JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. In this case the plaintiff sued for recovery of possession in respect of a certain plot of land and for damages. The first court decreed the claim for possession and half the claim for damages. On first appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Banda has found against the plaintiff on the facts and has dismissed the suit altogether. The point taken in second appeal is that the claim for possession was brought expressly under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, that no appeal lies from a decree under that section, and that the lower appellate court, though competent to set aside the decree for damages, could not interfere with decree for possession. These pleas are supported by the authority of a decision of this Court in Ram Harakh Rai v. Sheodihal Joti[1893] I.L.R., 15 All., 384, and it cannot be denied that if that decision is sound law and I am bound to follow it, the present appeal must be decreed to the extent involved in the plea set forth above. ‘If I thought it necessary to the determination of this appeal, I should feel bound to discuss the question of the change in the law manifested by a comparison between the wording of section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act V of 1908, and that of section 540 of the former Code of 1882. An appeal now lies from “every decree” (save where otherwise expressly provided), and not from “the decrees or from any part of the decrees”; the question is whether under the law as it now stands, it is possible to hold that a single decree can be broken up into two parts against one of which an appeal lies but not against the other. 2. Apart from this, however, I think this appeal fails with reference to the particular questions involved. 3. In Sheo Kumar v. Narain Das, [1902] I.L.R., 24 All., 501, this Court held that a claim for damages ought not to be joined with a claim for recovery of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the point being that the claim for damages necessarily puts in issue the plaintiff's title. 3. In Sheo Kumar v. Narain Das, [1902] I.L.R., 24 All., 501, this Court held that a claim for damages ought not to be joined with a claim for recovery of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the point being that the claim for damages necessarily puts in issue the plaintiff's title. In Lachman v. Shambhu Narain,[1910] 7 A.L.J.R., 1078, a Full Bench of this Court reconsidered the older decision in Ram Harakh Rai v. Sheodihal Joti, and, so dissented from it that I think it can no longer be treated as an authority on any point. Reference was also made to a Madras case, Ramasami Chetti v. Paraman Chetti,[1901] I.L.R., 25 Mad., 448, the principles involved in which seem to me very much against the present appellant curiously enough, the reported case most directly in point is one which, to some extent, cuts both ways. In Tilak Chandra Das v. Fatik Chandra Das,[1898] I.L.R., 25 Cal., 803, the first court had decreed a suit precisely like the present one for recovery of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and for damages. The Calcutta High Court took up the case in revision, and it is certainly arguable that this implies an opinion that an appeal could not have been brought, at any rate against the whole decree. On the other hand, the learned Judges were quite clear that the whole suit as brought was bad, because damages could not be claimed in a suit for recovery of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. They set aside the entire decree and ordered that if the plaintiff elected to proceed with the suit as brought, he should be put to proof of his title, suggesting at the same time that the plaintiff might perhaps be allowed to sue for recovery of possession only upon an amended plaint. 4. Now, in the present case the plaintiff pleaded his title in first paragraph of his plaint, and he put his title in issue by claiming damages. The cases above cited are clear authority for the proposition that no decree for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act could legally be given on the plaint as brought. According to the Calcutta case the first court was bound either to put the plaintiff to proof of his title, or to return the plaint for amendment. The cases above cited are clear authority for the proposition that no decree for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act could legally be given on the plaint as brought. According to the Calcutta case the first court was bound either to put the plaintiff to proof of his title, or to return the plaint for amendment. The decree as passed says nothing about section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, but simply decrees the plaintiff's possession and damages. It is quite true that a consideration of the judgment shows that the learned Munsif conceived himself to be dealing with a claim for recovery of possession under the Specific Relief Act, and intended to decree the claim on that basis. The fact remains that a decree for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and for damages is a bad decree, one liable to be set aside altogether and not capable of being split up in two portions—(a) a valid decree for possession as above, and (b) a bad decree for damages. For all these reasons I hold that the learned Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as it stood, as an appeal against the entire decree, and that his order dismissing the suit was right and not liable to interference on second appeal. I dismiss this appeal with costs.