JUDGMENT : KARAMAT HUSAIN, J. The following is the pedigree which will show the relation of the objectors to the judgment-debtors. 2. Puttu Lal and Bhola Nath obtained a decree against Musammat Radha. Afterwards a decree under section go of the Transfer of Property Act was made against Musammat Kusturi, daughter of Musammat Radha. On the 9th of September, 1907, an application in execution was made for sale of two mortgage bonds. One Behari Lal, a certificated guardian of the objectors, on the 25th of September, 1907, made an application to the effect that the decree-holders had applied for the sale of two mortgage bonds, that a sale of those two bonds would cause a loss to the minors, and that he therefore prayed for time for payment of the decretal-money by instalments. 3. The Court executing the decree refused instalments but granted time to the end of April, 1908, for payment of the decretal amount observing that it had no power to allow payment by instalments, and struck off the execution case. The next application was made on the 14th of April, 1909. An objection was taken that the mortgage bonds were the property of the objectors which they had inherited from their maternal grandfather, Param Sukh, and which could not be attached and sold as the property of Musammat Radha. The decree-holders replied that the principle of res judicata barred the objection. The court of first instance held that the doctrine of res judicata was no bar and allowed the objection. The decree-holders appealed. In addition to the plea of res judicata the plea of estoppel was also raised. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the plea of res judicata as well as that of estoppel was sound, and reversed the decree of the first court. That court in its judgment says :—“I think there is much force in the appellant's contention that the principles of estoppel and res judicata bar this objection, and that it does not now lie in the mouths of the respondents to say that these mortgage deeds cannot be attached in this decree ………. That court in its judgment says :—“I think there is much force in the appellant's contention that the principles of estoppel and res judicata bar this objection, and that it does not now lie in the mouths of the respondents to say that these mortgage deeds cannot be attached in this decree ………. The decree-holders attached these mortgage deeds in their decree, and, as remarked above, the respondents never raised any objection to their attachment, but on the contrary they applied to the court to fix instalments for payment of the decretal amount and not to sell the attached bonds in execution of the decree. The principles enunciated in the above quoted ruling clearly stand in the way and preclude them from raising the objection which might have been raised by them in the first instance. Following that authority I hold that their objection was barred by the principles of estoppel and res judicata.” The objectors come to this Court in second appeal, and it is argued by their learned vakil that the objection was not barred either by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel. In support of the contention that the objection is not barred by res judicata, reliance is placed upon Mohammad Ismail v. Wazir Ali, [1907] 4 A.L.J.R., 400. That ruling fully supports the learned vakil for the appellants. The matter in the present case had not been the subject of a former decision, and is not therefore barred by res judicata. The plea of res judicata has not been very seriously pressed by the learned vakil for the respondents. But he relying upon Coventry v. Tulshi Pershad Narain Singh, [1904] I.L.R., 31 Cal., 822, contends that the objectors are estopped from saying that the bonds are not liable to attachment and sale as the property of Musammat Radha. The plea of res judicata has not been very seriously pressed by the learned vakil for the respondents. But he relying upon Coventry v. Tulshi Pershad Narain Singh, [1904] I.L.R., 31 Cal., 822, contends that the objectors are estopped from saying that the bonds are not liable to attachment and sale as the property of Musammat Radha. From the facts of the Calcutta ruling it appears that the managing member of a family governed by the Mitakshara allowed execution to proceed actively for a year without the slightest objection, that he twice obtained stay of sale from the court on the plea that he would satisfy the decree, if time were allowed, that he paid the decree-holder a part of the debt and thus induced him to consent to time being granted, and that, under these circumstances, his representatives were estopped from averring that the decree was incapable of execution against them Girdhari Singh v. Hurdeo Narain Singh [1876] 3 I.A., 230, at p. 240, Bhola Nath Das v. Prafulla Nath Kunchru Choudhary, [1900] I.L.R. 28 Cal., 122, and Behari Lal v. Majid Ali, [1897] I.L.R., 24 All., 138, have also been cited by the learned vakil for the respondents. But in my opinion it is unnecessary to discuss those rulings. The learned vakil for the appellants distinguishes the Calcutta case from the case before me on the ground that in the present case time was only obtained for payment of the decretal money, and that the objectors did nothing to induce the decree-holders to believe that the mortgage bonds were the property of Musammat Radha. In my opinion the Calcutta case does not govern the case before me. There is nothing in the application of Behari Lal, dated 25th September, 1907, to work an estoppel against the objectors. Time only was granted to him and no order as to execution of the decree in favour of the decree-holders was passed. I, therefore, hold that the objectors are barred neither by the principle of res judicata nor by that of estoppel, from raising the objection, and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate court, send back the case to that court under Order 41, Rule 23, for disposal on the merits. Costs will abide the event.