JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff in an action in ejectment. The case for the Plaintiff is that the Defendants are trespassers and are consequently liable to be ejected. The claim is resisted on the ground that the Defendants have an occupancy tenancy in respect of the disputed land and are not liable to be ejected so long as that tenancy continues in operation. The Court of first instance negatived the defence and decreed the suit. Upon appeal the District Judge has reversed that decision. He has found upon the evidence that the second Defendant is an occupancy tenant of the land in suit and is therefore not liable to be ejected. 2. The Plaintiff has now appealed to this Court and on his behalf the decision of the District Judge has been assailed as erroneous in law because founded upon evidence not legally admissible against the Appellant. This evidence consists of recitals in four documents, namely, first, a deed of sale executed on the 15th January 1856 by the proprietor of the land towards the east of the disputed land in which he described the western boundary of his parcel as the tenanted land of the predecessor of the present second Defendant, Gopal Tewari : secondly, a mortgage deed executed on the 21st November 1892 in which the proprietor of the land towards the east and south of the disputed land described the western and northern boundaries of his parcel as the tenanted land of Gopal Tewari: thirdly, a conveyance executed on the 4th July 1903 by the proprietor of the land towards the north of the disputed land in which he described the southern boundary of his parcel as the tenanted land of Gopal Tewari: and, fourthly, a conveyance dated the 1st September 1862 which contains a similar recital. The District Judge has found that these documents are genuine and he has relied upon these statements in support of the allegation of the Defendants that Gopal Tewari was in possession of the disputed land as tenant in respect thereof from 1856 to 1903. On behalf of the Plaintiff it has been argued that he is not a party to any of these deeds and that consequently the statements in question are not admissible in evidence as against him. On behalf of the Defendants-Respondents reliance has been placed upon secs. 11, 13, 32, cl. On behalf of the Plaintiff it has been argued that he is not a party to any of these deeds and that consequently the statements in question are not admissible in evidence as against him. On behalf of the Defendants-Respondents reliance has been placed upon secs. 11, 13, 32, cl. (2) and 32, cl. (3) in support of contention that the statements in question are admissible in evidence. 3. In so far as sec. 11 is concerned, we are clearly of opinion that it does not assist the Respondents. Stress is laid mainly upon the second clause of sec. 11 which provides that facts not otherwise relevant are relevant if by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable. Now the fact that the proprietor of a neighbouring piece of land in describing the boundary of his parcel stated that the land of Gopal Tewari was situated on that boundary is not relevant for the purposes of the present litigation. The Respondents cannot succeed unless they get the statement itself admitted in evidence, the mere circumstance that the statement was made would not be sufficient for their purpose. Consequently sec. 11 of the Indian Evidence Act is of no avail to the Respondents. 4. In so far as sec. 13 is concerned the Respondents are in a similar difficulty. That section provides as follows : "Where the question is as to the existence of any right or custom, the following facts are relevant:-- (a) Any transaction by which the right or custom in question was created, claimed, modified, recognised, asserted or denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence: (b) Particular circumstances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognised, or exercised, or in which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from. 5. Here the transactions evidenced by the four deeds mentioned were in respect of lands other than the land now in dispute. Consequently it cannot be suggested that there was any transaction or particular instance by or in which the right now in question was claimed, recognised, asserted or denied. Sec. 13, therefore, is of no avail to the Respondents. 6. The Respondents finally fall back upon the provisions of sec. 32. Here reference is made in the alternative to cls. (2) and (3) Now cl. Sec. 13, therefore, is of no avail to the Respondents. 6. The Respondents finally fall back upon the provisions of sec. 32. Here reference is made in the alternative to cls. (2) and (3) Now cl. (2) provides that when a statement has been made by a person of the character described in the opening sentence of that section in the ordinary course of business it is admissible in evidence. It has been contended that when a vendor executes a deed of sale or a mortgagor executes a deed of mortgage he is bound to describe the boundaries of the land transferred and that consequently when he describes the boundaries he may be taken to have made a statement in the ordinary course of business. This interpretation of the expression "in the ordinary course of business" is however opposed to the decision of this Court in Sheonandan Singh v. Jeonandan Dusadh 13 C. W. N. 71 (1908), where the learned Judges followed the view accepted in the case of Ningawa v. Bharmappa I. L. R. 23 Bom. 63 (1897). As at present advised, we see no reason to dissent from the view adopted in the cases just mentioned. We must consequently hold that the statement in question does not fall within cl. (2) of sec. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. The question now arises whether cl. (3) is comprehensive enough to cover the present case. That clause provides that when a statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, it is admissible in evidence. It has been argued that this clause does not cover the statements in question, because they were made by persons who were in no way concerned with the land now in dispute and that consequently it was immaterial for those persons to know who was in occupation as tenant of the land stated to be lying on the boundary of the lands conveyed or mortgaged. In our opinion this contention is not well-founded. As pointed out by Sir Richard Couch in the case of Raja Leelanund Singh v. Lukhpattee Thakoorain 22 W. R. 231 (1974) the statement must be taken as a whole. In our opinion this contention is not well-founded. As pointed out by Sir Richard Couch in the case of Raja Leelanund Singh v. Lukhpattee Thakoorain 22 W. R. 231 (1974) the statement must be taken as a whole. Now the statement in these deeds that the transferrer was owner of the land conveyed or mortgaged and that he was either extinguishing his interest in the land by an absolute sale or placing a restriction or it by way of a mortgage, was undoubtedly one against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it. Consequently the statement as a whole would be admissible in evidence. This view is supported by the case of Ningawa v. Bharmappa I. L. R. 23 Bom. 63 (1897) which was accepted as good law in Haji Bibi v. Aga Khan 11 Bom. L. R. 409 (1908). The case of Abdul Aziz v. Ebrahim I. L. R. 31 Cal. 965 (1904) also points to the same conclusion, though the question there was simpler, because there the landlord of a property stated that there was a tenant in occupation of it, a statement clearly in derogation of his proprietary interest. We may add that the view we take may be supported from a somewhat different standpoint. When a person in the position of the vendor or the mortgagor in the deeds mentioned, transfers the property, and describes that the property conveyed or mortgaged is limited by certain boundaries he makes a statement as to the limited extent of that property. From this point of view it may fairly be contended that the statement is one against his proprietary interest because it is equivalent to an admission that his proprietary interest does not extend over any land outside the boundaries mentioned. In fact, to take a concrete illustration, in the event of a dispute between the transferee and the owner of the neighbouring land as to the boundaries between the two parcels, the statement made in the conveyance or the mortgage would be admissible in evidence as against the maker of it. From this point of view also, we think that the case is covered by cl. (c) of sec. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. We are of opinion therefore that the decree of the Court below cannot be assailed as erroneous in law. From this point of view also, we think that the case is covered by cl. (c) of sec. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. We are of opinion therefore that the decree of the Court below cannot be assailed as erroneous in law. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.