be attached to the fact that the two brothers, Jainti Prasad and Sarup Narain, were living in union when the will and deed of gift were executed in their favour. It was suggested that a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in (1896) ILR 23 670 (Privy Council) to the effect that the principle of joint tenancy is unknown to the Hindu law except in the sense of co-parcenary between the members of an undivided family recognizes the possibility of property being given or devised to two or more Hindus to be held by them in co-parcenary under the Hindu law. But the context shows that nothing of the kind was intended or contemplated, Their Lordships were considering only the incidents of the right of survivorship between joint tenants under the English law. But the context shows that nothing of the kind was intended or contemplated, Their Lordships were considering only the incidents of the right of survivorship between joint tenants under the English law. There seems to be a difficulty in treating a gift or devise of property to two members of a joint family as gift or devise to them of property to be held as undivided coparceners, for, as pointed out in the case of Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas (1902) I.L.R., 20 Bom., 445, such a devise or gift would create interests in favour of the issue of the donees who might be unborn at the time of the gift on the death of the testator. I see no reason whatever for supposing that either Ram Charan or Kali Prasad intended that any children that might be born to either of the brothers should on their birth acquire an interest in the property. It must be remembered that the two brothers were at the time joint with their father, Lachhmi Prasad, and others, and the fact that the gift and devise were made to them only suggests that there was no intention to benefit any other members of the joint family whether then in existence or to be born thereafter. It must also be remembered that Ram Charan had already given some property to Lachhmi Prasad to be held by him separately. In the circumstances I am unable to come to the conclusion that either Kali Prasad or Ram Charan intended that the two brothers should hold the property given to them as undivided coparceners. The fact that the two brothers were joint is not in my opinion a sufficient reason, in the present case, for holding that the donor and testator intended that they should hold the property as undivided coparceners. The lower appellate court held that the brothers took in severalty, and I am not satisfied that that decision is erroneous. 6. The question of limitation is disposed of by the finding of the lower appellate court that, though there is no good evidence of possession on the part of Musammat Mundra, there is no good evidence that her relatives ever held adversely to her. 7. I would dismiss the appeal with costs. Karamat Husain, J. I agree. By the Court.--The appeal is dismissed with costs.