Judgement Consolidated appeals and cross-appeals from the decrees of the Judicial Commissioner (May 14, 1907) in part affirming and in part reversing decrees of the District Judge of Raipur (August 6, 1906). The questions decided were (a) whether certain clauses in the wajib-ul-arz, or administration paper, executed on August 6, 1903, by the plaintiffs in the various suits in compliance with the requirements of the Government of India were in derogation of the rights of the plaintiffs, ultra vires, and as such liable to be expunged ; (b) whether the resumption by the Government of the administration of the police, excise, and cattle pounds within the area of the said zamindaris of the plaintiffs was in derogation of their rights, and as such ultra vires and illegal; (c) whether the suits were maintainable against the Secretary of State in respect of the matters aforesaid or any of them. The plaintiffs were zamindars, proprietors of tracts of country, varying in extent, situate in the district of Raipur in the Central Provinces. By agreement between the parties, the decisions in suits Nos. 6 and 27 of 1904, instituted by the zamindar of Khariar, were to govern and decide all the remaining suits. The estates of the zamindars of Khariar (plaintiff in suits Nos. 6 and 27 of 1904 and 31 of 1905) and of Bindra Nawagurh (plaintiff in suit No. 40 of 1904) respectively were acquired by the East India Company by right of conquest. They were ceded by the Rajah of Nagpur, the then ruling chief with sovereign power over those tracts, to the East India Company by the treaty of December 1, 1826. The zamindaris of all the remaining plaintiffs were in Chattisgurh, another portion of the territories of the Rajah of Nagpur. This tract was by the same treaty placed under the management of the East India Company on behalf of the Rajah, was restored to him (1829— 1853), and thereafter with all the other territories of the Rajah lapsed to the British Crown and became incorporated in British territory. This tract was by the same treaty placed under the management of the East India Company on behalf of the Rajah, was restored to him (1829— 1853), and thereafter with all the other territories of the Rajah lapsed to the British Crown and became incorporated in British territory. From 1862 the affairs of these zamindars were managed by the Government of the Central Provinces, on whose report to the Government of India dated October 31, 1863, the Supreme Government ultimately decided that the zamindars plaintiffs in these suits ranked as ordinary British subjects to be treated as superior landlords, and not as feudatories whose powers and authority had never been distinctly recognized and defined, although they had been actually exercised. The plaintiffs rights were left to be defined by the Settlement Department. The Chanda patent dated January 11, 1868, a scheme of pro prietary and administrative rights, was sanctioned by the Government of India as a general model applicable to non-feudatory zamindars, including the plaintiffs. But in 1869 at the settlement of that date the usual wajib-ul-arz was not executed by the plaintiffs, so that the terms of the Chanda patent were in fact not applied to them. They were permitted to continue to exercise their judicial and administrative functions as before, but in various directions their powers had become altered and controlled, and amongst others in judicial matters. They had been appointed magistrates under Act XXV. of 1861, their jurisdiction was limited in consequence, their powers of passing sentences had been greatly reduced, and they were brought under the immediate control of the Government. On November 25, 1874, sanads recognizing the proprietary rights and ownership of the zamindar of Khariar and of the other plaintiffs in their zamindaris were granted to them by the Government. In 1892 the whole question of the administration by the non-feudatory chiefs in the Central Provinces of functions of government, such as police, excise, pounds, &c, was considered and reviewed by the Government of India with special reference to the terms of a new wajib-ul-arz which it was proposed to have executed by the zamindars. In 1892 the whole question of the administration by the non-feudatory chiefs in the Central Provinces of functions of government, such as police, excise, pounds, &c, was considered and reviewed by the Government of India with special reference to the terms of a new wajib-ul-arz which it was proposed to have executed by the zamindars. The Government considered that, though the exercise of such functions had been continued to those zamindars in 1868 merely on grounds of temporary expediency, but not recognized as an indefeasible attribute of their status, their long-continued exercise entitled the zamindars to consideration, and that nothing short of clear administrative necessity or the obligation to comply with the general law of the land would induce the Government to summarily abrogate their powers. As regards the administration therefore of excise (abkari), pounds, and ferries, the Government decided that the then irregular system could not be allowed to continue, and that it was desirable, when opportunity offered, that the Government should assume the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the non-feudatory zamindars with respect to the excise certainly, and perhaps in regard to ferries and pounds also. Later on it acted on this decision, as detailed in their Lordships judgment, and obtained the execution of a new form of wajib-ul-arz dated August 6, 1903, comprising various provisions sufficiently set out in their Lordships judgment against which the zamindars protested as being in derogation of their rights. By his first suit in 1904 (No. 6) the zamindar of Khariar sought a declaration that he was not bound thereby. By his second suit (27 of 1904) he claimed a declaration that the Secretary of States withdrawal of his police and excise rights had been illegal and improper, that the levy of the additional takoli was illegal, that he should be decreed to pay the amount of profit from the excise administration in the event of its being held that the plaintiff was not entitled to retain the excise monopoly, for costs and other relief. In the suits filed by the other zamindars all their respective claims regarding the terms of the wajib-ul-arz, the withdrawal of police and excise administration, and cattle pounds, were included in one plaint. In the suits filed by the other zamindars all their respective claims regarding the terms of the wajib-ul-arz, the withdrawal of police and excise administration, and cattle pounds, were included in one plaint. The Secretary of State in his answer to each suit denied that the plaintiff had any such status or rights as claimed, and pleaded that the exercise of the administrative functions had been at the will and pleasure of Government and liable to be resumed or withdrawn; that he was bound by the conditions and limitations contained in the Chanda patent, which were communicated to each zamindar and acknowledged as the conditions under which the estate was held. Further that the sanad of November 25, 1874, had reference to those conditions; that as regards the wajib-ul-arz of August 6, 1903, it was not repugnant to any rights of the plaintiff, that its terms were in accordance with the instructions of Government and were proper and justifiable, that the clauses objected to were correct and within the authority of Government to impose, and were justified inter alia by (1.) the terms of the Chanda patent and forms of wajib-ul-arz sanctioned and directed to be used by the Government; (2.) previous wajib-ul-arz executed by the zamindars; and (3.) the provisions of statutes passed from time to time and in force in the zamindaris, and rules made thereunder. Further that as regards the claim to recover the right to administer the police and excise functions, and to maintain cattle pounds within the limits of his zamindari, the withdrawal by the Government of all the above functions was within its powers and authority, or was proper and justifiable as being called for in the public interests; that the carrying on by the plaintiff at the dates of the said withdrawals of police and excise functions and the maintenance by him of cattle pounds were in contravention of laws then in force in the Central Provinces, were illegal, and constituted offences; that full and adequate compensationhad been offered by the defendant for the withdrawal of the sources of income from excise and cattle pounds; that the adequacy of the said compensation could not be questioned in this suit; that the additional takoli imposed in respect of police charges was proper and justifiable and its propriety could not be adjudicated upon in this suit; that no suit was maintainable against the defendant in respect of the matters alleged, and that the plaintiffs claim relating to police administration was barred by limitation. The District Judge in No. 6 of 1904 held that all the clauses in the wajib-ul-arz were binding on the plaintiff except clauses 3 and 7 of part I. and clause 2 of part II., which are set out in their Lordships judgment. He further in No. 27 of 1904 held that the exercise by the Raipur zamindars of police and excise functions was not by virtue of any right in them, but on sufferance of or by delegation from the sovereign power; that the act of resumption of such functions by the Government was in exercise of its sovereign powers ; that the suit was not maintainable; that the Court had no jurisdiction to question the validity of the assessment of the takoli under s. 151, clause 3, of the Land Revenue Act (XVIII. of 1881); and that the claim to the net profits of the excise administration was not maintainable. The Judicial Commissioner in No. 6 of 1904 allowed the zamindars appeal so far as it related to pounds in clause 6 of part I.; and allowed the appeal of the Secretary of State in regard to clause 7. of 1881); and that the claim to the net profits of the excise administration was not maintainable. The Judicial Commissioner in No. 6 of 1904 allowed the zamindars appeal so far as it related to pounds in clause 6 of part I.; and allowed the appeal of the Secretary of State in regard to clause 7. In No. 27 he decided that the Civil Courts were precluded by the provisions of the Land Revenue Act from considering the validity of the extra assessment for cost of police. But he held that the rights claimed by the plaintiff in regard to the. administration of police and excise had been validly granted to him and were incapable of resumption by executive act. He accordingly granted the declaration prayed for and directed the repayment to the plaintiff of the profits from excise for the year 1903— 1904. Upon the main question in the suits which related to the rights, privileges, and powers of the non-feudatory zamindars of Raipur within the ambits of their zamindaris the material portion of the District Judges judgment, approved by their Lordships, was as follows. He traced the history of these zamindars, who in pre-Maratha days were independent, afterwards subordinate to the most powerful of the neighbouring chiefs, the Maharajah of Patna, and then, in 1755, under the dominion of the Marathas as tributaries. Upon transfer to the British power in or about 1818 they were included first in the Chota-Nagpur division and later on in the Central Provinces, separate sanads being granted and separate engagements being taken from each zamindar, the latter binding him to the right administration of judicial powers entrusted to him. In 1864 the Government of India directed the Central Provinces Government to divide them into two classes—(1.) chiefs who merely rank as British subjects; (2.) chiefs who rank as feudatories. The plaintiffs were placed in the former class and thereby acquired the status of ordinary British subjects, in contrast to their earlier status of independent chiefs. In the next ten years ( 1864— 1874) they nevertheless enjoyed the privilege of managing the police and administering the excise of their zamindaris. The plaintiffs were placed in the former class and thereby acquired the status of ordinary British subjects, in contrast to their earlier status of independent chiefs. In the next ten years ( 1864— 1874) they nevertheless enjoyed the privilege of managing the police and administering the excise of their zamindaris. In 1868 the Government of India sanctioned certain conditions regulating the bestowal of pro prietary rights on the zamindars of Chanda, directed them to be taken as a general model to be applied to other zamindars, including the plaintiffs, but nevertheless granted to the plaintiffs in 1874 ordinary proprietary right sanads. In 1888 and 1892 the police administration of Khariar and Bindra Nawagurh and of the other zamindaris was taken away from the plaintiffs, and in 1894 they were deprived of excise administration ; certain terms of compensation being prescribed. With regard to the Chanda patent the District Judge held that the plaintiffs were not bound thereby; and consequently that clauses 3 and 7 of part I. which were drawn up in accordance therewith were not binding on the plaintiffs. He also held that part II., clause 2, did not bind them. With regard to all the other provisions he ruled in favour of the Secretary of State. As to minerals the sanad of 1874 was silent, and Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, s. 151, vested them in the Government. As to the suspension, appointment, and dismissal of kotwars the rules contained in Central Provinces Revenue Manual, vol. 1, p. 179, were authorized by s. 147 a of the said Be venue Act and were consistent with the rules prescribed by the wajib-ul-arz. Part II. (15.) was not new and could not be objected to. He held further that the Land Revenue Act applied to the plaintiffs, who could not object to any of its provisions as ultra vires. The fourteenth ground of appeal to the Judicial Commissioner having urged " that the lower Court erred in holding that the Land Revenue or indeed any other Act of the Indian Legislature could affect the pre-existing private rights of the plaintiff unless they are taken away by express words or necessary implication," the Judicial Commissioner said " The fourteenth ground seems to me to state what the law is without thereby furnishing much aid to the decision of the present dispute. If a particular right was expressly or impliedly granted by the British Government to the zamindar, it certainly could not be taken away otherwise than by legislation or by agreement. And it is a rule of interpretation that when an enactment changes or takes away rights it is not to be construed as affecting existing rights, unless there are express words to that effect Doolubdass v. Ramloll ((I860) 5 Moo. Ind. Ap. 109, at p. 126); Papa Sastrial v. Anuntarama(( 1880) I. L. R. 3 Madr. 98, at p. 101,); Javanmal v. Muktabai. (( 1890) I. L. R. 14 Bomb. 516, at. p. 525.) See also Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 4th ed., p. 427. But in respect of each right in dispute the question will be, has there been an express or implied grant ? And in answering this the Court will have to bear in mind that the British Government is not to be necessarily regarded as having maintained the zamindar, after cession of his territory in 1826, in the enjoyment of all the rights allowed him by the Marathas Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee (( 1859) 7 Moo. Ind. Ap. 470,); Cook v. Sprigg. ([ 1899] A. C. 572.) In dealing with the rest of the plaintiffs appeal I will assume— for a reason already stated—that the Chief Commissioner was competent to order insertion in the wajib-ul-arz of all the clauses to which the plaintiff objects, subject, however, to the power of the Civil Court to cancel or amend any entry under s. 83 of the Land Revenue Act Then with regard to ferries and pounds the judgment later on proceeded " The Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, came into force in the Central Provinces on April 1, 1879 s. 4 (b) expressly empowers the local government to take possession of any private ferry, and s. 5 requires compensation to be paid. Assuming that all ferries in Khariar were private ferries in 1903 and that they belonged to the zamindar, his rights may under this express provision be taken away, and so far as clause 6, part L, of the wajib-ul-arz contemplates this and the grant of reasonable compensation I hold that the clause cannot be interfered with. With regard to cattle pounds the position is to my mind appreciably different. Act I. of 1871 followed and repealed Act III. With regard to cattle pounds the position is to my mind appreciably different. Act I. of 1871 followed and repealed Act III. of 1857 in pari materia; yet we find that the modified patent approved in 1874 (August 10) for the Raipur zamindars allowed them to levy pound fees under the rules obtaining in the khalsa tracts, while it is nowhere suggested that the pounds in the zamindaris were established as required by the later Act (s. 4). Clearly therefore the pounds in Khariar were both established and managed by the zamindar. The Act does not expressly provide for confiscating private rights, nor does it lay down that there shall be no pounds save those established by the district magistrate. In the face of these facts I am unable to see how the action of the Government in 1874 is explicable except as a recognition of rights vested in the zamindar. To say that the zamindari is a rugged and remote tract where it would have been difficult for the district magistrate to make and enforce such arrangements as are contemplated by ss. 4, 5, and 6 of the Act is to furnish a reason for allowing the zamindar to take the district magistrates place, not to shew that this course was the outcome of something other than an admission that the zamindar had a right to occupy that position. Not till 1892 were any steps taken indicative of a denial that the Khariar pounds had been placed permanently under the zamindar, and even then the denial took the shape of a clause in a wajib-ul-arz which the zamindar has not at any time accepted as binding upon him. I hold that there was an implied grant to the zamindar of the right to manage the pounds established by him and to receive the fees therefrom and that there is nothing in the Cattle Trespass Act to affect that grant. The words and pounds will accordingly be deleted from clause 6 of the wajib-ul-arz as prayed." With regard to police and excise administration the Judicial Commissioner held that the plaintiff was not bound by any term of the Chanda patent. "What he got in 1874 was a recognition or conferral—for present purposes it matters not which—of pro prietary right. The words and pounds will accordingly be deleted from clause 6 of the wajib-ul-arz as prayed." With regard to police and excise administration the Judicial Commissioner held that the plaintiff was not bound by any term of the Chanda patent. "What he got in 1874 was a recognition or conferral—for present purposes it matters not which—of pro prietary right. The devolution of that right would—in the absence of stipulation to the contrary—be governed by the ordinary law and the Government cannot legally alter that without express legislation. If the Government could alter the terms of its grant at pleasure it could also revoke the grant likewise. To a gift divesting a private donor of all his interest in certain property a condition cannot afterwards be attached Hussain Khan v. Nateri Srinivasa (( 1871) 6 Madr. H. C. R. 356.); Ram Sarup v. Bela. (( 1883) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 45.) And Government cannot, by issuing a subsequent proclamation, resume a grant made by a previous proclamation, inasmuch as it cannot, any more than a private person, without the consent of the donee, revoke a gift actually made Collector of Ratnagiri v. Vyankatrav. (( 1871) 8 Bomb. H. C. R. (A. C.) 1.) It follows that the lower Court has rightly deleted clause 3 from part I. of the wajib-ul-arz to depose a zamindar, would obviously be to derogate from the original grant to his predecessor." In the Secretary of States cross-appeal in reference to his withdrawal of police and excise rights the Judicial Commissioner found in No. 27 of 1904 that the powers in question had been granted to the plaintiff and ruled " that in 1892 and 1894 when Government resumed the police and excise rights respectively the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his own police and to administer excise in his zamindari and that he is still entitled so to do. The material passage of his judgment is as follows " I may say at once that in my opinion the defendant cannotch— if there was an express or implied grant of the powers in dispute—set up the defence of act of State. It seems to me that given such a grant the case is governed by the principle explained in Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1872) L. R. Ind. Ap. (Supp. It seems to me that given such a grant the case is governed by the principle explained in Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1872) L. R. Ind. Ap. (Supp. Vol.) 10.) There a claim in respect of lands seized by the Indian Government on the death of the Begum Samroo was held to be within the jurisdiction of the Courts on the ground that the Begum was not a sovereign princess, but a British subject holding lands in British India under a legal tenure. I would distinguish cases like Grant v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1877) 46 L. J. (C.P.) 681.), Shenton V. Smith ([ 1895] A. C. 220.), and Voss v. Secretary of State for India (( 1906) I. L. R. 33Calc. 669.) on the ground that in all the decision turns upon the rule that except where otherwise expressly provided servants of the Crown hold office during the pleasure of the Crown, and this not by virtue of any special prerogative of the Crown, but because such are the terms of each officers engagement. In the present case, as in Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1), the rugged and remote condition of Khariar may have been the reason why the Government resumed police and excise administration by a political act. The same condition is doubtless an explanation also of the line taken by Government in 1826 onwards. But this condition alone is certainly not sufficient to shew that there was no grant of the powers in dispute. In this connection the following remarks of the Lord Chancellor in Foresters Case (1) seem apposite — These considerations (including the abnormal condition of the territory in dispute), though they may explain much of what, appears from the record to have taken place, cannot affect the determination of the question under considera tion. They cannot alter the legal nature of the acts of Government, or make the resumption, under the assertion of a legal title, of lands claimed adversely by a subject, an arbitrary act of sovereign power against an independent State. They cannot alter the legal nature of the acts of Government, or make the resumption, under the assertion of a legal title, of lands claimed adversely by a subject, an arbitrary act of sovereign power against an independent State. And even if the state of the law in the territories in question at the time when the act of resumption took place gave—as perhaps it did— a larger power of resumption to the East India Company than it possessed in the regulation provinces, that circumstance would not exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts. " Sir R. Finlay, K.C., De Gruyther, K.C., and H. S. Gour, for the zamindars whether appellants or respondents, contended that the evidence shewed that from time immemorial they had possessed certain rights and privileges which entitled them to administer police and excise within the ambits of their zamindaris. Those rights existed antecedently to British annexation and were afterwards recognized and confirmed, first by the East India Company and then by the British Government. The Settlement Officer was not shewn to possess any jurisdiction which empowered him to alter or modify those rights and privileges so long acquiesced in or to affect the position and status of the appellants. The grant of proprietary rights at the first regular settlement was in recognition of previously existing rights and was not intended to alter or modify them. Under Act XVIII. of 1881, ss. 77, 78, and 79, he had power to make a record of rights, but not to alter or vary them. The findings or rulings of the Courts below so far as they were against the appellants proceeded on the footing that there was a power to legislate which had been exercised in a manner binding upon them. They relied upon the sanad of November 25, 1874, and the wajib-ul-arz of 1892, and contended that the various amendments and alterations introduced into the settlement paper of 1903 to their prejudice were illegal and ultra vires of the Settlement Officer and were not justified by any existing Acts of the Legislature. So far as the Government relied on the Chanda patent its provisions were shewn to have never been communicated to the appellants, who were entitled to assume that their sanads were intended to operate as grants of the rights in question. So far as the Government relied on the Chanda patent its provisions were shewn to have never been communicated to the appellants, who were entitled to assume that their sanads were intended to operate as grants of the rights in question. They referred to 3 Aitchisons Treaties, p. 91; Nicholls Special and Local Law of the Central Provinces (ed. 1874, Nagpur), pp. 1, 5, s. 20, and pp. 13, 30, 42, 43, to and 442 ; to extracts from a report on the zamindaris and other petty chieftaincies in the Central Provinces in 1863 by Sir R. Temple, contained in a letter to the Government of India from the Government of the Central Provinces dated October 81, 1868; Colonel Durands letter in reply; and the Orders of the Government of India dated April 3, 1865, classifying the plaintiffs as ordinary British subjects. The following Acts were referred to—Central Provinces Land Revenue Act XVIII. of 1881, ss. 68, 73, 74, 76, 77, and 78; the Amending Act XVI. of 1889; and the Scheduled Districts Act XIV. of 1874. As to the various clauses objected to of the wajib-ul-arz of August 6, 1903, other than police and excise, reference was made to Northern India Ferries Act (XVII. of 1878); the Cattle Trespass Act (I. of 1871), s. 18; Act I. of 1883, s. 23. Act XVIII. of 1881, s. 124, was referred to as to minerals, and s. 151; and s. 147a in the amending Act as to the appointment, suspension, and removal of kotwars. SIR ERLE RICHARDS, K.C., and Dunne, for the respondent. The Secretary of State contended that the terms and conditions imposed by the wajib-ul-arz of August 6, 1903, were within the powers and the authority of the Government to impose and were not in derogation of the rights of the zamindars. If these latter were set up as sovereign or quasi-sovereign rights, then the act of the Secretary of State abolishing them was an act of State and could not be questioned in Courts of law. If they relied on their sanads, those grants were not in recognition of pre-existing rights, but they were new grants and must be recognized as the source of the zamindars existing powers. If they relied on their sanads, those grants were not in recognition of pre-existing rights, but they were new grants and must be recognized as the source of the zamindars existing powers. Those grants must under all the circumstances be construed in reference to the terms and conditions specified in the Chanda patent and were not intended as indefeasible grants of the rights in question. The resumption and withdrawal of the administration of the police, excise, and cattle pounds were matters within the power and authority of the Government, and they together with the other provisions of the wajib-ul-arz were, it was contended in detail, in accordance with the Acts relating to those subjects. The appellants had failed to shew that administrative powers of police and excise could be the subject of a grant by Government to an ordinary subject, and also failed to shew that those powers had been either actually or impliedly granted. The question of the amount of compensation offered to them for the loss of their revenue consequent upon the action of the Government was not one which could be entertained by the Courts. It was contended that the suits were not maintainable. De Gruyther, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. These are consolidated appeals and cross-appeals from judgments and decrees of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces in part affirming, in part varying, and in part reversing judgments and decrees of the District Judge of Raipur. The zamindar of Khariar in the district of Raipur, and other zamindars in that district, proprietors of estates varying in extent and importance, have sued the Secretary of State for India in Council, complaining that they have been illegally deprived of rights to which they were indefeasibly entitled from time immemorial, and that by the requirement of Government officials they have been compelled to execute wajib-ul-arz or administration papers containing provisions in derogation of their undoubted privileges. Their contention is that the provisions of which they complain are illegal and ought to be expunged or annulled, and that the rights of which as they allege they have been improperly deprived ought to be restored by the Civil Court. It was agreed between the parties to this group of litigation that decisions in the suit brought by the zamindar of Khariar should govern all the rest of the cases. It was agreed between the parties to this group of litigation that decisions in the suit brought by the zamindar of Khariar should govern all the rest of the cases. The status of the zamindar of Khariar and the plaintiffs in the other suits is simply the status of an ordinary British subject. That matter was determined by the Government in 1864 after an exhaustive inquiry into the position of the petty chiefs of the Central Provinces. A few were recognized as feudatories having some of the attributes of sovereignty. The rest were classed as non-feudatories and declared to be ordinary British subjects. Before these petty chiefs came under British rule they held their possessions at the will and pleasure of the ruler for the time being in power. When their country became British territory, whether by conquest and cession as in the case of Khariar and in the case of Bindra Nawagurh in Chattisgurh, or by lapse as in the case of the other zamindars of Chattisgurh, they were left much in the position they occupied before. The district was wild and for the most part uncultivated, thinly populated, and very difficult of access. They paid to the paramount Government the tribute they had been in the habit of paying to their native rulers, reduced in some cases on account of the poverty of the district. They managed their estates as best they could, binding themselves to use rightly the judicial and administrative powers entrusted to them or left in their hands as a matter of. convenience or economy of administration. In no case were they recognized as entitled to independent power or as possessing any sovereign rights. In 1867 the Government determined to confer upon the non-feudatory zamindars in an adjoining district known as the Chanda district proprietary rights in the soil on certain terms and conditions which were embodied in a document referred to in these proceedings as the Chanda patent. It was the intention of the Government at that time that sanads should be granted to other non-feudatory zamindars in the Central Provinces, including the Raipur zamindars, framed on the model of the Chanda patent, with such variations as the circumstances of the case might require. It was the intention of the Government at that time that sanads should be granted to other non-feudatory zamindars in the Central Provinces, including the Raipur zamindars, framed on the model of the Chanda patent, with such variations as the circumstances of the case might require. However, it seems that when sanads were issued to the Raipur zamindars in the year 1874 the matter was overlooked or forgotten, and proprietary rights in the soil were vested in them, expressed in the sanad to be " subject to the payment of such land revenue and other cesses as may from time to time be assessed according to the terms of settlement and to the conditions specified in the administration paper and other settlement, records." In point of fact these sanads were not accompanied by any administration papers or any other record. This mistake or omission has given rise to much argument. The Government contended that the plaintiffs had recognized and were bound by the terms of the Chanda patent. The plain-jiffs, while relying on the terms of the Chanda patent which were to their advantage, maintained that the terms of the Chanda patent in their entirety, and so far as they tended to their disadvantage, were not binding upon them. In the result both Courts below have held that the Chanda patent is not to be treated as embodied in or affecting the sanads granted to the Raipur zamindars. In this conclusion their Lordships agree. For the purposes of these cases they think that the Chanda patent may be disregarded. In 1888 the Government decided that police administration in the non-feudatory zamindaris in the Chattisgurh division, including those belonging to the plaintiffs other than the zamindars of Khariar and Bindra Nawagurh, should be withdrawn from the zamindars, and that an addition should be made to the takoli or revenue payable by the zamindar when thus relieved of police duties. In March, 1891, the zamindar of Khariar accepted a fresh assessment of the takoli or revenue payable by him to Government under s. 54 of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act (XVIII. of 1881) for eleven years from July 1, 1890, to June 30, 1901, or until a fresh settlement should be made. He then agreed to be bound by all the conditions Laid down in the wajib-ul-arz of his zamindari and duly executed that document. of 1881) for eleven years from July 1, 1890, to June 30, 1901, or until a fresh settlement should be made. He then agreed to be bound by all the conditions Laid down in the wajib-ul-arz of his zamindari and duly executed that document. In September, 1892, the police administration of the zamindaris of Khariar and Bindra Nawagurh was assumed by the Government, and on that account an addition was made to the takolis of the two zamindaris. In November, 1892, a new form of wajib-ul-arz applicable to the case of the non-feudatory zamindars was approved by the Government. It was not, however, brought into use until some years later. In 1893 the Chief Commissioner, with the sanction of the Government, determined to assume the administration of excise. At the same time it was proposed to pay compensation for loss of income and for the present to farm out to the zamindars the excise administration, the takolis to run with their land settlements. Some of the zamindars accepted compensation and took farms of the excise. Some, including the zamindar of Khariar and others of the plaintiffs, refused both offers. In May, 1903, the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces decided to assume the administration of cattle pounds in the case of the non-feudatory zamindars in the Chattisgurh division, including the plaintiffs, paying compensation for the withdrawal of this source of revenue. In 1903, in connection with the new assessment, the non-feudatory zamindars in the Chattisgurh division, including the plaintiffs, were required to execute wajib-ul-arz in the form sanctioned by Government in November. 1892, with some further amendments. The proposed wajib-ul-arz was executed by the zamindar of Khariar and the other plaintiffs in compliance with the require ment of the Government. It was, however, executed under protest. It bears date August 6, 1903. After an ineffectual appeal to Government this litigation was commenced. The principal ground of complaint relates to the withdrawal of police and excise administration. That head of complaint in the case of the zamindar of Khariar is the subject of suit No. 27 of 1904. The withdrawal of cattle pounds is the subject of complaint in suit No. 31 of 1905. The clauses in the wajib-ul-arz of August 6, 1903, to which objection is taken are the subject of suit No. 6 of 1904. One of those clauses deals with cattle pounds. The withdrawal of cattle pounds is the subject of complaint in suit No. 31 of 1905. The clauses in the wajib-ul-arz of August 6, 1903, to which objection is taken are the subject of suit No. 6 of 1904. One of those clauses deals with cattle pounds. Suits No. 6 of 1904 and No. 27 of 1904 were heard together. It was agreed that the decision in those suits should govern the decision in suit No. 31 of 1905. On August 6, 1906, the District Judge delivered separate judgments and made separate decrees in the three suits. In suit No. 27 of 1904, the District Judge held that the Raipur zamindars in exercising police and excise functions were not acting as of right, but were so acting either by sufferance, or by delegation, and that the resumption of those functions by the Government was a thing done by the Government in exercise of its sovereign powers, and consequently that the suit was not maintainable. On appeal the Judicial Commissioner held that powers of administration in respect of police and excise must be deemed to have been granted to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his own police and administer excise in his zamindari. On this question their Lordships agree with the view of the District Judge. The District Judge dismissed suit 31 of 1905. The Judicial Commissioner reversed his judgment and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff. In suit No. 6 of 1904, which relates to the wajib-ul-arz of August 6, 1903, the following are the clauses objected to — In part I. " 3. Removal of zamindar and forfeiture of privileges. " 6. Resumption and management of ferries and pounds. " 7. Provision that forest mahals shall be managed in accordance with rules framed by the Chief Commissioner under section 124a Land Revenue Act. " 10. Declaration that all minerals are the property of Government." In part II. " 2. Discontinuance of nazarana on grant or renewal of leases. " 7. Appointment, suspension, and removal of kotwars (village watchmen) to be governed by rules framed under section 147a Land Revenue Act. " 11.—(1.) Forest lands not included in forest mahals to be managed in accordance with any rules made by the Chief Commissioner. " 15. " 2. Discontinuance of nazarana on grant or renewal of leases. " 7. Appointment, suspension, and removal of kotwars (village watchmen) to be governed by rules framed under section 147a Land Revenue Act. " 11.—(1.) Forest lands not included in forest mahals to be managed in accordance with any rules made by the Chief Commissioner. " 15. Hides and carcases of dead cattle to be the property of the owners of the cattle." The District Judge was in favour of the Government on all these questions except part L, No. 3 and No. 7, and part II., No. 2, On appeal to the Judicial Commissioner the decree was varied by adding a direction that the words " and pounds " be deleted from clause 6, part I., and by substituting the words and figures " clause 3 of part I." for the words and figures " clauses 3 and 7 of part I." On appeal to this Board the objection to part II., No. 15, was not pressed. The case was very fully and ably argued ; but after carefully considering the arguments adduced, the wajib-ul-arz of 1892, and the Acts of the Legislature to which attention was called, their Lordships are of opinion that there is no ground for disturbing the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner in suit 6 of 1904 except as regards cattle pounds. Their Lordships are disposed to think that the maintenance of private cattle pounds is incompatible with the provisions of the Cattle Trespass Act, and they are of opinion that under the circumstances the establishment and maintenance of cattle pounds under the superintendence and control of Government officials empowered to obtain the assistance of the police when required may be considered essential for the maintenance of law and order, and the peace and good government of the country, and therefore an act of the Executive Government with which it is not competent for the Civil Court to interfere. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that in suits 27 of 1904 and 81 of 1905 the decrees of the Judicial Commissioner should be discharged, and the decrees of the District Judge restored, but without costs; and that in suit No. 6 of 1904 the decree of the Judicial Commissioner should be varied by omitting the words " and pounds." Their Lordships do not think fit to make any order as to costs.