JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. 1. This is a second appeal by the defendants in a suit originally instituted in the court of an Assistant Collector, and by him decreed on February 2nd, 1910. The defendants, under a bona fide mistake as to the court to which an appeal lay, presented their appeal in the court of the Commissioner of the Division on March 30th, 1910. The appeal came up for hearing at Agra on May 10th, 1910, and the Commissioner returned the memorandum of appeal for presentation to the District Judge of Farrukhabad. The defendants actually presented the appeal before the said District Judge, sitting at Fatehgarh, on May 12th, 1910. The District Judge dismissed it as barred by limitation, refusing to exercise in favour of the appellants the discretion vested in him by section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. I should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of a lower appellate court in such a matter, vide Ranchodji v. Lallu, [1882] I.L.R., 6 Bom., 304 and Fatima Begam v. Hansi, [1887] I.L.R., 9 All., 244 also Parvati v. Ganpati Rokdari Naik, [1898] I.L.R., 23 Bom., 515. In this case, however, it seems to me that the learned District Judge acted on an unsound principle, and apparently on the strength of a misleading report. This report was to the effect that the appeal would have been in time if presented on May 11th, but was time-barred because presented a day later—is, because it had taken the appellants from the afternoon (or possibly from the evening) of May 10th to the morning of May 12th, to get proper legal advice as to their position and to bring the necessary papers from Agra to Fatehgarh. The District Judge accordingly called upon the appellants to prove by affidavit the reason alleged by them for their failure to present the appeal at Fatehgarh on May 11th. He dismissed the appeal because they proved unable to comply with this order. 2. Now the appeal, whether presented on May nth or on May 12th, was equally beyond time, and could be admitted only in virtue of the power conferred on the lower appellate court by section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In applying its judicial discretion to the facts of this particular case the court should have been guided by the principle laid down in section 14 of the same Act. In applying its judicial discretion to the facts of this particular case the court should have been guided by the principle laid down in section 14 of the same Act. That section, as it stands, relates to suits only; but it was not necessary to make it applicable to appeals because of the wider discretion already conferred on appellate courts by section 5. That the principle should be applied also to appeals was laid down by this Court in Balwant Singh v. Jamani Ram, [1883] I.L.R., 5 All., 591 which was approved in Ragunath Gopal v. Nilu Nathji, [1885] I.L.R., 9 Bom., 452 and in Ardha Chandra Rat Chowdhry v. Matangini Dassi, [1895] I.L.R., 23 Cal., 325. If, however, that principle be applied to the present case, it means that the court ought in equity to exclude the period, March 30th, to May 10th, 1910, both days inclusive, in computing the limitation period for the presentation of the appeal now in question; on this principle that appeal would be equally in time whether presented on May nth or on May 12th, 1910. I must not be misunderstood to say that the application of the principle involved in section 14 of Indian Limitation Act to this case was obligatory, or that it was anything but a matter of discretion with the lower appellate court, but I can see no adequate reason for the rigid limitation which the learned District Judge set to the exercise of that discretion when he took the view that he would have admitted the appeal without question on May nth, but must decline to do so when it was presented one day later. 3. I set aside the decree and order of the lower appellate court, and direct the District Judge to admit this appeal to his file of pending appeals and to dispose of it according to law. Costs here and hitherto will abide the event.