JUDGMENT Chamier, J. - The appellant having obtained a decree against two brothers, named Gulab Rai and Dal Chand, attached a house in Bulandshahr, alleging that it was the property of the judgment-debtors. The respondent, Tunda Mal, objected on the ground that he had purchased the house from Gulab Rai who had been sole owner of it. 2. The objection was allowed. The appellant then brought the present suit claiming a declaration that the house was the joint property of Gulab Rai and Dal Chand; that the sale by Gulab Rai was consequently invalid, and that the house was liable to be attached in execution of the appellant's decree. The first court decreed the claim, but the decision was reversed by the lower appellate court. 3. It has been found that the house in question was purchased by Gulab Rai at a time when he was living in union with his father and brother. But there is no evidence that the family ever possessed any joint property. If there is a presumption that the house was joint family property and the burden of proof lies on respondent to prove that the house was the self-acquired property of Gulab Rai, the claim must be decreed, for the respondent has not attempted to prove that the house was acquired by Gulab Rai with his own funds. All that was proved is that the house was acquired in the name of Gulab Rai alone. On the question of the burden of proof the courts below have differed. The first court followed the decision of AIKMAN, J., in Ramraj Rai v. Gulab Rai Weekly Notes, 1889, p. 214. The lower appellate court followed the decision of Knox, J., in Hem Nath Rai v. Janki Rai Weekly Notes. 1905, p. 212. 4. The point came before Couch, C.J. and Glover, J., in the case of Taruck Chunder Poddar and Others Vs. Jodeshur Chunder Koondoo Sir Richard Couch observed that there had been a conflict of decisions in the Calcutta High Court which it was impossible to reconcile. He referred to the decisions of the Privy Council in Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor (1869) 12 Moo. Jodeshur Chunder Koondoo Sir Richard Couch observed that there had been a conflict of decisions in the Calcutta High Court which it was impossible to reconcile. He referred to the decisions of the Privy Council in Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor (1869) 12 Moo. I.A., 523 and Dhurm Das Pandey and Others vs. Mussumat Shama Soondri as justifying the view that, as every Hindu family was presumably joint in food, worship and estate, if one member of the family was found to be in possession of property the presumption would be not that he was in possession of it as separate property acquired by him but as member of a joint family. His judgment in the later case of Gobind Chunder Mookerjee Vs. Doorgapersad Baboo and Others shows that his view was not accepted by other members of the court. In the case in 3 Moo. T.A., 240, their Lordships of the Privy Council said:--"It is allowed that this was a family who lived in commensality, eating together, and possessing joint property. It is allowed that they had some joint property, and there can be no doubt that under these circumstances the presumption of law is that all the property they were in possession of was joint property until it was shown by evidence that one member was possessed of separate property." This passage has often been referred to as justifying the view that property found in possession of one member of a joint family cannot be presumed to be joint family property unless there is evidence that the family possessed some joint property. Bub Couch, C.J., referring to this passage said:--"Now with regard to what their Lordships say as to the family being possessed of property.........the rule that the possession of one of the joint owners is the possession of all would apply to this extent that if one of them was found to be in possession of any property, the presumption would be not that he was in possession of it as separate property acquired by him, but as a member of joint family." It seems to me that the passage cited from the judgment of their Lordships shows -the necessity of proof that a family has some pint property, before it can be presumed that property held by any one member is joint family property. My view is supported by the judgment of Melvill and Kemball, JJ., in Lakshman Mayaram v. Jamnabai (1882) I.L.R., 6 Bom., 225, in the course of which the passage in question and the decision of the Privy Council in Luximon Row Sudasew v. Mullar Row Bajee (1831) 2 Knapp., 60, are referred to as authorities for the proposition that when there is ancestral property by means of which other property may have been acquired, then it is for the party alleging self-acquisition to prove that it was acquired without any aid from the family estate The necessity of establishing the existence of a nucleus of joint family property before the property in possession of any one member can be presumed to be joint family property is recognised in the cases of Moolji Lilla v. Gokuldas Vulla (1883) I.L.R., 8 Bom., 154, ILR 1889 13 61 (Bom.) and Dwarka Prasad v. Jamna Das (1910) 13 Bom. L.R., 133. The statement of Sargent, C.J., in Jagmohandas Kilabhai v. Allu Maria Duskal (1894) I.L.R., 19 Bom., 338 that the decision in Taruck Chunder Totadar v. Joodheshteer Chunder Koondoo (1873) 19 W.C.R., 178 had always been followed by the Bombay High Court cannot refer to the point now under consideration. In Kanhia Lal Vs. Debi Das and Another, (1900) ILR (All) 141 Blair and Burkitt, JJ., said:--"We hold that as the defendants set up their separate acquisition in a suit for the partition of a joint family, which admittedly was possessed as such of Borne property, the presumption of law was that the whole of the property of each individual belonged to the common stock." This is in accordance with the view taken by the Bombay High Court. In the case of Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaiya Lal (1900) I.L.R., 29 All., 244 the Privy Council said:--"It is admitted that Durga Prasad and his sons lived together as a joint Hindu family, and it is established that there was a considerable nucleus of ancestral property in his hands after the partition (between Durga Prasad and his brothers). The onus was, therefore, on the respondent to prove that his subsequently acquired property was his separate property." Their Lordships thus recognised the necessity of establishing the existence of some joint property, before the property held by all the members could be presumed to be joint. The onus was, therefore, on the respondent to prove that his subsequently acquired property was his separate property." Their Lordships thus recognised the necessity of establishing the existence of some joint property, before the property held by all the members could be presumed to be joint. In the case decided by Airman, J., mentioned above, there was proof that the family possessed some property. That was sufficient to justify the presumption which the plaintiff wished the court to make, and I do not understand why Aikman, J., went as far as he did. The text-books treat it as settled law that there is no presumption that a family has any joint property and that it cannot be presumed that property found in the possession of any one member is joint family property unless it is shown that the family as such possessed at least some property. See Ghose on Hindu Law, 2nd edition, p. 368, Mayne's Hindu Law, 7th edition, pp. 364 and 368. The weight of authority is clearly in favour of the view stated in the text-books. 7. For the above reasons I would dismiss this appeal with costs. Karamat Husain, J. I agree. By the Court.--The appeal is dismissed with costs.